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: Postmetaphysics

Postmetaphysics

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I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

With a grateful heart I gladly thank the Almighty God for his constant guidance and enlight-enment in order to find meaning, strength and enthusiasm in this project. I am ever thankful to my loving parents who gave me the first chance of education, the best schooling available and constant support of love and encouragement during these years of my doctoral research away from my homeland, together with other members of family. This was further nourished and encouraged by the Order of Friars Minor Capuchins, Marymatha Province, India, who gave me the opportunity and opened the doors, in order to take up this doctoral project. Sim-ilarly, my gratitude goes to the Friars Minor Capuchins of the German Province, especially the Capuchin Fraternity at Münster for being my family here in Germany that cared for me, protected me and supported me in all the ways possible. In addition, I thank the German Agency, ‘Kirche in Not’ for having been an important financial support in the initial stages of my doctoral programme.

The most important and the central part of my research programme is the scientific support, which I would like to acknowledge. I would not have reached today this stage without my Dok-torvater, Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Schmidt, Professor for Religionsphilosophie, Katholisch-The-ologische Fakultät, Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt a. M. His timely acceptance of my doctor-al project, his tremendous competence as ‘ direkt Schüler ’ of Jürgen Habermas, his ability to read my thoughts and understand my thesis, have been the most important motivating factors to work on my project. He could surmount the cultural specificity of scientific methodology, which created a bridge to both of us to complete this project. He has also been an important instrument in supporting my project and for the acceptance of the same at Katholisch-Theolo-gischen Fakultät, Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt a. M. I also thank the Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät and its members for considering my project and accepting me as doctoral student. I thank wholeheartedly Prof. Dr. Dr. habil. Klaus Müller, Philosophische Grundfragen der The-ologie, Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster, who helped me initially in choosing my theme and for an intensive follow-up of my project by being my first Doktorvater up until he unfortunately met with an accident. His constant support in choosing and suggesting the required literature for my thesis has indeed lightened my diffi-culties at a foreign University. The basic difficulties of comprehending a German philosopher Jürgen Habermas in the German language was supported by Prof. Emeritus Frau Dr. Edel-traud Bülow, Institut für Sprachwissenschaft, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität-Münster, for

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which I am immensely grateful. In a moment of uncertainty when my first Doktorvater met with an accident, Prof. Dr. Norbert Hintersteiner, Institute of Missiology and the Study of Theologies Beyond Europe, Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Westfälische Wilhelms-Uni-versität-Münster became a beacon of light so that I might not lose my direction. I am indeed grateful to him for taking up this role to guide me further both scientifically and also to find a new Doktorvater.

Added to the above-mentioned important personalities, I could not have presented the thesis in this given period without the help of the following persons, whom I would like to gratefully acknowledge and thank. Fr. Henry OSB M.A., S.T.L., L.S.S., Ampleforth Benedictine Abbey, York, U.K., Emeritus Member of the Faculty of Theology, Oxford University and the General Editor of The New Jerusalem Bible, has offered his precious time in correcting and giving suggestions with regard to English and a certain conceptual clarity. Fr. Prof. Dr. Emeritus Leonhard Lehmann OFM Cap., Pontificia Università Antonianum, Rome, in his competence in guiding many foreign students in Rome, has gladly gone through my paper. His contri-bution has been of importance owing to his proof reading of the whole paper from various perspectives. Fr. Paul Colemann, former Provincial Minister of the English Capuchins, U.K. had initially spared his time to go through my paper and made valuable suggestions and cor-rections. Fr. Dr. Stefan Walser OFM Cap. Junior Professor, Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Universität Bonn, too has been a friendly and fraternal support, who gave timely feedback regarding the presentation of my paper.

There have been a number of people in Germany, Switzerland and Italy added to my home-land India, whom I have encountered during these years of my doctoral studies. They have been a great support in many different important ways in order to realize this doctoral project. I am indeed deeply grateful to them.

Anil Babu Suthi

Friar Minor Capuchin

25.01.21

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II ABSTRACT

The terms “postmetaphysics”, “religion” and “public sphere” in the title suggest that my thesis places the emphasis on a study that revolves around the performance of religion in the public sphere, thereby implying a socio-philosophical discourse of religion. This study is based on Jürgen Habermas’ postmetaphysical philosophy about religion, paradigmatically expressed through the Essay, Religion in Public Sphere , in response to postsecular societies as well as their reception and rejection of religion. The primary questions functioning as points of orientation towards my work are premised on the problematisation of the mode of the functionality of religion within the public sphere, predominantly in India. Therefore, this research serves to ex-pose fundamentalist and non-reflective forms of religious problems in a society founded on the misunderstanding or irrational application of religious traditions. Consequently, it viscerally indicates that the Indian society has gradually distanced itself from a rational understanding and living of religion.

In response to the aforementioned phenomenon, the Habermasian postmetaphysical phi-losophy serves as a bedrock upon which I could construct my thesis by employing the work-ing methodology known as rational reconstruction. This methodology primarily necessitated conducting an analytical and historical study of society and the public sphere provided by Habermas, with a parallel positioning of the Indian context. This included the first premise, the functionality of religion within the public sphere. By tracing its sociological origins, the ba-sic claim that religion in its primary appearance is inextricably interlaced with society has been proved based on the discourse provided by Émile Durkheim. Obviously, that would not suffice to support my claim of rationality that could potentially be ascribed to religion. Consequently, a reconstruction of rational traditions supplemented my thesis via a detailed investigation into India’s socio-philosophical religious traditions, namely, the Cognitive Upanishadic Traditions. This approach is buttressed by an extensive analysis that exposes various rational traditions of religion, based on the methodological approach provided by theories of the Revolutionary Re-ligious Movements, the Axial Age, the Prophetic Disenchantment and Secularism, whose aim was to initiate a discourse that paved the way to reformative, authentic and rational religion. The logicality provided by these analyses through the help of Hans Joas and Charles Taylor, which underpins the similitude between the various developments in the religious sphere and the postmetaphysical approach to religion in the public sphere. It is in this manner that both Glauben and Wissen accommodate each other in finding a common ground or genealogy. The

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visibility of their results is expressed by making clear and distinct societal changes in a sphere where the performative role assumed by religions goes beyond the private sphere. This analysis is grounded in the exposition of postmetaphysical philosophy. The postmetaphysical meth-odology thus demonstrates that it does not position itself against religion. On the contrary, it not only presents various arguments to recognise the constructive, rational and positive character of religion but also urges the secular societies not to alienate religion by categorizing it as an irrational element. Furthermore, the possibility of translation of religious semantics to advance secular purposes has been further expounded on through the Habermasian discourse of Kantian philosophy of religion.

Therefore, the results emerging through the above-mentioned analysis paved the way to fur-ther ascertain the availability of similar occurrences in the Indian context and sphere. This en-abled a potential dialogue between the Habermasian provision of postmetaphysical philosophy and the religious in India. Subsequently, it was revealed that postmetaphysical approaches are apparently not alien to the Indian society. Nonetheless, the salient objective was to determine approaches and methodologies, which are either ignored or have disappeared. As a result, it was deemed quite fitting to discover this postmetaphysical methodology – which has thus far been worked out in a western context by Habermas – within the Indian context. Accordingly, it facilitated a transparent and unambiguous contextual understanding and functioning of postmetaphysical methodology.

After having various sources and analyses at our disposal, this thesis sheds important light on the originality of religion which possesses profound rational traditions and its concomitant sociological meaning. Finally, towards the end of my research, various postmetaphysical pro-posals are provided to the Indian religious, who become the primary agents in undertaking a self-critique of religion. The functionality of these proposals is realised by the application of the regained sources in order to respond to the problem of irrational and non-reflective religion in the public sphere, which becomes the summum bonum of postmetaphysical philosophy.

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II ABSTRAKT

Die Begriffe „Postmetaphysik“, „Religion“ und „Öffentlichkeit“ im Titel deuten darauf hin, dass meine Arbeit den Schwerpunkt auf eine Studie legt, die sich um die Performanz von Reli-gion im öffentlichen Raum dreht und damit einen sozialphilosophischen Diskurs über Religion impliziert. Diese Studie basiert auf der nachmetaphysischen Religionsphilosophie von Jürgen Habermas, die paradigmatisch in dem Aufsatz ‚Religion in der Öffentlichkeit‘ zum Ausdruck kommt, als Antwort auf postsäkulare Gesellschaften sowie deren erfolgter Rezeption wie auch Ablehnung von Religion. Die Leitfragen, die meine Arbeit prägen, sind die Problematisierung der Funktion von Religion im öffentlichen Raum, insbesondere in Indien. Daher dient diese Untersuchung dazu, fundamentalistische und unreflektierte Formen religiöser Probleme in einer Gesellschaft aufzudecken, die auf dem Missverständnis oder der irrationalen Anwend-ung religiöser Traditionen beruht. Infolgedessen wird deutlich, dass sich die indische Ge-sellschaft allmählich von einem rationalen Verständnis und Leben der Religion entfernt hat.

Angesichts des oben geschilderten Phänomens diente die nachmetaphysische Philosophie von Habermas als Grundlage, auf der ich meine These aufbauen konnte. Dabei verwendete ich die Arbeitsmethodik der so genannten rationalen Rekonstruktion. Diese Methodik erforderte in erster Linie eine analytische und historische Untersuchung der Gesellschaft und der öffen-tlichen Sphäre, wie sie von Habermas geliefert wurde, mit einer parallelen Positionierung des indischen Kontextes. Dazu gehörte die erste Prämisse, die Funktionalität der Religion innerh-alb der öffentlichen Sphäre. Die grundlegende Behauptung, dass die Religion in ihrer primären Erscheinungsform untrennbar mit der Gesellschaft verwoben ist, wurde auf der Grundlage des Diskurses von Émile Durkheim nachgewiesen, indem ihre soziologischen Ursprünge na-chgezeichnet wurden. Das reicht natürlich nicht aus, um meine Behauptung der Rationalität, die man der Religion möglicherweise zuschreiben könnte, zu stützen. Folglich ergänzte eine Rekonstruktion der religiösen Traditionen meine These durch eine detaillierte Untersuchung der soziophilosophischen religiösen Traditionen Indiens, nämlich der kognitiven Upanishad-ischen Traditionen. Dieser Ansatz wird durch eine umfassende Analyse gestützt, die verschie-dene rationale Religionstraditionen aufzeigt, basierend auf dem methodischen Ansatz der Theorien der revolutionären religiösen Bewegungen, des axialen Zeitalters, der prophetischen Entzauberung und des Säkularismus, deren Ziel es war, einen Diskurs zu initiieren, der den Weg zu einer reformatorischen, authentischen und rationalen Religion ebnete. Die Logik, die diese Analysen mit Hilfe von Hans Joas und Charles Taylor vermitteln, unterstreicht die

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Ähnlichkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Entwicklungen im religiösen Bereich und dem post-metaphysischen Ansatz für die Religion im öffentlichen Raum. Auf diese Weise kommen sich Glauben und Wissen bei der Suche nach einer gemeinsamen Basis oder Genealogie entgegen. Die Sichtbarkeit ihrer Ergebnisse kommt dadurch zum Ausdruck, dass sie die gesellschaftli-chen Veränderungen in einer Sphäre deutlich machen, in der die performative Rolle, die die Religionen einnehmen, über den privaten Bereich hinausgeht. Diese Analyse stützt sich auf die Darstellung der nachmetaphysischen Philosophie. Die nachmetaphysische Methodologie zeigt damit, dass sie sich nicht gegen die Religionen stellt. Im Gegenteil, sie führt nicht nur verschiedene Argumente an, um den konstruktiven, rationalen und positiven Charakter der Religion anzuerkennen, sondern fordert auch die säkularen Gesellschaften auf, die Religion nicht zu entfremden, indem sie sie als irrationales Element einstufen. Darüber hinaus wurde die Möglichkeit der Übersetzung religiöser Semantik zur Förderung säkularer Zwecke durch den Habermas’schen Diskurs der kantischen Religionsphilosophie weiter ausgeführt.

Daher ebneten die Ergebnisse der oben erwähnten Analyse den Weg, um die Verfügbarkeit ähnlicher Vorkommnisse im indischen Kontext und in der indischen Sphäre weiter zu er-mitteln. Dies ermöglichte einen potenziellen Dialog zwischen der Habermas’schen Bestim-mung der nachmetaphysischen Philosophie und dem Religiösen in Indien. In der Folge zeigte sich, dass nachmetaphysische Ansätze der indischen Gesellschaft offenbar nicht fremd sind. Dennoch bestand das Ziel darin, Ansätze und Methoden zu ermitteln, die entweder ignoriert wurden oder verschwunden sind. Es liegt daher nahe, diese nachmetaphysische Methodologie, die bisher im westlichen Kontext von Habermas erarbeitet wurde, im indischen Kontext zu entdecken. Dies ermöglichte ein transparentes und eindeutiges kontextuelles Verständnis und Funktionieren der postmetaphysischen Methodologie.

Anhand verschiedener Quellen und Analysen ermöglicht dieses Werk wichtige Erkennt-nisse über die ursprüngliche Natur der Religion, die über tiefgreifende rationale Traditionen verfügt, und über die mit ihr verbundene soziologische Bedeutung. Am Ende meiner Untersu-chung werden den indischen Ordensmitgliedern verschiedene nachmetaphysische Vorschläge unterbreitet, die sie zu den Hauptakteuren einer Selbstkritik der Religion machen können. Die Funktionalität dieser Vorschläge wird durch die Anwendung der wiedergefundenen Quellen realisiert, um auf das Problem der irrationalen und unreflektierten Religion in der öffentlichen Sphäre zu intervenieren, was zum summum bonum meiner nachmetaphysischen Philosophie wird .

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III GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Has secularism truly triumphed through the decline of the undeniable influence of religion in the public sphere? In all fairness, in order to address this rigmarole, it is important to en-gage in a dispassionate debate about the factum of this phenomenon. Based on various recent events, both constructive and destructive, every society is invited to ponder: that religion like never before, is percolating into western and non-western societies alike with even greater vigour that any secular man could ever envisage. Religion is taking various forms: progres-sive, conservative, stagnated, productive, fundamentalist, terrorist, and reconciliatory, among many others. In any case, it is being increasingly recognised that in a secular world, religion is expressing its potentiality of being translated.

Therefore, in this case, as many secular intellectuals have portended, religion did not disap-pear. If anything, it is witnessing a resurgence with renewed vitality through the institution of state2 (in the case of India) and is flowing underneath as gushing waters with heavy current. A sociological commitment reveals that society and religion are inextricably linked.3 However, the more one seeks to insulate it from societal matters, the deeper it creeps in and takes root. Arguably, there is no other element of society that exerts such a strong impact on individuals than religion itself. The semantic inheritance of religion influencing the societal pillars of mo-rality and ethics is indubitable. Religion is unique in that it imparts a collective consciousness and unifies people while simultaneously excluding those who do not belong to it. In that sense, its proclivity as a divisive instrument is self-evident.

Today, many political agendas focus on placing religion at the forefront of their political discourse because its trenchant proclivities can capture the minds of the people and gain pre-cedence over the sentiments of the common folk.4 Conquerors in history have very often at-tempted to impose their own religion on the people they conquered upon so that it would leave behind a residue of collective consciousness, which made it easier later for them to rule without great opposition.5 A poignant example is the idea of dividing India postulated on religion, which arose ever since the 1930’s among the Muslims (Jinah as the pioneer),6 which demon-strates the extent to which religion can unite and divide people at the same time.

The visceral attractiveness of religion can capture people more easily than any other organi-zation. It appeals greatly to the sentiments of the people that causes them to approach religion for answers to seek answers, solace, and succour. This is an exclusiveness of religion that no other elements of philosophy or science can replace.

Religion promises its adherents a better life than the present one through the concept of eter-nal hope. In doing so, it links light-hearted people to those who constantly long for a spiritual way of life. This corresponds to the famous charismatic movements, which developed a new-er concept that entails a mysterious healing movement of sorts in its centres. These centres of prayer and worship are referred to as charismatic healing centres. In the name of God, they promise an instant healing to all those who visit these places. Unfortunately, the Catho-lic Church, which is founded not only on the unshakable faith of the apostles but also on the strong philosophical underpinnings of Thomistic and other philosophical schools, has in be-come a rather apparent supporter of these movements in recent decades. Religion is gradually being stripped of its rationality, which once used to be a human cognitive achievement. More alarmingly, some of its regressive elements are pushing the common folks backwards. Thus, religion sometimes gives an impression that it is becoming an instrument in slowing down the development of rational thinking and scientific temper. Any religion could oppose such prog-ress of the human mind. Therefore, it is difficult to affirm with certitude that one particular religion stands against the ethos of modernization. In generalised parlance, it can be argued that every religion, in one way or another, serves as an agent against modernization. Religions, which are strongly premised on the cultural ground, or identify themselves with a particular land and culture, for instance, Hinduism and Islam, are struggling to make the requisite tran-sition towards modernization. On the surface, this might probably capture the attention of only a small percentage of people. Nevertheless, this small percentage apparently has a greater influence because the greater percentage is either tepid, or remains voiceless, or because the small percentage is routinely exploited by the politicians to accomplish their often-nefarious goals, thus offering them an extended platform.

Against this backdrop, it is imperative to acknowledge the vital role that religion plays in Indian society. It is seemingly impossible to separate this religious consciousness from an In-dian’s psyche, albeit with few exceptions. As a matter of fact, it reflects itself in most of the social and public areas of the Indian society. India is rightly associated with the undeniably robust Vedic culture and Upanishad philosophy, dating back to about the fifth to tenth cen-tury BCE. Although the sub-continent evolved from ancient times with a particular culture, philosophy and religious beliefs, she got exposed to the major and dominant religions of the world in the course of time through the encroaching mighty colonial powers, be it from the Persian world or the European world in the subsequent period. This resulted in the plurality of religions, which has had a tremendous impact on the development of society. Nevertheless, the new religions, which had entered the sub-continent, have caused both positive and negative impact on the Indian people. It could be compared to present day Europe, which is experienc-ing a widespread influx of eastern religion. Although Christianity and Islam took their roots in India two thousand and fifteen hundred years ago, respectively, Indian society continues to struggle to reconcile with the contours of these foreign religions.8 This religious, and by extension, societal schism, is creating manifold challenges in India. Though it is projected to be one of the salient countries that contribute to the international proliferation of information and technology, or the world of medicine, one can hardly understand this phenomenon back home. Religious colouring that is fundamentalist in nature to every minute system seems to be the norm of the day. Religion is creeping into every aspect of society and sometimes appears to be an anti-modernistic agent. It does not allow people to think critically; on the contrary, it makes people more obsequious to the point that they prefer to reconcile with the status quo. Unfortunately, this is the situation among all the existing religions.

Therefore, with this background, the dissertation aims to illuminate the rational elements of religion and its interlacing with societal life. This research is particularly founded on the philosophy and views espoused by Jürgen Habermas, who, in the German philosophical circle, is considered one of the most important intellectuals of our times. Nevertheless, his presence and philosophy among religious circles, especially in the context of catholic philosophical cen-tres in India, is not a very remarkable one. It would be onerous to identify outstanding Indian Catholic Philosophers or Theologians who credibly engage themselves with Habermasian phi-losophy of religion. Consequently, through this study, I intend to explicate the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas as an option oriented towards a critical study and living of one’s own religion in the public sphere.

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PART I: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

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1 Research Question/Problem Statement

The Indian context is widely known to have a varied and integrated approach towards religion. By contrast, the western understanding of religion, especially that of Christianity, is rather different. Habermas sees Christianity as a religion that has successfully undergone enlighten-ment; the protestant reformation is a poignant example of this phenomenon. This implies that religion has already been reformed in the past and has altered its approach to gain acceptance in society. However, no religion that currently exists in India has not undergone this phase of enlightenment as in the western sense. Thus, I contend that religion in general needs to be revisited to better understand its role in society and in the lives of individuals. To illustrate, though Christianity in the western world has undergone reformation and enlightenment, apart from its tenants of faith, the core practice of Christian religion has remained unchanged in India. Western Christianity is open to rationality and an intellectual understanding of its faith. Christian religious practices are frequently questioned by the faithful themselves and do not escape trenchant criticisms from even the believers. Whereas in the Indian context, Chris-tian religious practices are neither questioned by the believers nor do they reflect on religion’s functioning in their societies.

How can the Indian society engage in a discourse about religion, which aims at arriving at a better understanding of religion that contributes to a secular and modern India? India is glob-ally renowned for its profound philosophico-religious traditions in the world. People around the globe, are using the various methods of philosophies that originated in India to seek solu-tions for a plethora of problems ranging from self to that of society.1 This is observed in various fields, where members of various western religions look towards Indian philosophical exposi-tions as a panacea for their challenges. This approach is beneficial in that it gives them a differ-ent perspective of understanding their own religions. However, the various religious philoso-phies and traditions of India have been either buried, disregarded, or left in a state of confusion and disarray. It is ironic that even the foreign religions that entered the sub-continent seem to be gradually losing their rational and intellectual traditions in the public sphere. As a case in point, Christianity played an important role in the emancipation movements at various social levels. Its intellectual and rational traditions challenged some grotesque social and religious in-digenous practices. Even to this day, society experiences its engagement in social movements; but the propensity for acquiescing to religious superstitions and social inequalities based on caste, language, region and rite continues unabated.

Therefore, I claim that in India, all religions have remained stagnated religion when it comes to their role in the public sphere. There is a perceptible absence of intellectual comprehension of religion, which is definitely a problematic attitude that could exacerbate religious funda-mentalism in India.2 To make matters worse, religion is apparently concentrating more on external practices than its intrinsic attributes, which sometimes become a burden to its adher-ents as well. It prevents people from thinking beyond their given social structures and systems. Within such a framework, I see that it is necessary for the people of India to question the existing religious scenario in the country. And how one could alert the public about religious practices that do not go beyond mere rituals and festivities?

In what follows, I will enumerate the problem denotes the background for my research. It is classified into four areas; wherein religion apparently functions as a negative vibe to the society when it is practised without a proper intellectual or rational understanding of itself. Here, I will try to base myself on the facts and events, which speak for themselves, in expounding on how religion is lived today.

1.1 Religious Exclusions

To elaborate on the challenges associated with religion, I would like to commence with the phenomenon of exclusion based on religion. Though religion unites people, it is more than capable of dividing people. In order to elucidate this phenomenon, I shall refer to Rajeev Bhar-gava and his thesis concerning religious exclusions. He opines that there are two models of exclusion related to the area of religion: Religious exclusion and religion-based exclusion.4 For the purposes of this study, I am more concerned about the problem of religious exclusion than religion-based exclusion.

Religious exclusion is mainly based on personal religious beliefs, traditions and practices. Elaborating on this type of exclusion Rajeev alludes to one of the deadliest practices in India, untouchability.

Though this practice is not visibly practiced in our times on a large scale, it continues to exist in various other forms. Untouchability was originally a practice based on Hindu religion that refers to ‘contamination’ caused by a member of lower castes. While this aspect of contamina-tion is not openly expressed today, people of higher castes still tend to avoid members of lower castes. Sometimes, their involvement in auspicious public occasions is also prevented. This is also expressed in inter-caste marriages or inter-rite nuptials. If a person from one’s own reli-gious community establishes a relationship with a person of another cast, religion, or even rite, they are, in most cases, excommunicated from their religious communities and even disowned by their own families.6 More shockingly, “this form of exclusion is also found in the professedly more egalitarian religions such as Christianity. The Pulaya Christians of Kerala, who were for-merly untouchable Hindus, are still treated as untouchables by the Syrian Christians.”7

The second type of exclusion that Rajeev refers to is religion-based exclusion. It is an “ex-clusion of people from the wider, non-religious domain of liberty and equality (citizenship rights).”8 This type of exclusion is mostly experienced by members of religions that are not of Indian origin, such as Christianity and Islam. Civil benefits namely economic and political are denied on the grounds that they belong to foreign religions. But in the context of the concern that this study aims to address, these internal exclusions are worrying because the religious members themselves do not have a sound understanding of their religion.

Religious exclusions, which begin within one’s own communities, gradually spread their tentacles by distancing themselves from other religions and then claiming superiority of one’s religion over the other. Such attitudes sow the seeds of religious aggression or religious perse-cution. It assumes different forms such as attacking their places of worship, families, houses, educational centres, etc. Nonetheless, such behaviour is likely to be unrestrained because one tries to mix up religion and nationalism, as evidenced in the case of RSS in India, or other forms of religion-nationalistic movements in various parts of the world.9 This creates a fertile ground for religious fundamentalism, which is how I would like to expound on religion as a problem.

1.2 Militant Truth Claim

From the above-mentioned exclusivism, one can arrive at doctrinal exclusivism, also referred to as religious fundamentalism. The events surrounding September 11, 2001, led Thomas Schirrmacher to analyse such terrorist attacks as religiously fundamentalist attitudes. He poi-gnantly defines this fundamentalism as: “What is meant in common parlance with the word ‘fundamentalism’ is, however, a militant truth claim, and precisely that is what I find to be the shortest definition”10

This is a phenomenon that is more or less visible in all religions.11 It is more apparently expe-rienced by religions that claim to be the repositories of absolute truth. Until very recently, the Catholic Church has constantly held on to such an attitude, in matters of doctrine and even further proclaimed it confidently. The Catholic Church has excluded salvation outside of her boundaries and she is the sole container of all truth.12

Karen Armstrong sees fundamentalism as “embattled forms of spirituality and militant pi-ety”.14 Religious wars, which human history has experienced, have been primarily sanctioned by religious authorities that presented strong faith-based justifications.15 A similar justification is also provided in cases of societal oppression and discrimination. Religious fundamentalists take their authority directly from the sacred texts of their religion. This obviously demands an uncompromising subservience to a way of life. As a result, they do not consider and recognize the validity of secular authorities. Instead, the only law that governs them is the Law of God.16India is replete with the challenges associated with the combination of religion and ethnic fun-damentalism. There is a tendency to protect one’s culture and ethnic identity, which, in turn, is strongly connected to a particular religion. This is particularly experienced in the north-ern and central parts of India.“It is not unusual for ethnicity and religion to combine, as in Hinduism. Hindu Fundamentalism is ethno-nationalist as well as religious. The two spheres are not neatly separated.”18 However, fundamentalism inevitably gives rise to violence, espe-cially when it comes to attaining fundamentalist religious goals. Violence driven by religious fundamentalism is not a new phenomenon in India. It has seen a number of such incidents, especially in the post-independence era. Two prominent examples include the persecution of Kashmiri Pandits by the Muslims between 1989 and1991 followed by the Ayodhya Controversy in which members of both (Muslims and Hindus) religious groups had to face a terrible loss.19The dispute is centred on a plot of land in Ayodhya, which is regarded by the Hindus to be the birthplace of the Hindu God and King Ram.

These two models demonstrate how problematic religion and its role in the public sphere could be. At this point, it would be pertinent to explicate another problematic aspect of religion via the model of Reactionary Modernism.

1.3 Reactionary Modernism

As discussed above, the tenets and purpose of religion could easily be subverted by fundamen-talist conceptions. The present point pictures how modernity could be hijacked by religion without being itself essentially modern.

According to Meera Nanda, the concept of reactionary modernism is rooted in religious beliefs. She presents the case that the Hindu religious extremists attribute the success of mod-ern science to the scriptures of India. She, being a scientist, refers to this attitude as reaction-ary modernism (RM).20 This term RM could be traced, according to Nanda, to Jeffrey Herf (1984).21 Against the backdrop of the Nazi regime, Jeffrey addresses the deadliest nationalistic phenomenon.

Meera Nanda considers this model to explain the prevailing political attitudes in India es-poused by some Hindu Parties and Hindu Nationalistic Parties. These groups do not deny modern principles such as democracy, science and secularism; on the contrary, they become hyper motivational about these western ideals being rooted in their Hindu Scriptures.In wake of the Ayodhya Conflict and the ubiquitous success of nuclear bombs, these religious fundamentalists project themselves as having an upper hand. In both instances, the funda-mental ideology is to establish Hindu supremacy. For the purposes of this dissertation, I would call it a religious supremacy. Their intention is to bring Hindu gods, scriptures and traditions to the forefront.

Thus, espousing such views threatens the very secular fabric of the nation. These ideologies are not only detrimental for the survival of secularism; they also impede the, progressive lifestyle of the common people. Similar attitudes of religious bigotry exists in all religions in India which poses a threat to scientific temper and progressive thinking.

1.4 Inadequacy of ‘Ratio’ in Religion

In each of the above-mentioned situations, the problematic elements of religion are highlight-ed. These situations have a common pattern whereby religion is separated from its rational traditions and used as an instrument to implement either individualistic or sectarian ideol-ogies. In an attempt to accommodate fundamentalist attitudes, any religion loses its rational approach or traditions.

With regard to religion, the European model could be, to some extent, taken into consider-ation as possessing characteristics of rationalistic and secularistic components in the public sphere. With the genesis of the Lutheran Reformation in Germany and the Anglican Refor-mation in England, religious life in Western Europe apparently gave rise to a religion that wanted to extricate itself from elements that are associated with reasonableness and rationality. Naturally, this was expressed through agitations, reformations, and revolutions; many lives were also lost in this process. However, it presented an opportunity to question individuals’ own faiths, religious practices and traditions. It was tantamount to marching towards an en-lightened faith.26 If societies do not undergo a process of questioning individuals’ religion and its traditions, it could lead to the above-mentioned problems. In essence, it would lead to the problem of religious freedom, in which members of minor religious communities will have to face a gamut of challenges, including bloody persecutions. Political hijacking of religion ob-viously is deeply embedded in our societies, especially India, but if the masses themselves are educated about the desirable attitude associated with an individual’s own religion, the chances for religiously motivated societal disturbances will certainly reduce.

Therefore, I would like to adduce Jürgen Habermas in presenting my case against similar irra-tional connotations of religion in modern societies. As this case stresses the need for religious reasoning, I see the inherent necessity to undertake an analytical study of the role of religion in human society, especially in the Indian context. Thus, to embark on such a discourse, Jürgen Habermas is considered to be one of the important figures of our times, whose philosophy of religion would contribute towards a progressive Indian religious thinking.

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2 Thesis Prospect: Reasoning Religion

2.1 Habermas as a Conceptual Source for a Postmetaphysical Approach

After having illuminated the problem of religion becoming a burden to society and the root cause of several wars and riots, I wish to present the philosophy of Habermas as an alternative through which religion can play a constructive role in the public sphere. This approach would allow us to understand religion as a contributor to human society and human cognition. It is vital to recognize the fact that religion is the cornerstone and progenitor of human rational-ity.28 The foundations of various religions based themselves on reason, knowledge and faith, whose sole aim was to enlighten humanity.

The views of Habermas that religious semantic contents foster the establishment of human rights and protection of nature, to ensure justice and righteousness form the foundation on which the edifice of a positive and rational religion in the public sphere could be further constructed.

Religion alone possesses this rational semantic inheritance to our society. Therefore, in-stead of overlooking this rational inheritance in India or exploring a conscious rejection of religion in the west, we would do well to recognize the religious foundation of our so-ciety.31 However, in some of his recent writings, Habermas naturally focuses on religion more from a western perspective. But in general, one can decipher a strategy of analysing various world-views with universal acceptance in his texts. In The Theory of Commu- nicative Actions , Habermas speaks about the development of religion in the context of societal rationalizing. In doing so, he refers to Weber, Durkheim and Mead. Habermas reconstructs this rationalization process and demonstrates how the ethics of fraternity or brotherhood, which are rooted in Judaeo-Christian traditions, were imbibed into commu-nicative ethics.32

Habermas warns western society not to do away with religion; instead, he wants us to con-sider its deeply-embedded, rational semantic contours which served as a foundation in main-taining a just human society.

In this manner, he makes religious traditions available to both religious and non-religious citizens.

The term “postmetaphysical religion” indicated in the title of my paper captures the reli-gious philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. This term allows us to understand various nuances of Habermas’ reflections on religion and its role in the public sphere. As Habermas opines in BNR,34 postmetaphysical philosophy should engage present-day religion, and it should do so with what he refers to as a dialogical approach. According to this approach, there should first be a dialogue between religious and non-religious on a cognitive level. This prevents both groups from being judgemental and recognizes the rational elements present in both schools of thought.

This could be further used within the context of religious fundamentalism, where the religious members could be familiarized with the cognitive contents of their own religious traditions. The relationship between religion and science has been tense in the recent past, especially when we consider the development that took place in the twentieth century. However, this apparent discordance makes it more philosophically nuanced and receptive. An analysis of Niklas Luh-mann’s pragmatic development of the ethnological, psychological investigations and especially functional religious sociology makes it possible to understand important views ingrained in the social and pragmatic meaning of religious praxis. It could be partially compatible with the main thesis of pragmatism in the religious philosophy of Dewey and William James. Religion allows itself to investigate its pragmatic and meaningful constitutive function in wake of the unavailable conditions of human life.36 Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests:

Though India cannot be considered a postsecular society in the generally-accepted sense, a deeper analysis of the societal context does bring the country closer to the parallel level of a postsecular society. As Habermas suggests, it is important to adopt this postmetaphysical ap-proach in a postsecular society, wherein a dialogue occurs at the cognitive level.38 This is aptly summarized by Klaus Müller in his essay: Habermas und die neue Metaphysik.

2.2 Objectives of Research

Based on this basic understanding of Habermas’ ‘new interest’ in Religion, I wish to extend my work focussing on the role of religion in the public sphere. Though the essay, ‘ Religion in der Öffentlichkeit is more Euro-American in context, the philosophy, ideology and methodology in this essay could also apply to a non-western society like India. Though he places more em-phasis on differentiating between secular and religious, a hidden stress on plurality of religions is apparent. However, he says: “The introduction of the freedom of religion is the appropriate political answer to the challenges of religious pluralism. But the secular character of the state is a necessary but not yet a sufficient condition for guaranteeing equal religious freedom for everybody.”40 This is indeed is my area of interest, as I could extend Habermas’ thought and apply him even to other societies. What does this actually mean to me in my research?

Secularization of European society originated as a result of the critical view of religion. This is exactly what is lacking in Indian society.41 Religion had been considered a field that is above scepticism or criticism. Be it Christianity, Islam or Hinduism in India, their adherers hardly take a critical stand towards their own religion. It is always this feeling of ‘awe’ towards religion or the accompanying superstitious beliefs that hinders them from being critical towards their own creed. Although prominent philosophies like Jainism and Buddhism were born in India as a result of their critical attitude towards their own Hindu Religion, modern society seems to be blissfully unaware of this fact. Truth be told, it is a rather delicate issue to be handled. Being an Indian, I cannot criticise Hinduism and its practices, especially when I am a Chris-tian. Thus, I do recognize the importance of proposing an alternative outlook on religion and its role in India.

Authors like Kanchana Mahadevan work with themes such as postsecular in India. K. Ma-hadevan, in an article written in 2019, made a comparison between Habermas and Ambed-kar.42 She critiques the non-rationalistic religious understanding within the circles of Hindu communities, thus making it appear that it is a matter of only one religion. I would adopt a contrarian stance and contend that such non-rationalistic living of religion can be seen in all religions practised in India. For instance, Christianity is booming with its new Pentecostal communities, which do not preach anything else other than that Christianity is the true re-ligion.43 One cannot still deny conversions through allurement among the Christian church-es. The Catholic Church itself is struggling with issues like caste, regionalism, ritism , which inexorably fosters exclusive attitudes. Each religion has its fundamentalist proclivities, albeit in unique ways. Therefore, the application of my study is to propose concrete situations and contexts, where religion could be worked out cognitively as Habermas suggests:

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3 Methodology

3.1 Rational Reconstruction

One of the important scholars who worked on the methodology of Jürgen Habermas is J. Ped-ersen. This method is specific to the German historical school and is referred to as Rational Reconstruction. Habermas is best known for his discursive method, which is significantly de-veloped in his magnum opus, Theory of Communicative Actions . Unlike the hermeneutical methods, this Rational Reconstruction (RR) concentrates on rules, “which actually underlie that are not known by the subject or the subject is not aware of these. However, the subject has the capacity by intuition to master them.”45

Before we delve deeper into the integration of this method in his magnum opus, we can say that it could be referred to his work in 1962, which is known for the discourse about the public sphere. For a rational discussion that was necessary among the bourgeois, he opines that it is a necessity to begin by rationally reconstructing the inherent normativity inherent in different practices. According to Pedersen, Habermas uses this method “… without it always being equally clear what is meant. […] More specifically, he commences with earlier theorists or theoretical positions, picks these apart, rectifies their errors, and coalesces them again.”46In order to approach the reality, he tries to combine both interpretative and explanatory ap-proaches. However, this approach requires being descriptive and normative as well. Conse-quently, this comprises or deals with the reconstruction of the intuitive knowledge of the sub-ject concerned.47

What does RR try to unravel? It attempts to investigate and reveal the deep structures based on a set of rules similar to the production of meaningful linguistic expressions. This is consid-ered the primary premise by Pederson for RR. “RR must […] be assumed to explicate essential features of that which is being investigated.”48 This process of RR seeks to uncover the dynamics of fundamental competencies whilst also helping us comprehend the process of development over time that gave rise to these fundamental competencies. When one investigates how ratio-nality and reason have been developed in religion at various stages, it becomes easier to unveil layers of fundamental competencies.49

According to Habermas, based on the pluralism existing in the methodological approaches to social phenomena, one should not confine the discussion to a particular discipline. RR rests primarily on such theoretical and methodical pluralism.

Pederson says that Habermas’ intention in using this method is to establish a critical social the-ory. Such a social theory is made possible within the framework of two distinctive characters, which are, however, a consequence of RR. One is called the synchronic or horizontal analysis and the other refers to the diachronic or vertical reconstruction. In synchronic analysis, users themselves reconstruct intuitive or universal knowledge. “The crucial insight that Habermas reaches here is that there is a normative element in the way language is used, and that this normative element may serve as a critical standard against which actual communication may be measured.”52 In the diachronic reconstruction, “the historical development of language use is subjected to a thorough reconstruction”.53 Thus, Habermas takes Hegel’s historical element seriously. He also makes it clear that historical accounts are necessary to demonstrate that lan-guage undergoes a process of change over time and that language usage divulges the structures of consciousness embedded in it.54

Having thus presented the methodology that underpins the basic philosophy of Habermas, I would now like to elucidate how it would be applied in my research.

3.2 Application

My research is based on two pillars, namely, 1) social, pilosophical and historical analysis of religion and 2) their contribution to the process of rationalization of society. The introductory chapters serve as a primal yet informative basis about religion and its development to incor-porate Habermasian philosophy of religion to our societies. I find it pertinent to reconstruct the development of religion in our society, which can serve as a solution to many problems related to religious riots in our society. This can help us to de-fundamentalize the religious ideas and understand religion as an essentially societal phenomenon, which gives people a sense of belonging to a particular community into which they are bound by culture and lan-guage. To a great extent, western philosophical texts base themselves on logical conclusions, which, of course, cannot be denied by scientific research. However, dealing with a sensitive topic, I would like to rely on the Indian way of dealing with a philosophy which fundamentally does not differentiate itself from its religious texts. Therefore, the principles of RR are used to analyse the relationship between religion and society. In doing so, I aim to unpack the various developments in order to know the reality, especially in pursuit of the application to religion that currently exists in our society.

Habermas’ religious philosophy is in the context of religious citizens and non-religious cit-izens. He extols the virtues and valuable contributions of religion so that the non-religious citizens could also profit from it. Therefore, his philosophy has a special context where religion (institutionalized Christianity) is apparently dying out (or being transformed). But could that also be applied in a multi-religious context, religiously pluralistic context where religion is an inextricable aspect of the lives of individuals?

Upon assessing the various aspects that Habermas explores about religion and its undeni-ably rich contribution to society and philosophy, one can also conclude that religion is indeed a blessing. However, it is also important to pinpoint exactly how it made its contribution to so-ciety. The religious wars, which are part of the history of humankind, on the contrary, inform us that religions have caused unleashed wanton and widespread devastation to humankind through catastrophic events such as wars. And the number of cruelties that have taken place in the name of religion is witness to this fact. That is why Habermas proposes that religion becomes a positive element when it is understood and practiced appropriately. His analysis of religion is mostly available in his later works, where he speaks of adapting an intellectual or rational religion that would avoid any fundamentalist approach to religions.

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Therefore, a basic analysis of religion in the public sphere is counted vital which provides the setting to formulate a hypothesis about rational religion. This requires us to adopt a neutral approach to deconstruct the given phenomenon of religion in the public sphere and then inves-tigate the possible instances of rational and non-elements attached to it. It is a known fact that India cannot be viewed as a post secular society in the western sense. It has not experienced the decadence and resurgence of religion. Nevertheless, it is vital to note how we can use the posi-tive aspects of religion that Habermas proposes to respond to the societal problems caused by religion. Any attempt to hastily implement the western methodology of reformation of religion to the Indian context is likely to be a failure. Besides creating plenty of confusion and ambiv-alence, it can also trigger latent hostilities, towards modernism. On the contrary, if we solely analyse religious contents and their traditions embedded in rationality, we will give ourselves a better chance of understanding religion. This is what RR does in its process.

For this reason, following the methodology of Habermas, RR would help me to reconstruct the structures that underpin a robust comprehension of religion within the Indian context. Notably, this will further support the application of a postmetaphysical model of religion. Ac-cordingly, my research aims at conscientizing a socio-philosophical approach to religion in India to accelerate the modernity of religion in the public sphere, which is primarily based on the philosophical approach of Jürgen Habermas who evinces a special interest in the so- cio-cognitive contents of religion that grew up together with philosophy in the history of mankind.

3.3 Organization of the Study

Part I concentrates on presenting the various contexts that serve to illuminate elements, which could be considered potential reasons for the problem of religion in India. This begins with a short historical background of religion in India, and with the ways in which it comes into contact with foreign religions. In order to locate Habermasian philosophy, I shall, in the first part, focus on the aspect that Habermas directs his debate towards, namely, the Public Sphere. So I commence with defining the area where this debate would preliminarily take place. Then I proceed with presenting contexts within India that are parallel to that of Habermasian. This part comes to an end by an exposition of the challenges, which arise through an interplay be-tween the contexts, thereby introducing the contested areas, which will be discussed with the help of Habermas’ discourse on religion in the subsequent elements of my paper. After having contextualized the philosophical settings of the project, I proceed to explore the philosophy of religion based on Habermas’ viewpoints that analyse the gradual development of his philoso-phy on religion, which then emerges as the content of Part II and Part III as described below.

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Part II thus expounds on the conception of Habermas about religion and rationalization of society, which has a universal character. It deals with Habermas’ views on religion as a socio-logical component and simultaneously on how one can comprehend the development of hu-man cognition. This basic idea of Habermas is firstly illuminated via Durkhemian categories of religion and secondly by exploring the idea of axial age, as a cognitive leap, (with the help of Robert Bellah’s research on the development of axial age) which strengthens the notion of developing human cognition that is expressed in a religious setting.

Part III of my research consists of Habermas’ later philosophy of religion expressed through postmetaphysical thinking. This is accomplished by laying down the meaning and content of postmetaphysical approach, a term, which he uses to further develop the theme of religion. I then present Habermas’ appeal to preserve religion and its rational cognitive contents in the secular world by means of translation. This section analyses how translation works by first finding parallels in Kantian categories and then by interrogating Habermasian proposals.

In Part IV, a secularistic approach to religion will be presented, which includes two authors, namely, Charles Taylor and Hans Joas. Based on the previous chapter that analyses Habermas’ religion, these two authors expose secularism as being useful in the process of a reformative religion. More importantly, they help us to recognize the forgotten sociological meaning of re-ligion, which forms the nucleus of postmetaphysical approach to religion. This analysis strives to present before society, a religion that has the capacity to be rational, intellectual, reasonable and genuine. Furthermore, secularism serves as the ambience in which Habermasian trans-lation has a better likelihood of fructifying. It interrogates religion in the modern and secular world. This part presents religion in the secular world, not as an element that has lost its rel-evance for human society; instead, it stresses the importance of religion in the phase of secu-larity. It chiefly demonstrates the meaning and search of a genuine religion within a secular context.

Part V denotes an attempt to make the Habermasian religious philosophy relevant to Indian society. This includes some postmetaphysical models, which serve as parallels in connecting the Habermasian philosophy. In the later section of this part, I try to recapture the princi-ples of Habermas, which could be applied to the Indian context irrespective of its apparent non-Habermasian secular context. Lastly, I seek to locate the area and context where these Habermasian challenges (principles), namely, a philosophico/theological responsibility, could be materialized. Thus, it will attempt to propose concrete groups of persons, who could take up the responsibility of this hermeneutical responsibility of self-reflection.55

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PART II: CONTEXTUALIZING HABERMAS IN INDIAN RELIGIOUS SETTING

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1 The Setting of Religion in India

1.1 Historical Background of Religion in India

This section is a starting point of the discussion on various historical contexts of India that exposes the problem of religion that is rooted in the past. This makes it possible to comprehend religion as what we know it today. This discussion encompasses the Indian understanding of religion based on the Hindu/Indian scriptures and the growth of this religion. It also investi-gates the encounter of indigenous religions with their foreign counterparts and their response to this maiden experience.

The following table provides a clear picture that facilitates an understanding of the historical background of India:2

01.EpochTill 1750 B.C.E.Pre-Vedic Religions

02. Epoch1750–500 B.C.E.

1750–1200 B.C.E.

From 1200 B.C.E.

From 850 B.C.E.

Vedic Religion

Early Vedic Phase

Middle Vedic Phase

Later Vedic Phase

03.Epoch 500 B.C.E. – 200 B.C.E. Ascetic Reforms

04. Epoch200 B.C.E. – 1100 A.D.

From 200 B.C.E.

From 300 A.D.

From 650 A.D.

Classical Hinduism

Pre-Classic Hinduism

Zenith of Hinduism

Later Period

05.Epoch1100–1850 A.D.Sects: Hinduism, Islam-ic-Hindu syncretism

06.EpochFrom 1850 A.D.

From 1850 A.D.

From 1950 A.D.

Modern Hinduism

Neo-Hinduism

Missionary-Hinduism 1.1.1 Religion as Dharma

Habermas’ religious discourse is basically in relation to the understanding of religion in a Durkheiman sense of a church, an organized body, a community of believers.3 The following lines demonstrate the exposition of the concept of religion in a non-western sense, i.e., Indian. The modern Indian mind has borrowed the word religion from a foreign language. Anyone who looks into the languages of India would find it difficult to present any single word to translate ‘religion’.

The very expression or invention of the term ‘religion’, is basically a vocabulary of the Chris-tian European culture. As in any culture, religion refers to the area of human life pertaining to the relationship between man and a super human or absolute being called God. In the In-dian scenario, there had to be a vocabulary to express this phenomenon.4 What a western mind understands under the term religion – everything connected or related to God, faith and rituals – is denoted by the term dharma in the Indian languages.5 A word that is not equivalent to a western understanding of religion, as an organized one, with which the Indians were not familiar.

This is nevertheless what an indigenous Indian would concur as well. It is a widely accepted theory mostly among Hindus. Hinduism distances itself from dogmatism in this manner if we want to make a comparison to a western religion, Christianity. More expressive in modern times, it has been palpable through the lifestyle of Gandhi and his philosophy. “Hinduism is not a system of fixed dogma or official exegesis. According to Gandhi, Hinduism is a quest, a path for the seeker to take.”7

Many Hindus identify their religion as sanātana dharma , meaning eternal Dharma . The word dharma is etymological related to the Latin terms firmus (fest, stark) and forma (Form, Gestalt ). This form holds the world together and protects the sanātana Law that in turn is responsible for maintaining order in the world.8 Dharma is etymologically explained as some-thing that binds all the phenomena, be it material or spiritual. Mahabharata says that dharma assists people in reaching their goal moksa (heaven). It assists to fulfil one’s obligations, which are demanded in order that one can reach one’s destination, which is moksa .9

However, like western religions, the Indian religion too refers to a sphere, in which a divine entity becomes the centre of the system. However, this refers to theistic schools of religion. The Vaishnavas of the Vedanta, the Nyaya Vaisheshikas and even the Advaita-Vedanta are schools which link religion to a god. In western religion as well as in Islam, one can imag-ine heaven only within the context of religion and fundamentally with God. Thus, religion becomes a path that leads to heaven. On the other hand, unlike the west, Indian religion also accommodates atheistic schools, which too propose ways to heaven, albeit without the intervention of a divine being. Instead of looking towards a higher being called God, these spiritual paths pave the way for self-fulfilment, which refers to salvation and freeing oneself from the bonds of this life. That is how one can differentiate between the Semitic and Indian religions. “What unites all systems of thought regarding religion is the firm belief that reli-gion is a path and leads to liberation and bliss, with or without God.”10 The fact that spiritual fullness of man could be achieved without God becomes evident if we precisely analyse Bud-dhism and Jainism as heterodox schools and even other orthodox schools such as Samkhya and Mimamsa . These are all pathways that show how one will be able to reach the goal and be set free from the bondage of this world. By contrast, salvation and freedom from sin is a possibility only through faith and belief in God for members of Semitic religion and gener-ally to the western public.11

Contrary to the western religions of revelation, the Indian religion is open to the possibility of God’s presence in this world as pluralistic. The famous Bhagvadgita verse speaks of the incarnation of God more than once. The divine appears in this world whenever injustice be-gins to spread its evil roots. “ paritrā āya sādhūnā vināśhāya cha du hk itām dharma-sans- thāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge .”12 On the contrary, western religion speaks of God’s presence in a historic context and Parousia, where the possibility of a second incarnation is completely suspended. “Die drei großen Offenbarungsreligionen lassen das eine Wahre, das eine Göttliche ( Religio perennis, sanatana dharma ) in einer bestimmten historischen Gestalt von Religion ausschließlich aufgehen.”13 The Indian subcontinent nevertheless believes in the re-incarnation of the divine and there is no one particular religion that can claim its climax. Therefore, it is evident that India cannot give or have the model of a central religious philoso-phy as conceived by the western. Owing to the status that Buddhism – without God – received as a religion, it would be difficult to put the whole understanding of religion within the frame-work of a western religion.14

However, that is a myopic view because it pertains to the period before the European colo-nisers or even before Islam entered the subcontinent. After the advent of Islamic and Chris-tian, cultures, the sub-continent gradually got used to the term or concept of an organized religion.15 Therefore, even India has become part of the other parts of the world, which centred themselves on particular religions, thus giving them their culture. In discussing this theme of religion in the Indian context, we would do well to consider the existence of various religions that existed in Indian for more than 1500 years.16 A period that is more than enough to make it indigenous. 1.1.2 The Aryan Invasion Theory

A very controversial theory among Indian historians is the Aryan invasion theory. This theory posits that even before the Muslim rulers and the modern colonists invaded India, a group of people called ‘the Aryans’ had already invaded the country in an earlier period.17 These people who are called Aryans have their origins in the Indo-European people. However, this group of people was further divided into Indo-Iranian, who subsequently became the Iranians and the Indians. This particular group named itself the Aryans or Awairya (skt. ārya), which means the noble ones. Moreover, as opposed to being characterized by a particular race, they are known for their belief in certain moral norms like being faithful to the treaties they made, hospitality towards both enemies and friends, truthfulness, etc. The historians in general claim that this migration took place in the middle of the second millennium B.C.E. beginning from Iran and progressing gradually towards India through Afghanistan. Consequently, it is believed that a bulk of this migration took place between 1700 and 1400 B.C.to India.18

This description is no more than a theory about the earliest known people of India. It does not distinctively elucidate their religious beliefs as what we know today i.e., Hinduism. But we can derive some of the elements, which were common to these civilizations like the term gods ( Devas ) or even the concept of sacrifice to these gods. Historians, however, demonstrate a comparative culture of belief in gods as similar to that of ancient Rome, as Stefan Schlensog cites Stietencron:

This theory postulates that there had been an existing culture and tradition in the region of India, which was invaded by the so-called Aryans. These are known as the indigenous ( ein- heimischen ) who were considered the descendants of Harappakultur or the migrated Vedic Aryan race of the Indo-Aryan tribe in the Rigveda known as the Dasa or Dasyu , physically characterized as dark in complexion, snub-nosed, and more commonly described as those having a barbaric dialect.20

By stating this theory, we are in fact coming closer to the reality of multiplicity of religious beliefs even from the ancient period of India. Today’s religious diversity in India is not a new phenomenon; on the contrary, the land has seen the cultivation of myriad belief systems as the nucleus of its culture. It was in the later period that the Vedic literature and the domination of the priests gave a commonality to these different belief traditions. Though this commonality was a much later phenomenon, it came to be known as one religion of the land.

The postmodern reality of ‘anything goes’ is an expression in which the Indian religion can be described. Nevertheless, one cannot name an Indian religion as the one religion to have always existed in the history of India. While India came into contact with many foreign religions, such as the Abrahamic religions, it is pertinent to note that these religions did not engulf the indig-enous religiosity like in the other parts of the world. This proves that the indigenous religions were strong enough to preserve themselves. Furthermore, even Buddhism, could not expand effectively in its own land of birth despite the strong political support of King Asoka.

“It must therefore be internal criteria that determine the special ‘power’ and form of the Hin-du religions.”21 Alex Michael considers this phenomenon as “der identifikatorische Habitus” or the identifying habit .22 Wikipedia gives us the definition Habitus as following: “is a system of embodied dispositions, tendencies that organize the ways in which individuals perceive the social world around them and react to it”. The Hindu religion is however bound especially through the descendants; the ancestry of individuals assumes great importance in India. This word Habitus is further explained as: “Habitus refers to culturally acquired attitudes, habits and predispositions as well as conscious, purposeful actions or mythological, theological or philosophical artefacts and mentefacts.”23 Therefore, it could be imperatively suggested that the strong cultural oneness and their thinking pattern could have been an important factor in facing these foreign religions. The cognitive, together with normative and aesthetic aspects, constitutes a common social attitude, which leads to a solid orientation of being together.24

In trying to pinpoint the exact indigenous religion in India, we commonly refer to Hinduism as the religion of the land or indigenous. But which of the many traditions that exist in India could be framed as Hinduistic? This is also a contentious matter among many Indians. Accord-ing to some, Hinduism is just a coherent or an interrelated religion constructed by the west. The word Hindu is, however, a foreign derivate beginning from the Persian Muslim rulers who differentiated Muslims from the others. It is they who gave the name Hindu to the population living beyond the river Sindhu. And so, the European colonialists continued to use this term.25 Ergo , only with difficulty and conventionally can ‘Hindhu’ be regarded as a religious name.

However, Dharma is also understood relatively according to each one’s societal stand. The salvific character of this dharma is predicated on how each one takes dharma or lives dharma in the hope of having a better rebirth. This relativity of dharma is further explained by Axel Michaels in Hegelian terminology: “When we say bravery is a virtue, says the Hindoo, bravery is/is a virtue of the Kshatriyas (warriors).”26 This relativity of Dharma is something very special to Hinduism. It is possible because every single social group that conveniently accommodates itself to this ethic in relation to Dharma’s could be exchangeable. For the sake of further clarity, it can be inferred that the principle of dharma stands above an absolute claim. This principle stresses itself as a social thinking pattern in accordance with the habituality of a group. There-fore, this type of religious character almost gives us the picture of the diversity of religious groups and their understanding of religion in India.27

Nevertheless, the indigenous religion has its basis in the Sanskrit texts and their Brahmanic traditions. To explore this religion in its details would be to enter into a bottomless abyss com-prising gods and goddesses of various regions and social groups of the people beyond Sindh. Therefore, we must confine ourselves to the Brahmin scriptures as the fundament of an indig-enous religion. “For a long time, it was also customary to declare the traditions, mostly based on Brahmanic Sanskrit texts, to be the ‘foundation’ of Hinduism and everything else to be de-viations or modernizations.”28 The authority of Vedas is however considered central to all these indigenous religious groups. Brian K. Smith opines that Hinduism is a religion whose people and their traditions are generated with a legitimate relation to the authority of the Vedas.29 1.1.4 The Advent of Islam and Diversity of Religion

The Islamic invasion of India is considered one of the important phases that contributed to a hybrid Indian culture. Up until then, its monoculturalism had largely prevailed in India in the aftermath of the Aryan invasion. India had become a region of a multiplicity of gods and goddesses, however, based on the Vedic literature and subsequent scriptures like Bhagvadgita. This was characterized by belief in the multiplicity of gods and ritual practices.30 The advent of Islam to India could be conceived in comparative terms of secularism in the west or even the early Christianity against the roman polytheism. Islam enters a land of a multiplicity of gods and it proclaimed just one God without a portrait or representation in human senses. Islam’s ideology and religion was in stark contrast to India’s many forms of divinities that were always expressed and portrayed in different human and animal forms. This mode of comprehension of religion and divinity certainly posed a challenge to the existing non-secularistic culture.

Islam, which is strongly identified with the Arabic region, did have traces of its Arabic pres-ence in India even before the genesis of Islam. The sea trade that was quite common between India and Arabia made it easier for the later Islamic rulers to reach India before the Europeans landed. The first invasion took place in western India under the Caliphate of Caliph Omar (634–644). It is said that just as in other parts of the world where Islam was very vigorously conquering the lands, a strategic religious policy was adopted in India as well. From a Muslim point of view, both Hindus and Buddhists were polytheistic and factually considered non-be-lievers. Instead of forcing these nonbelievers to convert31 as in certain regions with regard to Christians or vice versa, they allowed them to continue to practise their own religions and cul-tures and morality. However, this was permitted only after the payment of a special tax known as jizya .32 Thus, the Muslim rulers were able to gradually extend their empire throughout India by the middle of the twelfth century.33

A noteworthy characteristic of this period was the openness and readiness of some Muslim rulers, who were not just interested in conquering India and bringing Islam. As a matter of fact, they were also philosophers and artists who promoted philosophical debates between the two cultures and religions.

The nature of Islam in the periods surrounded by the Akbarian rule favoured all the existing religions, including the new Christian religion that was entering India. Akbar’s wish for inter-religious dialogue and mutual understanding has been encapsulated by Schlensog as follows:With the advent of Islam, the indigenous religions were considered one religion – the Hindu religion36 in contrast to the foreign religion – Islam. Nevertheless, these two religions repre-sented not just their belief systems but also had their own cultural setup.

The combination of Islam and Hindu ideologies made its presence felt on a variety of spheres, such as religion, art, music, architecture, literature, astronomies and mathematic. What one experiences today in India as some of the historic icons as part of tourism, are largely also Islamic.38 1.1.5 Puranic Process

In the wake of the emergence of foreign invaders entering the subcontinent, the natives felt a compelling urge to protect their own culture and above all, their religion. As explained above, the religion of the natives of the subcontinent was thoroughly different from that of the Islamic invaders. They felt threatened by the advent of a monotheistic culture trying to invade and make space for itself within the sub continental context. However, this awareness and fear of losing their stronghold on tradition and culture impelled the Brahmanic community to invent a new process of uniting the different tribal religions of the subcontinent. This was also the method they had used in the ancient period by introducing Vedas and the Upanishads. Apparently, they adopted the same strategy in protecting themselves and the subcontinent as well. “The Puranas grew into a vast corpus with some regionally identifiable texts, rich and variegated in their myths and forms of worship and even social norms suitable to the changing conditions.”39

However, this process provided a protective cover again foreign invaders as well as the local born movements such as Buddhism and Jainism. It can be stated that this puranic process laid a foundation for the Hindu religion. More specifically, Sankara is said to have established the foundation for this process whereby a syncretic religion endeavoured to combat the challenge posed by Buddhism and Jainism in the post-Vedic period (600 B.C). Thus, it was an instru-ment of the Brahmins to unify the existing practices, beliefs and rituals of various regional folk forms. “The puranic process thus represents ‘an instrument for the propagation of brah-manical ideals of social reconstruction and sectarian interest, a medium of the absorption of local cults and associated practices and a vehicle for popular instructions on norms governing everyday existence.”40 It was a widespread phenomenon that involved Brahmins who were well versed in the Vedas as the donors of land grants, Brahmins who composed the Puranas, pro-viding a “rich mythology around the major gods like Visnu and Siva, and Brahmana temple priests who followed agamic canons for temple rituals and worship.”41

This strategy of combating alien forces that threatened the Brahmanical religion was further extended and laid stronger foundations during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is ascribed to the great spiritual leader Sankara.42 However, other sources tell us that “it occurred during the Vijayanagara period which sought to restore temple worship and brahmstanical (Hindu) orthodoxy threatened by the intrusion of alien religions like Islam which affected the existing socio-political organisation.”43

This entire mechanism can also be seen as a process of vedicization.44 It was an attempt to include the widespread local tribal religions. This Purāṇizing of the other gods of various tribes was an attempt to lend credence to the Brahmanical emphasis that all the other religions had a Vedic-Brahmanic origin. It was portrayed as the sole source of all religions that would give a “pan-Indian character to all the regional and local cults”.45

However, Champakalakshmi opines that the application of colonial and imperial laws to the Indian religious structures and systems led to the unification of various local and divergent faith traditions. It was advantageous for both the parties: the British and the locals. The locals now had their identity as a common Hindu folk that gave them a sense of pride of belonging to a strong religious tradition, namely, the Vedic tradition. At the same time, it became easier for the British imperial rule to deal with “the conflicting claims of different communities to socio-religious privileges and status hierarchy.”46

1.2 Classification of the Society

(without using the term  varna ) appears in the late Rigvedic  Purusha Sukta  (RV 10.90.11–12), which has the Brahman, Rajanya (instead of Kshatriya), Vaishya and Shudra classes forming the mouth, arms, thighs and feet at the sacrifice of the primordial Purusha, respectively.”47

The Aryans who entered the Indian subcontinent came into contact with the Ureinwohner who were dark complexioned. The Aryans who entered were white and originally did not cre-ate a schism between themselves and the dark complexioned people; instead they mixed open-ly with others. This became a matter of concern to the Brahmins, who saw that the society was moving towards Gesetzlosigkeit (adharma). As a result, they invented various classifications in society, which is today known as the caste classification. In doing so, they pushed the na-tive population to the lowest strata of society, naming them as Dasyas , the blacked skinned people.48

According to the sources available, the ancient literature of India could be traced back to 1300 B.C. However, the appearance of the caste system does not seem to be very significant until the later Vedic ritual literature period from 500 B.C. to 500  A.D. Interestingly, the earliest Rig-Veda period c. 1300–100 B.C. does not exhibit any signs of caste system that was included in this literature “though the elements out of which it developed were evidently in existence.”49

However, caste is basically comprehended as a divinely ordained system. Indian society was given this understanding from the ancient period onwards wherein religious understanding and religious support of this system attained societal integration. Once it had garnered reli-gious support, especially from the holy scriptures of the religion, acceptance grew faster with-out any resistance. The society which was chiefly dominated by the Brahmanic community owing to their knowledge of the Vedas and the authority that they possessed over the ancient scriptures, gave them the opportunity to organize society on a religious basis and more im-portantly, as a divinely inspired system. The theory that caste is based on religious ideas could, however, be supported by the analysis of Durkheim about religion by Célestine Bouglé.50 It was put forward by the following citation from Alex Michaels: “The society-based belief system of the Hindu society-Dumonts “Church” (Frz. Eglise) was its caste system. Since then, the thesis that the caste system has been able to assert itself mainly on the basis of religious ideas has been repeatedly put forward.”51 Though the above historical background gives us an impression that caste system is basically founded on a religious comprehension of society, other scholars dis-agree. A study of certain researchers who stayed within villages experienced various factors that contributed towards this caste system. They deny the religious basis of this caste system owing to the following reasons: Contrary to popular beliefs, various castes do not represent social groups; rather, they are more cognitive concepts in social organization and hierarchy. These castes function as social system, albeit within certain limits. It is interesting to note that Brahmins alone do not belong to the dominant caste. On the basis that it provides to the social organization of the society, one can observe that caste offers individual talents, capacities or even goods in an exchangeable religious and economical system.

All these factors suggest that caste is not merely a religious based system; instead, it is found-ed on the aspect of “centrality, economic dominance and patronage”.52 1.2.2 Varna as an Organization of the Society

The conclusion that caste is not a religious phenomenon gives rise to the further exposition of an organizational system. The following citation gives us an understanding of caste as a system of societal organization. This observation forms part of the missionary experiences of the early 20-century in India, where the missionaries were deeply involved in the societal activities of the poor strata of society:

The following tables demonstrate the societal system based on this varna system:

LandownerRajputs, Kshetri, marhatta, Nair

PriestBrahmanen

AstrologerJoshi

HealerVaidya

ScribeKayashtha

TraderBaniya, shrestha

A further societal division based on the nature of work was also automatically premised on the Varna.54

Social GroupsIndian TerminologyRelations, Functions and

Characteristics

Stand, Caste-GroupsVarna (also jati)Classical Stand arrangement, socio-re-ligious Ideology: Brahmana, Ksatriya, Vaisya, Sudra

Caste,

Professional-Grouping

Sub-caste

Jati

Jati

Commonality in Profession, Name,

Traditions; Formation of (political)

Caste-organisations

Dto; however, it is limited to region and language.

Clan, Sippe

Lineage

Gotra, vamsa, kula, sapinda;

Hindi: Kutumb, bhai-bandh, khandhan

A genealogical fictional criterion, especially which are relevant for rela-tionships for marriages and relative.

Blood relations with visible or detect-able links

Family GroupsJati Hindi: Biradari,

Nepali: Thar

A familial help contributed by neighbours in economic and religious occasions, marriage proposals, par-ticipation in rituals for the dead, and having common living quarters, gods and festivals.

Joint Family

Extended Family bzw .

Nuclear family.

Parivara

It is similar to family groups but in addition. there exists a common inher-itance and household.

Commensality, raising children, an-cestral care, performance of life cycle rituals 1.2.3 Varna to Caste: A Demeaning Element of the Society

So far, I have discussed the element of Varna as something that refers to a person’s skin colour or complexion. The white complexioned Aryans who invaded the subcontinent gradually be-gan subduing the native dark complexioned people as permanent slaves or workers in their household. This differentiation was made purely on the basis of skin colour. However, over time, this differentiation of colour became a reference point to establish a differentiation in so-cial status, thereby emerging as a synonym for class division in society. Thus, the natives were considered to be inferior to the people of different skin colour. Nevertheless, the exact period of

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emergence of this societal classification remains unknown. A song from the Upanishads gives information about this classification. (Rv X, 90 – Song of Purusa)55

This system which had its origins in the Vedic period did not continue till the modern pe-riod; instead, it took different turns influenced by societal developments and foreign and col-onizing influences. Today, caste system does not principally refer to a person’s profession be-cause members of various castes are present in various fields of works.

In the modern period, there is, at least officially, a claim of equality in a society that avoids any sort of caste-based discrimination. The Constitution of the free India in 1949 was composed by Dr Bimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who himself was a member of the lower caste. He belonged to the so-called untouchables of the society and went on to become a neo-Buddhist. The Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the constitution clearly speak of the equality of people and no discrimination based on Religion, Race, Caste and Sex. “The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.” Furthermore, Ar-ticle 17 condemns untouchability: “Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.”57

These articles in the Constitution are a clear indication of the existence of discrimination in society. The story of the untouchables in the Indian society is rather a tragic one that can-not be refuted. Although the caste system had its origin in Varna that did not include any discrimination such as untouchability, the later evolution of this system gave rise to such practices.

This is one of the most pervasive theories, at least in modern studies of the caste system. “A familiar trope in contemporary South Asian studies in the institutions often described as char-acteristic of Indian civilization, are, in fact, ‘inventions’ arising from the activities of British colonial authorities.”58 However, in order to analyse this nebulous situation, I will try to ex-pound the theme starting from the origin of the word ‘caste’, which had replaced the original term Varna .

The word caste has its origin in Portuguese, which in fact is derived from the Latin term castus; it is an adjective that means “morally pure, guiltless, pure, chaste, and pious”.59 Some Portuguese ancient correspondences used this word ‘caste’ depicting their colony, India. For instance, in 1516 A.D., Barbosa writes about the King of Calicut and his familial situation. He describes that the King had thousand ladies who belonged to very good families ( de boa casta ). Another chronicler named Caspar Correa writes in Cendas da India por about the casta of Christians in 1561. In 1562, Garcia in his Colloquios dos Simples e Drogas e Cousas Medecin- aes da India mentions the caste of Cobler. Another important source is the Sacred Council of Goa in 1567, which uses the word ‘caste’ as having the same meaning as that of a race, tribe or clan.60 Other Greek and the Muslim sources are older than their Portuguese and English counterparts: Megasthenes who worked in the court of Chandragupta II in Patliputra (Patna) describes 118 tribes in India. The word used by him is meros of Greek, but it was translated by J. W. McCrindle as, ‘Tribes’. According to Michael, Megasthenes even simultaneously de-scribes seven more classifications of professions: “namely sophists (Brahmins), farmers, shep-herds, craftsmen and traders, military, officials and advisers.”61 In this manner, one’s position in society is emphasized.

However, this does not indicate the immense importance of race, which is underlined or normally understood by other authors. The British were rather partial in according the same status to its colonial nations as that of the European nations. They considered the organization of the state and nation in India to be more complicated and segmented. Therefore, in organiz-ing Indian society, they did not want to use the same terminology that was common to Euro-pean settings. Owing to numerous differences that prevailed in the society, they invented this social group called ‘caste’. “In this way, a new social group was ‘discovered’, the caste, in which one saw closed bodies without the ability to form territorial states, comparable to the medieval guilds and guild.”62

There has been a sceptical view on whether caste was a conspiracy between the Europeans and the Brahmins “imposing a specific unity on the complexities of Indian society?”63 Certain scholars believe that the colonisers were being advised by the local Brahmins to maintain the varna system so that the Brahmins could continue to maintain their hegemonic presence in so-ciety under the aegis of the colonial rule. However, Susan Bayly does not agree that the British invented castes because she says that “the social reality of caste existed beyond the acknowl-edged influence of the British.”64 However, one cannot conclude with any degree of certitude that the British or other colonial powers invented this system that poses a serious threat to human dignity. Indubitably, ‘caste’ has different meanings, manifestation and derivatives or nuances of meanings.

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2Public Sphere as the Stadium of Habermasian Philosophy of Religion

Habermas’ philosophy of religion engages with the results of one’s own private religious con-victions and phenomenon. Put differently, it is a non-private or a public religious issue that he intends to deal with. Religion as experienced in personal lives through the aspect of a personal relationship with a higher being and compartmentalized in the field of Glauben’ (Faith) is treated by Habermas by a debate with Wissen (Knowledge) , which is a reflection of religious individuals’ public life. Understandably, he does not treat ontological inquiries as the sub-stantiality of his philosophy. Neither is his religion ensconced by an investigation into facts of revelation and questions related to the correctness of scriptures or their exegesis. To be clear, he is not a defender of faith and its tenets. Instead, he is a defender of the faithful or of believers.66I believe that it is important for Habermas to concentrate more on the believer than on the content of belief. In this way, he observes and expresses only what can be seen and experienced externally rather than imagining religious consciousness on a subliminal level. His analysis places importance on the actions of these believers inspired by a personal belief system. This, in turn, is available in the non–private sphere of the individuals, which Habermas refers to as ‘Public Sphere’ (PS).67 This PS connects various individual believers where they can express their private beliefs on a communitarian level. My intention of religious analysis intrinsically finds its basis in this concept where religion is being investigated in the PS rather than in the private.

Undeniably, the role of religion in the PS has its roots in the ancient world. Nonetheless, in our modern times, authors such as Casanova, Berger, Taylor and Habermas have taken this theme to the forefront of philosophical discourses. The underlying intention behind such an approach could be attributed to their interest in the events relating to civil society. Habermas recognizes the relationship religions have as organized bodies across societies with the state, which governs the civic lives of its citizens.68 The sphere existing between the state and the civil society is considered by Habermas to be the PS. It is in this sphere that all the organized religious bodies find themselves actively participating in expressing their views about the civic life and the policies that the state is required to make. Consequently, they apply themselves to debates, which are no more just religious, but are actually concerned with the policy making of the state.69

The following chapter investigates the concept of the ‘Public Sphere’ along with the concom-itant dynamics in society. It then attempts to connect religion and its communitarian role in the PS. I also contend that religious spaces could be considered to be the PS where the opinion of the public/believers is influenced and shaped.

2.1 The Public Sphere

The term ‘public sphere’ is often associated with social and political philosophy of Jürgen Habermas ever since he published his work entitled The Structural Transformation of Public Sphere .71 Habermas analyses the historical genesis of the PS in civic societies and explains how this PS began to deviate from its original intention along with its structural transformation. The study on the PS was his Habilitationsschrift (postdoctoral dissertation) in the Frankfurt School of Philosophy. Despite being initially rejected by his mentor, it was recognized as a valid contribution to the Frankfurt school of critical thinking in the later stages.72

Habermas traces the origins of the PS to the Age of Enlightenment wherein both secular and religious scenarios were characterized by critical thinking and heated debates. The endeav-our was to investigate the political discussions that the PS initiated during the American and French revolutions. He believes that the term PS is closely related to Bourgeois because it was seen as a space that existed among the Bourgeois, the so-called elite group of the society, which was keen to make its opinions known to the state by engaging in discussions on issues related to society and the state at large.73 It was a post-war scenario in Germany that led him to unleash the latent potential of bourgeois.

It could be observed that Habermas explores this concept in relation to civic life; thus, the cit-izens themselves are the actors in this sphere. This space also allowed common men to express their views on various issues pertaining to the societal life. It is a space of institutions and prac-tices between the private interests of everyday life in civil society and the realm of state power. Various aspects of the PS such as newspapers, journals, and institutions of political discussions and even places of entertainment like clubs were considered to accommodate the initiation of public discussions. Moreover, matters related to societal and political life were discussed even in even salons, pubs, and coffee houses, and meeting halls.76 Though it is not difficulty to identify limitations in Habermas’ analysis on the PS, he is apparently right in plotting out its emergence in an era of democratic revolutions. Consequently, for the first time in history, ordinary citizens were provided with an opportunity to express their views concerning public issues. This included their active involvement in political discussions, debates, organizations and protests against all sorts of unjust authoritarian structures of the society. This sowed the seeds of social changes that gradually cultivated in western societies and continue to this day.77

2.2 Public Opinion

In discussing the public sphere, we inevitably exposed to the reality of its important compo-nent, i.e., Public Opinion (PO). In the previous section, we have seen that the PS creates space to express the opinion of people, which implies that this opinion of is formed through discus-sions and arguments. According to Habermas, this process needs to take the form of discursive argumentation. Importantly, this discursive argument presupposes freedom of speech, assem-bly and freedom of press as well.79 Such freedom accommodates public use of reason, which depends on “normative commitments to openness and rational political discourse.”80

The word ‘opinion’ both in English and French is derived from the Latin expression, ‘ opinio’ , meaning, “of the uncertain, not fully demonstrated judgement.”81 The PS paves the way for discussions on various issues relating to societal improvement through a discursive method.82They basically reflect “the genuine needs and correct tendencies of common life.”83 There is another meaning that Habermas attributes to it, namely, ‘reputation’. This word implies the representation of an opinion of a person by others. It is an:

One of the important elements of this PO is a critical approach based on critical refection . With a basic background of critical reflection, one would be able to form a judgment, which then gets converted into an opinion. PO in English is developed through public spirit. However, Haber-mas opines that PO and Public spirit are not one and the same as he uses the word “instead” in using these two expressions. But the English have sometimes used these two expressions as synonyms. Nonetheless another expression such as ‘sense of the people’ forms the basis of public spirit, which in this context is an oppositional one to the commonly held opinions, es-pecially by the state. This public spirit thus expresses an important character of the enlighten-ment era. Habermas sees an essential element that is utilized in this PO: reason.85 Individuals put this reason into practice and therefore, PO “did not arise from mere inclination but private reflection upon public affairs and from their public discussions.”86

There are two different categories of persons who are highlighted in order to make this PS work effectively through PO. The PS strongly depends on PO, which is formed and structur-ally presented through scholars. They take PO and examine it, then determine its rationality through their scholarly expertise. After having gone through this stage, PO moves to the Gov-ernors, the second category that puts PO into practice whatever conclusions were drawn based on the critical reflections of public guided by the experts/scholars.

In PO, there exists a mutual responsibility that every citizen owes to one another. The PS plays an important role in a democratic setup, where it forms the opinion based on valid reasons, and the justifications given by its members ought to be based on reasons acceptable by all. “Only in this way can citizens see themselves not just as subject to the law but as authors of the law, as the democratic ideal requires.”88

2.3 Transformation of Structures

The intrinsic capacity that is embedded within the purview of public opinion has the capacity to change the political structures. They have the potentiality to influence the secular authority and religious authority as well. On the whole, the PO that develops in the PS plays a key role in shaping various ideologies and beliefs, ultimately showing its impact on the legislation of civil life. Habermas explains this phenomenon with an example of the debate on gay marriage. Public views and opinions certainly play a role in effecting a change in the case of an institu-tional religion. In view of my overarching goal i.e., to arrive at a postmetaphysical religion in India, this stage of transformation of structure is important. To bring about the desire change in the religious thinking, it obviously begins from the PS, where the PO is initiated and oper-ated. A discussion of the existing system by the public will give the impetus to informed views about existing structures. Such an influence of PO on the change of religious thinking and structures is important for the purpose of post metaphysical thinking.

Habermas refers to the case of Britain in explaining this role of PO in politics.

PO gradually developed in various places and were published in pamphlets before attaining the stage of press that presented critical opinions of the public.

Next, I will briefly explicate how PO functions actively, especially in an institutionalized Reli-gion like the Catholic Church. This explains how PO could also be materialized in influencing legislation within the religious institutions. The Catholic Church, which is regarded as the oldest religious institution, also has traits of public opinion and its influence in the transformation of structures. Pope Pius XII was the first pope to use this term ‘public opinion’ within the Church.Against the backdrop of Lutheran Reformation, the church was impelled to respond to the situations and demands of its members (the public). At this juncture, the famous Tridentine theology speaks of sensus fidelium . The Spanish theologian Melchior Cano († 1560) developed this doctrine in his work, De Locis Theologicis .93 However, the public opinion that is experi-enced in the civil society and the PS that one experiences in the Catholic Church varies.

The remarkable influence of the public that includes both the civil and the community of believ-ers which compelled the Catholic Church to make amendments in the transparency regarding child abuse cases cannot be denied. Equally, various Marian shrines of the late eighteenth to nineteenth century had a tremendous effect on the declaration of certain dogmas propagated by the church. Therefore, it is impossible to by-pass ordinary people, and their daily faith, be-liefs and practices that made an indelible contribution to how the church functions till today. The above citation illuminates a salient element that lies underneath the working of a genuine PO. The description on PS by Habermas obviously deemed to have an intention to rescue the original purpose and vitality of the PS, which had gradually lost its credibility. Based on the aforementioned observations, one can conclude that the PS has definitely a political function, especially in influencing the legislative body of the government. They have the capacity to offer reasons that are to be taken into consideration and lead the legislators to discuss the necessary response to various PO. This could be referred to for example in modern India.96 The Indian Law had to make necessary changes regarding the punishment of a rapist after continuous in-fluence of the public and its opinion in treating a case of rape, which elicited the attention of the world media The public consciousness in India grew rapidly ever since the grotesque incident that took place on December 16, 2012. This has become visible through the demonstrations and protests that shook the entire nation in exercising its right as individuals to express their opinion and even coerce the legislative body to make necessary amendments.97

2.4 Religion and the Public Sphere

After having undertaken a robust investigation into the nature of the PS and its functions through the PO, I would like to explore why religion is apparently an important element of the PS that can even potentially affect the legislative policies of governments, let alone the ancient world and Middle Ages where religion dictated social and political lives of the people. Apparently, this impact continues to exist in our societies even today in a society where there is a clear separation of church and state. This is exactly what Habermas investigates in his philos-ophy of religion. According to him, ignoring such an element is not a good idea. Instead, being aware of it would give support in leading rational societal lives.98

Habermas begins his analysis of religion in public by citing some of the important events to have unfolded throughout history. These mainly refer to the religious wars and suppressions that beleaguered modern times and continue to this day. He refers not just to the Muslim world but also to other parts of the world, where such religious related fundamentalism is prevalent. In this manner, he demonstrates how religious conflicts are dominating the narrative in world politics.100 Religion also plays a pivotal role in the so-called modern societies like America. It even continues to dictate people’s personal lives and their decisions. As a consequence, the quest for modernity in the world is apparently facing a stronger force that has stifled its accel-eration. Ever since the enlightenment period, the west is trying to assert itself as the perfect model of a secularized society, holding the ultimate liberal space, where religion could not have an upper hand. On the contrary, these western societies witness a constant increase of religious presence and influence in their societies. Furthermore, these societies often witness hostile political divisions based on religion. It is not uncommon for politicians to take sides based on the importance of religiously motivated movements in society. Major issues like abortion, gays, and unconditional rejection of torture influence political divisions. Issues such as these are very much based on religious convictions.101

The influence of religion in the public sphere is acceptable for Habermas, albeit on one condi-tion that they must satisfy certain cognitive conditions with epistemic attitudes.103 “The con-stitutional freedom of conscience and religion is the appropriate political response to the chal-lenges of religious pluralism.”104 Every citizen has the right to participate in the public life of a society. Towards this end, the citizens can also exercise their rights to express their opinion in the PS, regardless of whether it is secular or religious. Unfortunately, it is often erroneously construed that imposing restrictions on religious life is not problematic. However, people be-longing to this category consider the supremacy of rationality and the inferiority of religious rationality to be nothing less than irrationality in the public domain. “[…] secularists propose a limit on religion in the public sphere, which they take to be a basis for equal inclusion, but at the same time insulate themselves from understanding religious discourse, practicing an ironic exclusion.”105

The philosophical role of religion that Habermas recognizes in the PS is the significance of its contribution in forming the ethical and moral fabrics of society. In the context of PS, he concedes that religion is the cornerstone on which our society’s civic values and political structures have been constructed.

Habermas sees the essentiality of religious rationality that lies at the centre of society that plays an unseen role in the formation of PO. Though liberals or seculars are quick to point out the diminishing role of religion in the PS, it cannot be denied that the influence of religion in our modern times is a reality, which, however, continues to represent the opinion of Westphalia Trea-ty (1648) when the principle was still “ cuius regio, eius religio (whose region it is, his religion it is).” In essence, religion has never really been a private affair.107 Hence denying the active presence of religion would be akin to denying a primal element of society. Thus, it is necessary to recognize the presence of religions, which have their share of contribution in forming laws pertaining to morality and ethics in society. Cristina Lafont clearly differentiates between J. Rawls and Haber-mas regarding the involvement of every citizen and the validity of the reasons cited by them. The limitation of Rawls in his proviso108 excludes religious reasons to some extent. Though he does allow religious reasons in politics, there is a ‘providedness’ that puts a break on religious reasons and he continues with proper exclusiveness of political reasons. Habermas, on the other hand, widens the scope of religious reasons in the PS by obviating this censorship or proviso.

2.5 Public Sphere in Pre-Modern India

Traces of the PS according to Habermasian work could be found during the Age of Enlighten-ment in Europe with the initiative of bourgeois societies. Through colonialism, postcolonial societies have imported the structures of the PS and the formation of PO in modern times. This is a general impression that is given by the colonial bosses to the rest of the world. Though the colonialists themselves engaged in critical debates, something which is deemed unique by Habermas, the fact remains that this was absent in the colonial areas.110 Here, I would suggest, with the help of Christian Lee Novetzke, that such an impression could be denied and that we could trace the PS and the development of PO in India even before the PS developed in Eu-rope.111 Apparently, in an early period, the PS functioned through the agency of religious saints in India. This establishes the fundamental differences between the early west and Indian PS. In a study about the PS in pre-modern India, Christian Lee Novetzke gives us examples of cases where PO cultivated within a religious context and religious literature.

The concept of PS is not alien to modern India as the country had experienced the work-ings and its effects during the independence movement. The traces of the PS could be traced back to the thirteenth century A.D., where the vernacularisation of religious texts became a powerful instrument in forming the PS. However, this is limited to a particular area in the vast sub-continent territory, because it is evidently a daunting task to spread its tentacles in a faster way that one could expect in modern times, owing to the vast territory that India has in comparison to the European territories. Therefore, it would be imprudent to compare the PS in a European context with that of pre-modern India. In his research, Christian inserts the analytical comprehension of the PS by Habermas to this context. He suggests that the PS comes from a religious background or movement. It cannot be denied that almost every religious founder was endowed with the charisma required for creating PO that affected the daily lives of people. “So, the idea of the Public Sphere that we have from Habermas, though it begins in a highly provincialized time and place (Europe, eighteenth century), has enough generality to it to extend beyond this time and place, to other societies engaged in critical debate about the common good.”112 Interestingly, Habermas limits his PS to the eighteenth century, claiming that it cannot be transferable. For all those who continue in this line of thought, it is obviously an invention of the western world. However. Christian even opens up the possibility of looking at it in other non-western societies “… Habermas’ own definition of the public sphere is very general and appears quite transposable, hardly the homogenous product of eighteenth-century Europe; it appears as a heterogeneous phenomenon at home in many places and times. Haber-mas defines the public sphere as a society engaged in critical debate.”113

Christian Novetzke describes the “genealogy of discursive sphere” with a serious engage-ment of critical debates that Habermas discerns in cafes and public houses, existed five centu-ries earlier in India; he refers to this as the “nascent public sphere.”114 This PS neither entailed a complete democratic participation nor did it involve a political scenario. Thus, many scholars did not consider it to be PS prior to that of the European one. Despite such limitations, Chris-tian Novetzke suggests that making Sanskrit religious texts available in vernacular languages was one of the best means through which a PS was created during these early centuries. Ana-lysing two such texts of Lilacarita and Jnanesvari, Christian Novetzke comments:

It is clearly suggested that by the vernacularization of these texts and the availability of salva-tion to everyone irrespective of their caste or gender that a “[…] discursive sphere opens up in which questions of social equality, […] rise to the surface of public debate.”116 In this manner, Christian Novetzke develops the idea of public debate of Habermas as something that cannot be constrained; instead, the diversity of public debate is brought into light.

This public debate was initiated by the lives of devout persons who used their devotion and religious commitment for bringing about societal changes and shaping consciousness. The character posed in these writings is Chandrakhar, a controversial figure, whose societal status, especially his caste, was unknown. Despite a controversial background, which is generally not acceptable for the Brahmins, he is considered a saint, a central figure who rejuvenated this public sphere and expressed critical ideas against evils of society. Nonetheless, unlike what we see in the modern times or even the beginnings of the public sphere in Europe, he ignites this fire through his religious discourses. A similar observation can be made about Kabir Das in the Moghul court. Belonging to a lower section of caste, he was able to initiate discourses that supported the idea of equality. “Kabir himself belonged to the weaver ( julaha ) caste of converts to Islam, placing him outside the pale both of the identifiably Hindu and the Muslim world.”117 To cite another example, the Bhakti movement was a religious movement that aimed at extolling the virtues of devoting towards a personal god. Bhakti means piety. The Bhakti movement created similar parameters in society for public debate that questioned the equality of man before God, irrespective of his caste and gender. Saints involved in this movement cultivated a sort of public sphere where both the commoners and the elite had the opportunity to come together. The aim of these saints, however, was to express their personal devotion to a deity. Through their methodology and approach to this deity, it was explicitly made clear that such devotion ought to overcome all impediments in the form of inhuman practices prevailing in society. In his devotional expressions to a personal deity, he overcomes all societal taboos that restricted members of lower status in participating public worship of gods. But the life of Kalidas proved that devotion to god goes beyond one’s social status. This is surely a matter of discussion among the elites of the then society, especially the Brahmins who consider Shudras as unclean and belonging to the lower part of the society. Lee’s study on the above mentioned two writings (Jnanesvari and Lilacarita) that engage in religious discourses with a highly de-bateable and critical style with regard to social problems, such as equality in society. By the very fact that these writings were made available in the vernacular language creates awareness of public and social problems that concern them.

Hence the PS that one could discover in India is significantly different from the Haberma-sian description of the western PS. Despite their different approaches and methods, the shared factor that could be derived in both these cases is ‘a critical approach’. They ignite a critical debate with regard to issues related to social and public lives.

2.6 Religious Spaces as Public Sphere

After having analysed and compared J. Habermas and Christian Lee, it goes without saying that in the Indian context, public debate is an issue that could be more actively worked out in a religious context than in a secular context one like that of a European model. Examples for such in our present times are the strong political parties that place religious figures in the fore-front in order to shape the public opinion for both credible and odious reasons.119 Similarly, the numbers of religious centres with their gurus, who are known to have the penchant of mixing religion with national opinion-forming are on the increase in the society. Therefore, I suggest here that religious spaces, what are generally called as places of worship, are indeed centres where the public opinion is being formed in a way that should not be underestimated. “[…] not only ought we move past the idea that religion has a restricted place within a given public sphere, but that it might be the very centre of one, the primary medium or aesthetic for critical public debate about the common good.”120

Considering religious spaces as PS is helpful to recognize how deeply these religious spaces influence civic lives. In fact, this is true not only in the Indian context; rather, I see that it hap-pens around the globe, though one does not make a mention of it as the PS. In every religious space when a community is gathered, religious convictions and consciousness are formed on a regular basis, which then get transferred to the civic societies in making decisions. Habermas cites Paul Weithman who sheds light on the role of religious, especially with the example of legislatures making decisions about sensitive topics such as abortion or gay partnership:

This gives rise to the logical question: where do these citizens get influenced in forcing the governments to make policies that are congruent with their views? Without a doubt it is their religious gatherings, scriptures and constant expression of their communitarian opinion that inspire them to make their voices or opinion known to the governments. The example of American evangelicals is particularly poignant in demonstrating how influential religion is in forming the PO. These evangelical centres are comparable with Habermasian cafes or sa-loons where PO is formed. The Islamic world that is constantly rife with the threat of war and violence could also be considered an example where the PO is imposed under the penalty of religious chastisement. The pre-independent India is another instance where we see the strong force of PO developed among the religious circles and centres that eventually led to the coun-try’s division on religious lines. Observing how the negative effects of religion were creeping into the Indian politics, Nehru the first Prime Minister of India was disenchanted with the state of affairs and was doubtful whether India would remain healthy and productive. He did not want religion to play any role in politics, but to no avail, for his wish has never come true. On the contrary, religion has had a strong impact on the so-called independent India. “How long that will take, I cannot say, but religion in India will kill the country and its peoples if it is not subdued.”122

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3 Habermasian Parameters in Indian Context

As mentioned before, Habermasian philosophy is a euro-centric philosophy. Therefore, in the attempt to make him fit into the Indian context, it is fundamentally important to investigate whether similar social contexts can be seen elsewhere in the Indian setup. Hence, this chapter on parameters of Habermas helps me analyse the extent of the Habermasian context that can be found in India. I would be classifying the western context into three various phenomenal characteristics viz ., modern, secular and plural. Although these three parameters are interre-lated, they exhibit their own specialities in the Indian setting.

3.1 Modernity

Modernity in relation to the theme of religion is the essential idea that underpins this discus-sion. Modernity is however a hallmark of European or western societies. As a starting point of the discussion on modernity, it is important to know the influence that religion has had on the thought pattern of society in general, given that it was seen as a stumbling block to modernity. In the context of modernity, secularism and pluralism are considered as essential, as characteristic features of the ideology of modernity. Societies which declare themselves as modern portray an image of an ecosystem that has liberated itself from the stifling shackles of religion, which has dominated civil authority in more ways than one. However, Weber posits that though modernity aims to establish a super excellent world of rationality that can only occur through the conduit of religion, as it is the essentiality of all pre modern societies.123Modernity’s goal to transform existing practices that encompass human life in its entirety. It fosters a novel way of thinking and reimagining things to make way for progressiveness. Here, I would like to limit myself to the understanding of modernity in relation to Indian contexts and to show the similarities prevailing between the western and Indian societies with regard to modernity. It would also be pertinent to point out that this chapter would not undertake a detailed explication on the concept of modernity. As the purpose of this chapter is to situate the Habermasian context, I would succinctly outline the theme within the boundaries of mo-dernity pertaining to my research. 3.1.1 Modernity Defined

The central point of the discussion that characterizes the PS is a critical approach or criti-cal thinking of the masses. This idea, however, is pivotal in understanding how modernity emerged in society. The word ‘modernity’ is derived from a Latin word modernus, derived from modo, meaning the ‘present, now and recently.’ Augustine had used this term in the early Christian period in a Roman context. The interplay of two different cultures, Roman and Christian, encouraged Augustine to coin this term “in contrast to an antinomic sense compared to antiquus .”124 In his time, Christianity was like a young child belonging to a dif-ferent generation. Therefore, he had to refer to this context in comparing Christianity to the older generation, which is the pagan Rome. Thus, the purpose of this vocabulary is to denote or express the difference or the newness of an historical era that brought about transformative change, almost obliterating everything pertaining to the past.125 “[…] the expression moder-nity repeatedly articulates the consciousness of an era that refers back to the past of classical antiquity precisely in order to comprehend itself as the result of a transition from the old to the new.”126 In this process, one can observe that there is a process of negation of the present; it is a movement that is looking for improvement or to accommodate the right perspective. It implies a human yearning towards authenticity or perfection that moves from an imperfect past, which is why Habermas says it is a “ yearning for true-presence ”.127

The aspect of a continuous elaboration and improvisation in materializing modernity, as posited by Habermas is in contrast to those who say that modernity has been accomplished. More specifically, he said: “Modernity is the only universal civilisation and remains the only valid and legitimate universal discourse”.128 The all-embracing element of modernity is the virtue of self-correction, which is effected by reforming itself in the prevailing situations and conditions of the people. “The crux of Habermas’ argument is simply that modernity is capable of reforming itself by allowing, limiting, appropriating and internalising criticisms.”129

Therefore, I deem it fit to summarize modernity in a single terminology based on the views espoused by Habermas and other modern thinkers, as rationalism. The idea of modernity that revived European societies is founded on this concept of reviving rationalism.

Western modernization, however, becomes an indicator to the rest of the world, which tries often to imitate it. This is an undeniable fact. For example, China, which is a very staunch ad-herent of communism, owes its idea to the western Marxist invention of communism. When we consider such examples, one must accept the fact that modernity is a child of western civili-zation. “Habermas – through a re-formulation of the theory of rationality – tries to demonstrate the historical-universal validity of Western rationalization, that is, the fact that it represents an ideal model for modernization.”131 However Habermas believes that despite being labelled as western, rationalism does not imply that it is available only in the west . However, in a Weberian sense, “rationalism is Western because it presents features proper of the Euro-Atlantic civiliza-tion – especially those recognized as bound to a logic of domination.”132 In addition, Habermas states that modernity loses its meaning and freedom if modern rationalism is characterized by logic of domination. Nonetheless, what Habermas observes about western rationalization is “a universal-historical emergence of modern structures of consciousness”.133

In line with the Habermasian conception of modernity, one can derive the idea of eman-cipation that runs through his discourse about modernity. The struggle arising during those periods of modernization were characterized by this single phenomenon that aimed at exam-ining the importance of a subject, which is materialized by laying emphasis on the rights of individuals.

Hence, this aspect of emancipation will be elucidated in the following discussion by analysing the period of enlightenment and its effect on modernity. 3.1.2 Enlightenment and Modernity

The period of enlightenment was considered the era of modernity where there was a rift between the ancient regime, religion and progressive ideas in which a strong current was emerging by the triumphalism of science over religion to free people from obsolete thoughts and encourage them to explore more progressive thought patterns. Freethinkers mark the era of modernity as arising from the enlightenment period. The deistic movement played a remarkable role in the philosophical and religious world that prepared a fertile ground for freethinkers who were until then oppressed by the state and church alike. Urbanisation, industrialization, capitalism, and Marxist philosophy linked enlightenment and modernity from an elementary level itself. “In the Enlightenment, reason enables men to be liberated from error, from superstition and submission to the traditional powers of the Church and the aristocracy, to be masters of their own destiny, to pursue individual and collective happiness” (as the American Declaration of Independence recites).135

In his essay on The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment , Habermas makes a comparison between enlightenment and myth that enters into the area of conquering the self, the Id or the ego. Based on the legendary Greek texts, he demonstrates how one has to undergo a lot of difficulties in the hope of overcoming the old self, but the fact of the myth is that one returns to the old self without being aware of it. One seems to elude the fate of the myth, but this is not the case. So for Habermas, “An almost completely rationalized modern world only seems to be demystified; on it rests in fact the curse of demonic objectification and fatal isolation.”136There is a formative process in which one struggles to move away from old and redundant ele-ments while aiming for a goal that brings newness. Consequently, the concept of emancipation emerges from the whole process of enlightenment both on subjective and objective levels.137

Against the post-structuralists philosophy of the French, Habermas postulates that enlight-enment, as an unfinished project of modernity and the elements that try to deactivate the emancipatory potentiality of enlightenment, especially by the French postmodernist, needs to be reconsidered rather than being ignored.139

The enlightenment period in the west apparently serves as the starting point of modernity that paved the way for the emergence of many new critical thinkers like philosophers, artists, scientists who strived to work towards removing impediments towards human development. Modern philosophies such as Cartesian theory and others around the seventeenth century had apparently rejected previous philosophical theories. These new approaches placed human rea-soning in the center of their thought.141 With such a basic comprehension of enlightenment, it would be interesting to look towards the east to see how the word enlightenment is referred to. Buddha’s spiritual awakening is alluded to using the word ‘enlightenment’. This too refers to a formative process in which Siddhartha had to undergo a process of renunciation and journey towards seeking the truth.

In investigating modernity and enlightenment, we often revolve around religion as the scapegoat that was labeled as an irrational element of society which was to be eliminated during this period in order to expedite the journey towards modernity.142 Religious reasons were hardly considered rational and the sole aim of these enlightenment advocates was to distance themselves from the irrationality of religious structures while reaffirming belief in a God. The various events that occurred in Europe such as agitations, revolutions, debates, sup-pression of religious orders like that of the Jesuits, and burning at stake for heresy resulted in the emergence of new religious groups like the Methodists in Britain or pietism in Germany. On the whole, this period has more to do with religion than with enlightenment.143 3.1.3 Modernity a Scheme to Emancipation

The very idea of being conscious of one’s own self and rights includes the emancipation that connects society with the French revolutionary principles such as fraternity, equality and lib-erty. Societies across the globe have accepted these principles in order to make a transition from the past, traditional to the present, new and modern. One of the enduring effects that was attributed to modernity is the idea of emancipation. This included a consciousness that brought awareness among the citizens about their rights as human beings both in Europe and globally. I shall refer to two examples, where this emancipation could be concretely experi-enced in order to demonstrate how modernity and emancipation are deeply interrelated: wom-en and gays. These two categories of people have historically been relegated to the position of marginalized sections of society. In Indian parlance, a comparison could be drawn between women/gays and people belonging to lower castes who were not given equal status in society. But globally, especially in the context of Habermas, women and gays were commonly subject to rampant discrimination. The modern consciousness that stressed on the theory of emanci-pation opened up opportunities for these two groups.

“Modernity is a process with no end that implies the idea of permanent innovation, of con-tinual creation of the new. Living in the present, it is oriented towards the future, avid for novelty, promoting innovation. It invented, as (…), the tradition of the new .”144 If the definition of modernity could be based on development and progression, then it can be construed that modernity has been part of our human history in every age. Just as the New Age thinkers consider themselves modernists for being reformers of the old religion, so did the reformers of every age. Therefore, modernity cannot be limited to a particular period of time in history be-cause it is an on-going process that every generation seems to have experienced and continues to experience. In this sense, the origins of modernity in the subcontinent could be referred to reformed thinking beginning from Buddha himself. He was on enlightened person who abol-ished inequality among citizens and gave equal status to all, regardless of one’s caste, creed, or sexuality.

Still further one can refer to modern thinking in the sub-continent under the influence of colonial rulers. Reform movements were simultaneously in vogue in India as in the western world. These movements included the emancipation of women that even resulted in India pro-claiming the first female prime minister in the world. The expansive potentiality of human rights consciousness that emerged in the west and then reached the colonial states acceler-ated the transition from the traditional societal living and responses to a so-called modern pattern.145 India is considered the world’s largest democracy, which, in turn, is seen as the hallmark of modernity. The centrality of this discussion represents the idea of emancipation that allows modernity to emphasize the idea of equality. This, in turn, is materialized in a dem-ocratic state than in a theistic regime. The political atmosphere that fosters the engagement of every citizen in being part of the country’s legislation and election of its representatives indi-cates their active participation in public life.

Though the idea of modernization emerged in western circles around the enlightenment pe-riod and the early revolutionary period, it took almost three to four centuries to actualize these ideologies. I say ‘a certain realization’ because there is a lot more yet to be done as Habermas says, the project of modernity is not yet finished. A lot needs to be done to ensure everyone has equal status in society. This emancipatory aspect is an ongoing process that seems to be moving at a snail’s pace at many parts of the world, including India.

However, if colonial history is anything to go by, we can safely infer that the process of mo-dernity was not a successful one, as colonialism has acted in contrast to what their homeland people fought for through enlightenment and revolutions. The basic values of fraternity, equal-ity and liberty were completely disregarded by the colonizers. Through colonization, humanity once again introduced slavery and violated freedom of expression. If modernity is emancipa-tion, then such examples show that it remains an elusive goal. 3.1.4 How far is India modern in Habermasian Sense?

When answering this question, I have to be careful about the universality of modernity. In ref-erence to Eisenstadt , authors like Choukrone and Bhandari have raised valid questions on the universality of modernity.146 Could there only be one model of modernity? Is western moder-nity the only feasible type of modernity? Therefore, questions can be raised on Habermasian presentation of western rationalization as universal-historical emergence of modern structures of consciousness or an ideal model for modernization.147 This impels us to reflect on the unilin-ear conception about understanding in contrast to that of a linear and singular model.

However, the following discussion is an attempt to evaluate the levels of modernity based on Habermasian and Indian understanding.

When speaking of modernity, it would be imprudent to undermine the important group of citizens identified with modernity. The bourgeois middle class plays an important role in this regard. Just as the middle class or the bourgeois in Europe played a leading role, the same can be said about the Indian subcontinent. Though the middle class in India does not engage in po-litical debates publicly, its lifestyle does change from time to time (or stage to stage). From the observers’ point of view, it can be said that modernity appears by itself during this unconscious stage of changes. The middle class has a predilection for imitating universal trends. By this I mean that the middle class tend to adapt to an automatic learning process (transferred from the west) without being given normative instructions. In the present world, the middle class has access to universal trends, which could be tried out within their limited given contexts. Moreover, there is an awareness that grows among these people about subjects and ideologies through cross-cultural engagement that then leads them to modern lives.149

One of the important means through which this consciousness increases in India is the the-atre what is called the silver screen, the cinema and the popular magazines appearing in both English and vernacular languages. These serve as agents through which newer lifestyles are learned and imitated. Sometimes, it even occurs that this imitation is aimed at being a contest-ed society in European or American societies while losing their self-identity. However, there are both positive and negative sides of these agents.

A critical response to societal problems is one of the remarkable features of modernization, which is particularly tangible in the Indian metropolitan atmosphere. Here, we need to dis-tinguish between the urban and rural approaches and extrapolate the dependencies on each group’s mentality, psychological and social perspectives. The urban approaches are based on their exposure to the global approaches which allows them to broaden their horizons, which, however, cannot be said for rural areas. One can observe that the more one is exposed to global perspectives, cultures and critical approaches, the more one will be able to progress towards a modernity that even the rural areas yearn for. “Demographic disturbances that uproot mil-lions of people from their ancestral habitat and the concentration of the majority of the pop-ulation in urban environments that are functionally complex, culturally pluralistic, socially heterogeneous if not chaotic”,151 is an aspect that can be deciphered from the modernization process in diverse historical experiences.

As mentioned before, Indian modernity has an affinity towards imitation. The Indian con-sciousness has been conditioned to view the outsider or more precisely, that which emerged from the early colonial times, as superior.

This type of consciousness has been enforced by the colonists in order to serve their agendas because the westerners cold not understand the profundity or even nuances of indigenous cultures. Hence, the imitation of modernity is sadly a fruitless modernity that bears no change in the consciousness. Contrary to the west, modernity in India did not arrive through a mass change of consciousness. The masses never asked themselves why they needed to be modern or did not fight against monarchies in order to have a modern rule. They were treated as timid pushovers who had to accept whatever situation they were forced to be in. In a philosophical sense, modernization in Indian context was not a conscious process. Though I referred to the various conscious efforts of emancipation in India in the previous section, the point I am try-ing to make is that it was an extremely slow process due to the lack of mass involvement in the process of modernization. However, Choukroune points to a more than singular understand-ing of modernity, instead letting the experiences of various scholars and researchers speak for themselves:

Thus, the features of modernity in the west and India cannot be equated but it could be, to a certain extent, be traced out through the external appearance of modernity which is expressed by India’s engagement in the process of emancipation though it cannot be considered a mass conscious engagement.

3.2 Secular

Modernity, as investigated above, leads us to a further parameter, which is closely related to modernity. The following point of discussion on the secular nature of the Habermasian context and the understanding of what secularism means from a sociological perspective accommo-dates Haberma’ thinking in the Indian context. Notably, I will not be commencing a debate on secularism as it will be discussed in a separate chapter to further my investigation on post-metaphysical thinking in relation to secularism.

In this section, I express my scepticism about the contours of Indian secularism, exploring whether India is still in a pre-secular stage in the western sense. The word ‘secularism’ itself was not originally part of the Indian constitution, but was later inserted by the late Mrs Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India in the wake of religious tensions between the Sikhs and the others.154 Against this backdrop, the word ‘secularism’ could be dealt in a pluralistic context. This pluralism is mainly based on the existence of different religions in India. As we have seen in the previous section, even the word ‘Hindu’ was coined by the invaders in order to differentiate the local religions from foreign religions.155 3.2.1 Indian versus Western Secularism

Theidea of secularism that emerged in the Indian context is not comparable to the western or the American scenario. The word ‘secularism’ obviously originated in the western context, which has its impact on religious thinking, and simultaneously resulted in a secular way of life in various sections of society. But …

If one tries to apply the western concept of secularism to India, it could exacerbate the con-fusion about the whole affair of secularism. The concept of secularism emerged from the west in reference to the separation of the church and the state, as explained by various scholars; for this reason, it would be rather difficult to ensure contextual relevance in India For instance, Marxist secularism was motivated by a visceral aversion towards religion per se. Whereas it would be difficult to have a hostile attitude towards religion from the individual’s perspective because religion is an inextricable part of people’s lives and societal conditioning. Therefore, any expression that separates a person from religion would be nonsense. Religion in the west-ern sense is represented by an entity called the church, which is institutional. It is a body of representatives of a particular religion that speaks for the whole community. So, the individ-ual’s religion is deeply linked with this institutional religion, which has the form of a govern-ing body similar to that of the civil state. The history of Europe is replete with examples of immense power that the church had as a governing body over the civil society. This is exactly where the difference arises in the Indian context. Otherwise, secularism has to be conceived in the context of liberal-democratic tradition of the west, which is why America has naturally made a larger contribution towards it. “The secular state is a state that guarantees individual and corporate freedom of religion, deals with the individuals as a citizen irrespective of his religion, is not constitutionally connected to a particular religion, nor seeks either to promote or interfere with religion.”157

In the following discussion, I will analyse the Indian secularism in reference to toleration and equality of religion and the recognition of religion as a vital aspect of society. 3.2.2 Toleration as the Dynamism of Secularism

In the European historical context, one cannot separate the church from the state. The pre-vious stages of European history were dominated by one religion, which was supported by the emperor. Any signs of other religious faiths were considered to be unacceptable. One of the famous examples of such suppression of other faiths even in modern Europe is the deadly inquisition. Even Germany’s history depicts how the Germanic race was brutally supressed by Emperor Charles V, who embraced Roman Catholicism and wanted all his German allies to be part of this faith.

However, in the Asian context, many kingdoms co-existed in one country. These kingdoms, however, differed in their religions: Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist. The kings of each religion did support their own religion but also respected members of other religions living in their king-dom. Nevertheless, in some south Asian countries where Islam has spread enormously, one had to resign to the fact that the monarchs did play a special role in that. They did sometimes enforce their religious ideologies on people belonging to other faiths, chiefly by means of taxation.159

It is instructive to observe the situation of the Delhi Sultanate of the thirteenth century. The rulers of the Delhi Sultanate were Muslims, who were called the sultans. The Muslim law-mak-ers present in the courts of the sultans were staunch followers of Islam and they zealously urged the Sultans to rule the sultanate in accordance with Islamic laws and traditions. Howev-er, the Sultans were prudent enough to be aware of the multi-cultural and prevailing religious scenarios of their kingdoms and acted accordingly. Though the religious leaders had a strong influence on the Sultans, their expectations were not always met. “Those laws and precepts had been developed and evolved for communities where the bulk of the people were Muslims. No theoretical framework existed for a state where the bulk of the subjects were non-Muslim even though the ruler was a Muslim.”160 Due to this attitude, the sultans were sometimes even accused by the religious authorities as “having deviated from the path of the true faith.”161However, the sultans based themselves on the teachings of the prophet in dealing with the non-Muslim majority population of their kingdoms.

The sultans followed this policy of religious tolerance and Akbar is one of the famous emper-ors who considered it to be a salient facet of his reign. His son Jahangir continued his policies regarding religious tolerance. Though they were aware that religious wars were intensifying in other parts of the Muslim and Christian world, they took a different approach in accepting members of various religions. Conversions were also allowed, so much so that the Christian Jesuit fathers who were in the court of Akbar almost hoped that Akbar would be converted to Christianity owing to his devotion to the Blessed Virgin. However, that development did not transpire. Instead, the Christian missionaries were granted permission to convert people who wished to be converted.163 “In fact Jahangir, in his Memoirs , claimed credit that while the Tur-anis persecuted the Shiites, the Safawids persecuted the Sunnis, during his father’s reign but religious differences were tolerated in his own reign.”164 3.2.3 Indian Secularism as Trans-Cultural Potentiality165

Rajeev Bhargava interprets Indian secularism as:

This cultural aspect was influenced by the mingling of various foreign cultures that settled in the Indian subcontinent, thereby making the country multi-cultural redolent with various religious traditions. According to Rajeev Bhargava, he is trying to interpret the “basic constitu-ents of secularism”167 in the Indian context. It is important to interpret secularism considering the historical and contextual realities of the time and reiterate that there can be more than one interpretation of secularism. The idea of secularism itself is a process of evolution . It devel-oped in various contexts and then takes different forms and expressions in diverse cultures. Therefore, this context-based aspect of secularism assumes great significance. For instance, we need to ask ourselves why we need secularism at all. What was the purpose of the emergence of this idea of secularism? From the history of secularism, it is apparent that the church in the European context had both temporal and spiritual power, which dictated society until very re-cently. Eventually, a compelling need was felt to separate the church from the temporal power. But this was not the case in India where religion had a different role to play in society.168 Rajeev points out that this historical emergence of the idea of secularism must be interpreted based on the times we live in, not only in India but also in the western world, where the stronghold of various religions is becoming increasingly pervasive. “This new multi-religiosity is threatening to throw western secularism into turmoil.”169

In the Indian context, the relation between secularism and “its constitutive relation with substantive values” Was evidently forgotten.170 Ultimately, the unique situation of adapting secularism is based on India’s multi-religious context. Rajeev thus expounds on the distinc-tiveness of this interpretation of secularism that is unique to India in the following lines:

3.3 Plural

The third parameter of pluralism can be deduced from such secularistic understanding of the Indian society. One can investigate pluralism in various areas of social scientific research. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will confine the discussion to pluralism in a reli-gious context. Pluralism in religion is unique to India. Even before the Indian continent had encountered Islam or Christianity, it was characterized by pluralism in its own belief system. According to Mall, the famous phrase, “ ekam sat, vipra bahudha badanti Rig Veda, 1, 164, 46”, formulates or lays foundation for all religious foundation. 172

In the Indian structure, politics and religion are not incontestably separated, which differs from to the western understanding of secularism. Secularism in the western sense is common-ly understood as a complete separation of the state and the church. In this sense, secularism is conceived rather as a western concept and consequently, cannot fit into Indian scenario. Nevertheless, Casanova refers to Habermas that Europe is an exception with regard to secular-ism.174 Therefore, one would find it difficult to expect a similar pattern of secularism in India. This is well explained as a “principled distance” by Rajeev Bhargava.175 By this, he means that there cannot be an absolute separation of religion and state in an absolute manner. A certain amount of distance is set by the boundary of the preamble, which allows the state to interfere with (the) religious matters. In the case of Hindu religion, for example, when the members of lower caste are not allowed into temples, the state intervenes to protect the rights of these persons.176 On the other hand, secularism is understood in the context of a pluralist society. It could be consequently expressed as sarva dharma sambhava , which means equal respect for all religions. In fact, secularism in India is defined as showing respect to and considering all the religions to be equal. In particular, the political approach to religions must be neutral without any modicum of favouritism.

The first traces of religious freedom in India in the modern times dates back to the era of Queen Victoria. In the process of transferring power from the East Indian Company to the throne, the Queen issued an official proclamation in which she mentioned about the equal treatment of religions in India. Though it was not a constitution, it was still regarded as the official document in which Indians thereafter had recourse in matters of religious freedom.177In the later period of early 1772, the first governor, General Warren Hastings, implemented a reform in ruling the people of India. He made a thorough assessment of the secular character of India and asserted that every Indian was to be judged according to their own religious law in religious matters and not in accordance with the English law. “… in all suits regarding in-heritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages, or institutions, the laws of Koran with respect to Mahometans and those of the Shaster with respect to Gentooss shall be invariably adhered to.”179He opined that it was very important to administer a law based on justice that Indians would understand.

Ever since the entry of foreign religions into India, the country became a land where various faiths could co-exist. Principally, it became home to the two of the three great Semitic reli-gions, namely, Christianity and Islam. Mall cites Amartya Sen in the following words: “that India’s long and deeply rooted tradition of heterodoxy has contributed to the coexistence and coexistence of religions on Indian soil”180 As a result, one would find that for some centu-ries, India accommodated various religions such as: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Zarathustrianism, Sikhism, and Baha’ism. 3.3.2 Socially Confused Identities Based on Foreign Background

This confused identity in Indian society is a reality based on religions. Members of various religions, however, do not have a fixed identity of themselves owing to their adherence to for-eign religions. In fact, the two major religions namely, Christianity and Islam should not be considered foreign religions in India in view of their background and their presence in India. Both these religions entered India roughly at the same period that they made their presence felt in the western or Islamic world. However, they failed to be recognized as indigenous religions due to historical confusion and background. Islamic and Christian kingdoms have existed in India for a very long time.181But merely because the founders or the principal figures of these religions originate outside India, it is automatically considered that they are foreign. The existence of Islamic and Christian religions has made great contributions to the Indian culture and various aspects of literature and music.

Nevertheless, the religious traditions and beliefs espoused by these religions make them be-lieve or feel that they are basically connected to other parts of the world. The Christianness of an Indian gives the feeling of being part of the larger Christian community, which exists outside of India. It is an inevitable feeling that religion imparts to its members. Though they are innately Indian in practicing the traditions of the culture, there is a side of life that clings to the non-Indian culture.

Such proclivities are found among non-Christians and non-Muslims too. Owing to moder-nity and western education, many Hindus also behave in a more western way than most of the Christians. However, they do not have to struggle with this identity crisis due to the very fact that they are not Christian. They are modern and western, but not Christian. This is what makes them more Indian than the Christians in India. However, if a Christian or a Muslim is asked about their identity, they would very much say that they are Indian, but they have a very strong affinity and affection towards the respective countries of their religious origin. 3.3.3 Freedom to Practice Individual’s Faith

Practising one’s faith, especially that of the minority, is obviously a difficult task. Though it is not the case for the whole of India, it is gradually creeping into various parts of the country. One can compare it to a seed that has already been sown which has grown into a tree spreading its branches to the whole of India. Religious pluralism has always remained a special charac-teristic of India. Members of minor faiths had to undergo suffering in practising their faith owing to various reasons, as had been the case with Christianity in the early Christian period. Though religious pluralism has contributed significantly to the development of the subconti-nent, it also had to pay the price for it. Religious conflicts in India have been making headlines for all the wrong reasons, especially in the recent past. This was, however, a phenomenon even the ancient times, but of late, it appears to be disturbing the democratic and secular nature of the country.

Pluralism in India could be considered in various areas of societal life. However, my main concern is pluralism with regard to religions and their influence on Indian society. This refers to communal groups and not ethnic groups. However, one should be careful in distinguishing between ethnic and communal plurality. As I am trying to discuss this topic in reference to the religious situation in society and the evident scenario of conflicts based on religion, it should be considered communal rather than ethnic.183

With the rise of nationalistic parties, which confuse the citizens by stating that being Indian means to be a Hindu, the co-existence of various religious is at stake. Pluralism was safeguard-ed in the Indian society even from the times of Mughals or even before by the early indigenous kings.184 In many religious riots, the minority group comes under attack by the majoritarian faith group of the particular area. In this case any of the three religions (Hindu, Christian, or Muslim) could come under attack. However, in most of the cases, Christians and Muslims are considered to be the minority groups that are being targeted and attacked, though mem-bers of all the three religions apparently live harmoniously in the normal day-to-day lives. But there are some pockets of India where the common folk is instigated by political parties with a self-motivated intention. In such instances, religion is perniciously used as a scapegoat. Ram Adhar presents the underlying claim of Absoluteness as one of the major reasons for religious conflicts. Therefore it is vital to have an interreligious philosophy, which should be made man-datory in order to avoid the religious reductionism.185

3.4 Challenges from Unmediated Areas

Towards the end of this chapter, I would like to synthesise that has been discussed until now. This synthesis is divided into two points. Firstly, I am to show the encounter between tradition and modernity in which religion is obviously the linking point. In the second point, I wish to introduce the contested areas of this thesis that follow up this first part. 3.4.1 Encounter of Tradition with Modern186

In developing the theme of my research, I have commenced by exploring the contexts of the main author and the contexts into which this research is intended. This exploration reveals an encounter between tradition and modernity. These two concepts appear to be in stark contrast considering their functions in the society. However, the process of this encounter between these two so-called polarities leads to philosophical and religious expositions that unravel newer elements which are reflected across societies.

There is an underlying tension that grows in this encounter between tradition and mo-dernity, which sometimes results in conflicts in the societies that cause massive destruction. Sometimes, we can identify the modernists as secularists though not in the sense of atheistic nature and traditionalists as religious fundamentalists. As per my observations and inves-tigations, religion becomes a topic of intense debate between these two different groups on either side.

However, the interplay between tradition and modernity also leads to the formation of newer forms of knowledge, which is fundamentally based on a critique of what was known before. For instance, in the preceding chapter, the discourse on parameters has demonstrated how the three areas viz., modern, secular, and pluralism paved the way to new knowledge. These three categories aimed at producing either a newer understanding of religion or accommodating the presence of foreign religions in the case of pluralism. During the development of the public sphere, it was observed how the bourgeois societies were involved in forming the public opin-ion with a critical theory as its basis.

Fundamentally, this encounter between the tradition and modern cleared the pathway for a critique on religion, which, however, has dictated human life from time immemorial. Moder-nity raised questions on the ancient rituals and traditions that are deeply rooted in the religion. In the Indian scenario, it was religion that was critiqued as part of a social reformative process as alluded to in the chapter that dealt with the caste system.

The very aspect of religious understanding and its societal functioning through the caste system in India has certainly undergone tremendous change. Both subjective and objective changes that occurred through various perspectives about such a religion-based system were attributed to an encounter between tradition and religion. In this encounter, one can observe that modernity has not weakened tradition; rather, it has added a new dimension to it.

Entering into modernity means there’s a lot to do. The analytical attitude of proponents of modernity counts rationalism as its founding stone; however, there is more it than meets the eye. “Both tradition and modernity form the bases of ideologies and movements in which the polar opposites are converted into aspirations.”187 Based on this encounter between tradition and modern the following contested areas arise. 3.4.2 Contested Areas

As discussed above, the encounter between tradition and modernity produces aspirations, which are converted from polarities. And these aspirations could be themes, which pave the way for further discussion as elements of contested areas. In this context, I present two import-ant elements that work as contested areas when it comes to religion. The Habermasian philos-ophy of religion will be divided into two parts. The one aspect is the question of rationality intertwined in analysing religion. The second is the formulation of this rational aspect in our times, which is expressed through postmetaphysical philosophy of Habermas. This process of reconstruction helps us to analyse the role of cognitive development that has brought about changes in society. This is well expressed by Habermas: “The genealogy of post-metaphysical thinking attempts to understand the structural change in world views on the occidental path of development as a learning process.”188

Wolterstorff clearly says that Habermas has not given a definitive definition of rationality.189This is hypothetically acceptable in reference to his discourse theory, which allows us to dis-cover rationality that differs based on context and historical background. Could that also refer to how Habermas attempts to distance himself from the dominating attitude of Eurocentrism? In my argument against the problem of religion, the analysis of rationality helps to unveil that which has been hidden by unwanted religious traditions and societal practices. That is why I will be discussing this relation between the rationality of religion and society in the follow-ing chapter. Investigating this rational aspect of religion from the ancient times is important because as Habermas claims: “Religions are not only absorbed in the cognitive dimension of world views but have been constitutive for the structuring of early socio-cultural forms of life as a whole.”190 3.4.4 Postmetaphysics

The very first impression that one would get in observing the word Postmetaphysics is it stands in stark contrast to metaphysics. Nonetheless, Habermas uses this strategy in initiating di-alogue with the religious. The second part entails dealing with this second contested area, which is the postmetaphysical philosophy of Habermas. In the following parts, the exposition on Postmetaphysics clarifies this misconceived position about Postmetaphysics by dwelling on the reconstructivity of religion from a postmetaphysical logic. This is expressed to illuminate the concretization of the element of rationalization from historical perspectives to the present reality of the rationality of religion.

Hence, these two elements basically discuss elementary concepts of religion that sheds light into how religion could be given a positive status in our secular age based on their rational inheritance and contribution to societal cognitive growth.

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PART III: HABERMAS’ RELIGION I – TRACES OF RATIONALITY IN RELIGION

My interest in reasoning religion forms the basis of the search for solutions to the problem exposed in my introductory part. In this process, the two parts of exploring Habermas’ philos-ophy of religion facilitates the reconstruction of rationality that is bedimmed by a fundamen-talist interpretation of religion or otherwise a highly secularistic position of the outright denial of religion. These are rather two extreme positions. Nonetheless, Habermas’ postmetaphysical logic offers a philosophical solution that could resolve many of the challenges facing religion today. The word ‘rationality’ captures the centrality of the problem of religion that I am trying to enquire about. The term rationality functions as the basic concept that leads to the further exploration of post-metaphysics. This postmetaphysical approach certainly challenges reli-gion and its practices especially from a perspective of reason. Habermas believes that reason is very essential in treating religion, but he draws a healthy boundary in dealing with both areas namely, reason and faith. Habermas himself does not define Vernunft in traditional forms, rather his comprehension of rationality is expressed firstly through his Theory of Communi-cative Actions. Habermas’ philosophy of religion is certainly a Denkprozess . It is developed as a result of his deep ruminations. His previous conviction that communicative rationality will replace religious rationality sooner or later is certainly not his present position. He tends to see more positive aspects in religion.1

In this segment, I will try to treat elements, which are instrumental in understanding re-ligion from a sociological perspective that links with the Habermasian discourse of religion from a critical point of view. The extensive description of intellectual formations of axial age is meant to form the premises on which a clearer claim of rational inheritance of religion could be established. In the postmetaphysical discourse, the aspect of critical analysis of religion and its practices is meant to contribute towards a rational faith that combats socially problematic elements of religion. By contrast, I argue that the element that lies beneath the problem is the issue of rationality. This rationality need not be brought or borrowed by religion from outside to correct themselves; according to Habermas, one can divert attention to find the genealogy of rationality in religion itself, because reason’s own genealogy is dependent on religion.2

It is argued that the rationality of modernity mostly appears myopic and narrow, expressed mainly in natural sciences, technology and economic models. Religion is the only element that could give rise to certain moral aspects and they are concretely found only in a religious language, which, however, is non-existent in natural sciences. To exercise such an approach, Postmetaphysical philosophy helps to disclose the productive elements of religion.3

The following investigates religion from a socio-philosophical approach and demonstrates the rationalization of society through religion. Firstly, to support this idea, I have considered the thesis of Émile Durkheim, whose approach to religion plays an important role in compre-hending Habermas’ genesis of religious philosophy. The following chapter, nevertheless, does not aim to question the existence of a particular transcendental being. Rather, my aim here is to understand and shed light on how humans began to conceive this idea of a transcendental being and what the external factors were – including the sociological factors. This part dis-cusses the process of understanding religion, which underwent various stages of reformation from one generation to another through the conception of ideas such as profane and sacred, which eventually found their expression through symbols and rituals. These are the important foundational concepts, which support the description of religion in a rather more substantial manner: “If the Paleolithic man can be considered a “full human being”, it follows that he also had a number of beliefs and practised certain rites. For the experience of the sacred is an ele-ment of the structure of consciousness.”4

Habermas, in his second volume of The Theory of Communicative Action , discusses this phe-nomenon in a dichotomy of terminology: ritual and symbols, profane, and sacred. Symbols and ritualistic gestures could be something which we encounter in everyday life; but it is very important to comprehend that which lies beyond these symbols and rituals – religion.5Haber-mas speaks about religion in reference to society. Therefore, it is imperative to consider religion in its sociological perspective.

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1 Rationalization of Society in Durkheiman Categories

It can be seen that underneath this assessment, there is definitely Habermas’ foundational idea of communicative actions. Thus, the following part is a discussion based on Habermas’ analysis of Durkheim’s sociological concept of Religion. This noticeably dwells especially on the social factors that contribute to the birth and growth of a religion.

1.1 Collective Consciousness

“Durkheim analyses religious beliefs and patriotism not as extraordinary attitudes of contem-porary individuals, but as the expression of a collective consciousness rooted deep in tribal history and constitutive of the identity of groups.”7 The relationship between the individual and society is inevitably significant in the social theory of Durkheim. The following quote specifies what is very fundamental to this idea of collective consciousness: “Purely religious beliefs are always common to a particular community which confesses to adhere to them and to practise the common rites that go with them.”8 Joachim reveals that for Durkheim, the very important moments of religion are collectivity, convictionality and rituality, which are essen-tially ritualistic practices. These elements have contributed towards the social coherence in the early stages of religion. They form of the core aspect of religion and Habermas makes a rational interpretation of Durkheiman view, based on his theory of communicative actions. In place of rituality , Habermas shifts to linguistic communication , which is comprehensible through semantic potentialities. And in place of religion , which possesses the power of social integra-tion, Habermas makes the transition to rationality of communicative actions . For Habermas, communication, language, and rationality form the essence of his line of thinking in religion. They almost take of the significant step of replacing Durkheim’s triple concepts viz., collectiv-ity, religion, and rituality.9

With this basic understanding of Habermas’ evaluative perspective about Durkheim, I would like to return to his basic ideas about religion from a sociological perspective. In the following quote, Durkheim’s concept about religion is poignantly articulated by J. C. Ranges:The Palaeolithic age refers to the era when this concept of religion came into being: a stage when human beings tended to develop their cognition and aimed at knowing something high-er or more powerful. This pursuit could be speculated to understand and ascribe meaning to themes such as suffering, sickness, death, and life, which were obviously a part of daily life. It began with experiences involving daily life situations. Religion was, however, part and parcel of society, and vice-versa . 11It is well represented in how Émile Durkheim defined religion:

Religious thought is itself composed of collective representations, which are the products of a real social group. The reality and dynamism of these social groups are obviously verifiable; therefore, Durkheim reverted to these original social groups in order to understand modern religion and its communitarian phenomenon. Apparently, he finds no highly significant dif-ference between modern and ancient groups other than the aspect of faith in a named tran-scendent God.

1.2 Totemism

The above quote exemplifies how the concept of religion is deeply embedded with societal lives. This aspect of collective consciousness, which is obviously a production of collectivity and commonality, could be more enlightened with the elementary form of religion known as totemism.14 The earliest form of religion alluded to by Durkheim was discovered among the Australian natives. At this stage, it would be pertinent to provide a succinct elucidation of form of religion: totemism . The central aspect of this religion is solidarity, which is formed through the rituals performed during the nightfall. This has an innate relation to the sociological as-pect of religion, which can otherwise be replaced by the society:“[…] because, according to Durkheim, totemistic religions contain at their core the structure and elements of all further and later and moreover highly complex forms of “religion.”15

Although Durkheim discussed two other forms of elementary religion, namely, animism and naturism, he appears to be holding on to totemism in order to explore the origins of reli-gion for another reason:

This totemism, which he found during his years of research in Australia, is considered by Durkheim to be the elementary form of religion. The aspect of society being identified with a god or of God being the embodiment of society is well thematised in the following thesis of Durkheim:

In the modern world, one can comprehend this phenomenon concretely in the tribal societies and their religious systems (religions). Every tribe identifies itself with a god whom they con-sider to be the embodiment of themselves.Nevertheless, before continuing this discussion, I would like to quote the expression used by Durkheim to clarify totemism: “The species of things that serve to designate the clan collectively is called totem. The clan’s totem is also that of each of clan’s member.”18

These are the principles that helps us decipher the immanent relation between religion and the society. The “ Australier ” (the English translation could be “the Australian”), which denotes the aborigines, mostly live in small groups and in families. He observed that most of these groups live together on the basis of economic activity. Periodically, these different groups come together on account of their relationships with one another – they could, for example, be var-ious families belonging to the same clan. Every time they meet, they celebrate, dance and sing together, which lends an element of group dynamism and excitement to the group members. For Durkheim, these are the focal points or the actual genesis of religion.19 These meetings project the interrelatedness of these groups for whom it is difficult to comprehend religion and society as separate entities.

One cannot, however, separate religion from society for it is religion that is the basis of all morality in society and law. This is something I would be discussing at a later stage of this study. The individual is very much dependent on society and god. As mentioned earlier, god represents a clan and by extension, every individual living in society also depends on both god and society. Religion has always provided humans with a sense of community. Religion brings people to-gether based on their commonality and encourages people to express concern for members of the community. Had it not been for religion and god, from where did the whole structures of morality and important themes emerge, like love towards neighbours, and forgiveness/recon-ciliation/acceptance of strangers? Thus, it is logical to discuss and reasonable to observe the ex-istence of God as a supreme being. As a consequence of these logical discussions, one can either accept or deny the existence of God. However, could that also be said about religion? Religion is a day-to-day factor which continues to form societies and its moral consciousness. One cannot deny the fact that religion is a societal element and the foundation of society, which gives legit-imacy to commonality. Religion gave direction to the commonality of devotion towards sacred objects/elements rather than to utilitarian earthly everyday concerns. Thus “religion has been the anti-individualistic force par excellence, inspiring communal devotion to ethical ends that transcended individual purposes.”21

Furthermore, said the following can be said about collective consciousness:

Nevertheless, one can observe that Durkheim in his Elementary Forms of Religion tries to explain religion:

Durkheim, however, tries to focus on the social function of religion, which has indeed become an important point of relation in figuring out the function of religion. Religion, nevertheless, is a very essential element of the social structure, which, in turn, contributes to stabilising the society through the empowerment of an organic solidarity.24

1.3 Psychological Factors

In my further analysis of the deep structures that bind religion and society, I would like to expli-cate the function of psychology as an essential element in the development of religion. A discus-sion on the psychological perspective in this particular realm is apparently indispensable because it brings into light that there is no other factor than ‘fear’ that subjugates the human self to a so-called super-human self. It is well elucidated in various traditions and cultures in different ways. I opine that people from ancient times were inclined to experience this fear as a basic element in inventing the concept of gods and goddesses. Both for eastern or western origins of reli-gions, the element of fear is the common thread that follows a collective consciousness. In fact, a psychological perspective would even take the aspect of collective consciousness of religion under its mantle, claiming that it is indeed man’s psychological need to want to belong to a group of like-minded people, etc. Predominantly, the experience of transcendence by various people brings them together and gives a collective consciousness, as Robert Bellah describes: Why would one have to give offerings to gods; what could be the possible reason behind it? I personally see it as an attitude of appeasing the so-called gods. I conciliate gods, because I am afraid that but for my offering, a sort of retribution or chastisement would ensue. Even modern men understand various natural phenomena as the inexorable retribution from gods and begin to attribute every mishap to a god who punished them. This might be one of the reasons why the prophets of the OT preached against such offerings.27 Instead, they said that God demand-ed a contrite heart.28 The material offerings were not deemed significant in the eyes of God. Human intellect and rationality teach us to impartially and critically analyse the underlying cause of a particular disaster. On the contrary, even up to the Middle Ages, human history tells us that religion propagated the idea that all the catastrophic events that could not be explained owing to the lack of knowledge and scientific discovery was a ramification of divine wrath. Owing to the modern-day scientific developments, humans now have developed the ability to distinguish various phenomena. The enormous development in the area of psychology, howev-er, gives us rather solid clarifications.

With the development of metaphysics and the use of reason, humans at least began to com-prehend the realities of life by leveraging basic human rationality. Thus, psychological factors were apparently dominated by pure human reasoning and the cognitive faculty was preferred in reflecting the divine.

Contrary to what I suggest here – that the psychological factor of fear played an important role in inventing god – Max Müller seems to be presenting the prehistoric Aryans and their invention of gods otherwise. Thus, one can go beyond mere psychological factors to compre-hend religion in its entirety. With the help of Rigveda, (the oldest Indian Books, as I mentioned earlier), Müller significantly notes that these Aryans came in contact with the Eternal and Unending Being through Reason just like the modern metaphysical thinking man. This gave them the impetus to move in the direction of discovering or establishing a religion. This reli-gion is known as Henotheism which means that the Gods namely, Indra, Varuna, or Soma who capture the attention of his devotees turn towards them. These gods were regularly implored by the devotees as only true God. They understood from natural cognition that this divine, eternal being cannot but be just one and this Unity was addressed as the Heavenly Father/Himmelsvater, which is incomparably the most beautiful expression which the Indo-German have given for the divine. Max Müller has very convincingly given the following context30:

With this reference, the argument that religion had its origin only in the psychological factors can be ruled out to a certain extent. One of the German classics that explored the field of reli-gion was Rudolf Otto, whose idea of the Holy sheds light onto religion itself. He explored this basic concept as the concept of the Holy is obviously central to religion.

A discussion, however, about Rudolf Otto’s or Schleiermacher’s expression of religion as something attributed to feeling, can indeed lead us to psychological factors. Though they dis-cuss about a one-on-one relationship and experience, it is for me basically an analysis of the psychological aspects of humans. Robert Bellah refers to this phenomenon by citing George Lindbeck’s attempt to explain religious reality:

1.4 The Profane and the Sacred

Basing myself on Durkheim’s definition of religion, I would like to infer that even before re-ligion appeared in the form that we have today, the Palaeolithics had already conceived the ideas of the profane and the sacred. These are the two important concepts characterizing the essence of religion. The very first impression that one might get by hearing the word ‘religion’ is ‘sacred’. A sort of sacrality is innately attributed to this word. Religion leads us to something sacred, which means the opposite of profane. We can comprehend the meaning of sacred in different ways. But a socio-philosophical perspective aims at searching the meaning in relation to society and its reception.

What is actually sacred? In sociological parlance, philosophers and sociologists consider soci-ety to be sacred – a society bound with a certain set of norms. It is like what we would call the church. It is an institute with certain set of normative regulations for a moral life that leads up to the spiritual regime. In dealing with this moral context and the ‘way of life’ typically demanded by the church, we arrive at the concept of sacredness. In this sense, it could be hy-pothetically concluded that the church is essentially an institute with a certain set of normative rules leading up to the sacredness of society. Habermas says:

Sacredness receives authority by means of the group, which underlies the strong foundation for this institutional authority. Society exercises power and authority over the individual in more ways than one. It is a power that is imparted by the dynamism of the group. Due to the involve-ment of sacredness, this cannot be simply tarnished. Referring to the cognitive development of man in earlier times, I have been trying to decipher the true meaning of sacred and profane. Sacredness, as we now understand it based on various theories and definitions, is something which makes us feel a sense of awe and respect. To be clear, it creates an enigma about some-thing that is hidden from the natural sense of human beings. Habermas detects an equivalent disposition leading towards what is sacred to moral authority. This is because sacredness too has the characteristics that awaken both awe and fear simultaneously.35

However, in the archaic societies, sacred more or less corresponds to our present-day con-ception of sacred. As the sense of religion was emerging, this aspect of separation formed the dichotomy that existed in sacred and profane, thus leading to the notion of holiness, an indelible part of religion itself. In some objects and living creatures, there have been certain practices and symbols which were considered to be set apart. Similar objects were used both in the context of profane and the sacred. Though the objects remain unchanged, the meaning and worth attributed to them differs. We see trees growing everywhere in the forest, but a sin-gle tree – one among other trees – is set apart and dedicated for ritual practices and hence, is considered sacred. It is similar to the comparison of objects like stones or images created from stones or wood. Though ‘wood’ is used for fire, making hunting objects, building houses or huts, a certain wood is considered holy and sacred.

Habermas, however, finds out that Durkheim bases the foundations of morality exactly on this dichotomy of sacredness and profane. “He puts forward the thesis that in the last analysis moral rules get their binding power from the sphere of the sacred; this explains the fact that moral commands are obeyed without being linked to external sanctions.”37 In elab-orating further on the sacred and profane, Habermas asserts that the individual enters into communion with other believers without regard for the imperatives of self-maintenance. This individual submits himself totally to the power that lies beyond human conception, or merges with the impersonal power of the sacred, which transcends everything that is merely individual.38

With the above discussion about the notions of sacredness and profane, it appears to me that they spark, nevertheless, the idea of association or dissociation. Durkheim says, “The sacred thing is, par excellence, that which the profane must not and cannot touch with impunity.”39The Indian society has used a similar expression about sacredness to label human beings as touchables and untouchables. “Sacredness is a property of society itself. It involves behaviours irreducible to any other kind of social domain.”40

In the introductory part, I elaborately dealt with the caste system. Now, I shall analyse it in terms of the dichotomy of sacredness and profane. The intentionality underpinning the phenomenon of separation of objects according to the argument above is to create the two domains. However, this similar is intentionality carried faultily and irrelevantly in separating people based on their duties in society. All those who are bound to sacred duties are also con-sidered sacred and entitled to elicit respect. Similarly, folks who are associated with menial jobs in society are considered profane. Thus, we have a very clear and tangible expression of both domains in societal professional terms. Unfortunately, this paved a natural way to the most insidious, deplorable, and social dehumanizing practice of society – ‘untouchability’. Based on innumerable incidents in Indian society, one can say that this practice is yet to be obliterated from the country. Thus, we can conclude that the meaning, sense, and understanding of the sa-cred and profane has undergone an evolutionary process. Consequently, it is evident how a ra-tionalistic separation of the two could take the form of an irrational and heinous functionality. In an Indian context, it is very pertinent to discuss the caste system, which originally began as classification of societal jobs, and eventually adopted this dichotomy of ‘sacred and profane’. The problem of untouchability has its roots in this dichotomy. Though it was originally an idea that referred to a duty or dos and don’ts, Indian society misinterpreted it. Nonetheless, one can trace untouchability and its roots to the attitude of discrimination that the invaders projected towards the inhabitants of the land. That is, the lords, who became lords by conquering por-tions of land, made the inhabitants their permanent slaves and enforced all sorts of manual labour upon them. This was the origin of the phenomena of untouchability as introduced by the Aryan invaders.42 This took a new shape when the Aryan settlers claimed the land and began to divide societies according to the work they were engaged in. In the course of time, the settlers and the locals apparently became one folk living on the other side of the Hindukush. The sacred scriptures and other literature were common to all those who dwelt there. This sep-aration in the archaic society was intended to create a special place for the things which could not be associated with the ‘normalcy’ of society.

However, the development of the understanding of this sacredness mostly had a religious con-notation, as it was attributed to sacred, holy, and mysterious gods. Sadly, it ended up estab-lishing the most dehumanizing practice in the history of the world. Sacredness is an attribute given to anything that man considered to be set apart. The sacred things and symbols that we see today would not have been sacred in themselves unless man attributed this significance to them and began considering them to be sacred. Durkheim was occupied “… with (the) how (of) homo religiosus forms behavioural systems out of the category of sacrality. Here, the sacred is not a reified, divine object, but rather objects of any kind upon which superhuman value has been placed and around which mythic and ritual worlds form.”44

The moment humans started separating certain things, like the trees, stones, or other natu-ral or even manmade objects, from the ordinary, they automatically became sacred. The signif-icance of the sacred lies in the fact that it is distinct from the profane.

Hence, the perception of man about society made an attempt to create an apparent division among the entities of the world. Consequently, the cognitive potentiality of man through the process of rationalization produced the dichotomy of sacred and profane in order to form the normative foundations of society.

1.5 Rituals and Symbols

Religion is a phenomenon that deals with the realm of experience of subject-and-object-di-chotomy. Religion in this way is allegoric of a common idea that gathers people aiming at the same goal. In the process of achieving this common goal, they work together on regular basis. This particular ‘work’ turns out to be a ritual, which consequently gives them ‘commonness’. As Durkheim refers to the coat-of-arms that represents the clan, religion in contemporary terms represents a clan of people. However, this may not be the same clan that one usually at-tributes to the term ‘clan.’ It actually means different individuals with similar goals. “Collective identity has the form of a normative consensus built up on the medium of religious symbols and interpreted in the semantics of the sacred. The religious consciousness that secures identity is regenerated and maintained through ritual practice .”46

How should we then concretely experience these concepts of ‘sacredness’ and ‘profaneness’? A tangible experience or concretization of sacredness is possible through rituals and symbols, which are used in sacred gatherings, as Durkheim suggests. Durkheim refers to the meeting at night by the tribal communities in order to perform rituals in the darkness. It is something done in the same manner at the same time at regular intervals, which invites the community to a continuity of the tribe and its traditions. Robert Bellah clearly differentiates these moments from daily chores.

He specifically analyses Durkheim’s position about rituals:

Nevertheless, certain daily activities of our lives turn out to be rituals and are associated with a religious meaning.48 It is the same as when I referred to the sacredness attached to certain objects derived from normal existence. However, they acquire this meaning only in a certain context. Habermas alludes to Durkheim referring to a collective consciousness represented during these sacred rituals. Let us take the example of the Christian rituals in the modern age. Despite being rooted in antiquity, they represent a collective consciousness. It is these religious rituals and symbols that hold the collectiveness of the group and give credit to the institution. Habermas expresses it by saying that every ritual has an element that enables or facilitates the continuity of religion. Religion alone would not survive without being rooted in a ritualistic practice. Habermas believes that a ritual is a non-semantic form of expression, which devel-oped even before the development of language with words. A man becomes a man by learning through his behaviour with his fellow members of the species, and by working harmoniously towards a common goal. The equilibrium between the needs of the individuals and the group is very fragile and needs to be stabilized through something, such as a rite. Thus, it is a form of communication which differentiates itself from the daily routine. However, the common goal of this rite is directed towards an object that does not belong to the world. The ritual serves as self-assurance of both the individual and the society and is able to create some sort of solidari-ty. This is exactly what Durkheim was pointing out when referring to the Australian religion of Totems.50 “Religious symbols are disengaged from functions of adapting and mastering reality; they serve especially to link those behavioural dispositions and instinctual energies set loose from innate programs with the medium of symbolic communication.”51

Ritual can be observed as the enforcement of the outward behavioural program aimed at so-cial integration. This indicates that ritual leads to solidarity, in which Habermas discovers the communicative role that these religious symbols and rituals give to its adherents. The rituals and symbols used by members of the same religion speak to one another and it is this commu-nication that keeps the community united.

According to Durkheim, one doesn’t require language for social integration in the elementary form of religion, because the ritual speaks itself and it is vorsprachlich . The discussion under-taken so far has helped us go beyond the phenomenon of religion in the traditional sense. Reli-gion that we experience and live today has been a gradual process of various societal cognitive developments. This is the first step towards analysing religion from a socio-philosophical ap-proach that helps us to understand modern religion. At a deeper level, it can also help combat fundamentalist attitudes that claim the absoluteness of truth.

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2 The Axial Age

Why is the Axial Age in my research important and how does it improve the understanding of Habermas’ attempt to strengthen his argument about the hidden normative principles of ratio-nality within religious traditions? This is the basic question that will serve as the foundation in exploring this point of discussion. One cannot but refer to this Axial Age period in discussing rationality in religion. This discussion claims that the concept of rationality in the arena of reli-gion or even of human reasoning made a very significant advancement during this period. An-other important reason underpinning this Axial Age discussion is to establish the foundation for the forthcoming chapter centred on religion in terms of postmetaphysics. What Habermas calls postmetaphysical philosophy has its roots in this “axial intellectual formations”.53

Therefore, in order to establish the rational inheritance of religion and argue that religion pos-sesses rational heredity that formed the very basis of human rational thinking, I take it as another point of reference in exploring the philosophical discourse on religious rationality. Habermas uses the hypothesis of axial at a stage where he attempts to identify the commonal-ity of genealogy of philosophical reason and religious faith. He contends that they both have the same point of origin. They are both products of the cognitive revolution of 800–200 BCE.55Axial Age initiates the independence of thinking and reflection. This is what Habermas calls “cognitive advance in the world history process of religious rationalization”.56

According to the research undertaken by Hans Joas, the Axial Age hypothesis can be traced back to Karl Jaspers and the likes of George Simmel, Sinologist Victor von Strauss, Max Weber, and Ernst von Lsaulx.57 Moreover, in our contemporary period, we Jan Assman and Robert Bellah are associated with this theory. However, for the sake of this discussion, Robert Bellah’s work is especially poignant58 because of his extensive exploration about India in the axial age. Terminologies such as revolutionary age in the human cognition could be summed up in one sentence: “Jaspers sees the axial transition as a revolution in human thought and subjectivity. The key theme, which he detects in the ideal of all the axial regions, is a new awareness of transcendence ”59.

2.1 Defining Axial Age

The thesis of Axial Age is defended by Karl Jaspers in his book, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte where the influence of Alfred Weber and Max Weber is palpable. Referring to the ‘strangeness’ that he detected in the world during this period, he says:

The strangeness expressed here is considered by Habermas to be a cognitive leap of humanity. The human cognition during this period takes a further step by liberating itself in its thinking. It is not solely a liberation in thinking; instead, it is characterized by a revolutionary think-ing that took the critical path by basically questioning the existing religious practices. As Ei-senstadt put it, ‘re-organization and re-ordering’ of society and its beliefs became the central point of interest to this age. “… [n]ew type of intellectual elite became aware of the necessity to actively construct the world according to some transcendental vision”.61 The theme of crit-ical theory, which appears repeatedly in Habermasian philosophy, comes to the forefront of this theme as well. The essential element that forms the basis of this theory is the focus on the cognitive leap of humanity. “Jaspers understands the fact that these parallel developments in different cultures occur at the same time as an indication that a similar mental state is articu-lated.”62 This includes members of all categories in human society. Thus, it is not just the phi-losophers (who were considered intellectuals) that come under this heading; religious thinkers, founders and preachers also initiated this move.63 The axial age also witnesses the emergence of sacred scriptures or philosophical discourses that influence the world till today.

The revolutionary character of the axial age is more visible in the socio-political scenario. Bellah demonstrates that the nomos thinking as the point of reference on which the political conditions of the society underwent a change. The advanced cognitive thinking that emerged through the prophets and wise men shaped the worldviews that emerged during this time. The axial age is preceded by the archaic age where the king was regarded as the divine rep-resentative in society. However, in the following period, this representation of underwent a change. The new rulers of the axial age also claimed to be of divine origins, but not in the line of the existing monarchs. They appear from an insignificant root, which was not deemed royal until then. They all claimed divine origin for their rule, or at least they were endowed with this. They had to move against existing societies. They were not from the existing lineage of kings; instead, they were born as leaders and had their own charisma, albeit with a divine claim, given either by themselves or by society.65 However, “the old unity of God and King was broken through dramatically in every case, and yet reaffirmed paradoxically in the new axial formulations.”66 The axial age covers the time, for example in India, of the Buddha and his contemporaries, thus signifying an era resistance and revolution. The existing monarchies, religious, and social systems invited trenchant criticism, and this age was characterized by the movement towards greater purity.

Nonetheless, in the following section, I will discuss the process of gradual progression that served as a precursor to this newer stage of human cognition.

2.2 From Mythos to Logos

The process of rationalization that emerges in human cognition could be explained through this transition period. The Logos basically differentiates itself from the mythos through its character of reason. The age of gods and their offspring is called the age of myth whereas the age of logos is referred to as the age of humans according to Herodotus. He uses the term ‘hu-man age’ which indicates the mid-6th century, as also suggested by Jaspers to be the time of axial age. This implies that the age preceding the human age was an age of myth. The age of myth was marked by imagination and tales which were not verifiable, they were even turned into poetry, while the beginning of the age of logos was characterized by reason that entailed empirical investigations made possible through historical recording.68 It could probably bring out the Hegelian philosophy of history where he attributes spirit to history and what is his-torical as mere nature.69 What is spirit is dynamic and what is nature is static. Herodotus uses the word ‘Logos’, which means accounting for historical events while categorizing every other story under the category of myth, which cannot be subjected to empirical investigations.70

What happens in the axial age is the transition from mythos to logos. This process of tran-sition that shaped the axial age could be technically seen as a movement from the mythical understanding of religion or religion being formed and transmitted through myth into a realm of logos or translated here as reason. I am attempting to show the result of deduction observed through axial age. “The axial age religions”, says Habermas, “made the cognitive leap from mythical narratives to a logos that differentiates between essence and appearance in a very similar way to Greek philosophy.”71 By analysing this transition, we arrive at the emergence of the axial age. Mythical era or mythical stage of cognition is a period of time in human history in which religions mostly progressed by passing down of myths, which they have heard from the previous generations. What is lacking here is the written form of philosophising or reason-ing the transcendental experiences, which were preserved in the religions.

Contrary to mythical thinkers, “evolutionary thinkers of this period (Logs) broke free from the immanent frame of mythical thought, and achieved a transcendent viewpoint from which to contemplate the world and human life as a whole.”72 In seeking to approach religion with a rationalistic perspective or even to present it to society with a rational essentiality, I find it vital to recognize the importance of such a transition from mythical humanity to rationalistic humanity. Habermas refers to Bellah in this perspective and how he presents that humans have gradually distanced themselves from mythical narratives and concentrated on a more tran-scendental point of reference to their moral and ethical actions in life. The term Weltgesetz represents the embodiment of an unseen god or saviour, a more concretization of the divine, transcendent power as experienced in the world of humans. However, the beliefs and practices do not completely disappear in this transformation, but take a new form. “The ideas and magical practices of popular religions do not disappear. However, they are integrated into new teachings founded by prophets and wise men and into new cultic forms, thus changing their meaning.”73

What we could conclude or derive from these two elements, myths and logos, is that the intellectual or cognitive standard of man as undergoing a change. Logos can be understood as having characteristics such as reasoning and critical questioning:

2.3 Pre-Axial Cultures: Robert Bellah

The following discussion refers to Bellah’s description of pre-axial stages of human cognition. In making an attempt to explain what Axial Age is and its importance in the religious critique, I defined it as bringing out the aspect of the potentiality of human cognition. So the present discussion is about the various stages of this cognitive potentiality that allowed humans to reach the axial age. This is a brief description that will help us comprehend various important cognitive cultures as envisioned by Robert Bellah. 2.3.1 Episodic Culture

In this culture, Bellah brings out the earliest religious experiences related to the perception of mammals. This stage is the earliest type of culture that one can categorize in building up the process of human cognition. This phase of cognition refers to how a species responds to distinct situation based on earlier experiences. By analysing the responsive patterns of great apes, it is observed that they respond to particular situations promptly and construc-tively depending on previous experiences, which have been stored well in the memory. The higher mammals here require attention and intention, which are very significant in episodic culture. In describing this episodic culture and holding to the dichotomy of attention and intention, Bellah claims that the deepest religious experience is in this way rooted in the mammalian perception,75 although one can observe that the responses are mainly based on utilitarian ends in this stage. What makes the species attentive and conscious is the need of being with fellow members of their groups where it is possible to relate based on needs. “Alert attentiveness is also a valuable asset for humans seeking to fulfil their intentions, including moral intentions that are far more than utilitarian. But the concrete immediacy of a consciousness fully present in the here and now may also be significant resource for the religious life.”76 2.3.2 Mimetic Culture

A significant feature, which is to be observed in this stage is ‘pedagogy’, a process of teaching imitation. In fact, this is the first time that pedagogy makes its appearance. Although the word ‘mimic’ suggests that the actions of the mammals did not comprise vocals, thus implying silent actions, vocalization did emerge during this period. Bellah says that Donald refers to prosodic control of the voice as a necessary part of the evolution of language. In this stage, humans did not have to learn everything; rather, they had the opportunity to be told how things could be done. Bellah refers to this culture as “ an event about an event” . Humans, unlike other animals, could see and remember both the past and the present; they were also in a position to portend the future, and this Bellah sees as stepping outside of the episodic consciousness and moving forward.77

“… [A]unified, collectively held system of explanatory and regulatory metaphors. The mind has expanded its reach beyond the episodic perception of events, beyond the mimetic re-construction of episodes, to a comprehensive modelling of the entire human universe.”79Mythic culture is hugely connected to ritual, which created an opportunity and envi-ronment for learning. From the stage of mimics, which also involved vocals, humans in this mythic culture enter into the arena of semantics. This language acquisition, however, cannot be unfolded in an individual’s context but only in a social context. The develop-ment of language required an external support system, which is nothing else but ritual – as maintained by Bellah, basing his arguments on Terrence Deacon. It is interesting to observe how myth permeates into every aspect of human life during this stage. “Although myth gives a comprehensive understanding of life, it does so exclusively by the use of metaphor and narrative. Also, mythic culture until very late in its history was, except for drawings of various kinds, an exclusively oral culture.”80 During a ritual, people tried to repeat the actions and experiences not just in symbolic gestures but also with the use of language, which had been preceded by vocals. Robert has described the myths referring not only to the European context but also to the Australian aboriginal milieu.81 This stage has played a pivotal role in most ancient societies. The myths have served as a very important medium in establishing religions. 2.3.4 Theoretic Culture

This theoretical culture denotes a sort of dialogue with the mythic culture. It entails the dismantling of existing semantic models, especially the narrative style of thought. This does not, however, imply that there is a complete new way of semantics which has altogether pushed out the earlier forms of cognitive adaptation. This is merely a matter of reorgani-zation of the earlier forms of communication. Put simply, this culture was aimed at storing its memory external to that of the human brains. The mythic culture gave way to the devel-opment of an important medium for knowledge transfer. This gradual use of language was essentially strengthened by myth-telling, which obviously requires human brains to store this knowledge. Besides human brains, there was no place of storage, where this knowledge could be preserved.82

However, theoretic culture discovers an external disk of storage irrespective of human con-ditions. Thus, we have the first graphics independent of human corporality. These can also be evidenced by Palaeolithic cave paintings. 2.3.5 The Axial Age – India

This part analysis the axial age attitudes from religious heroes in the Indian subcontinent. It was an era when trade was flourishing and when a significant growth of population and well-fortified cities took place. At this axial moment, there appeared many renouncers of the world. Bellah says that the word ‘renouncer’ had various meanings; nevertheless, what one could derive by the sense of this word is this: renouncing the life of a householder to lead the life of an ascetic, which obviously was characterized by mendicancy as itinerants. 84

Bellah claims that the Indian case is nevertheless a unique one, which differs from all the other three axial-age centres, viz., Israel, Greece, and China. A brief explanation of the prevailing Indian scenario against the backdrop of sacred scriptures and the political situation will help us comprehend this issue better.

The Vedas are considered the earliest scriptures of the Indian sub-continent, and mostly comprise hymns, predominantly used at sacrificial rituals. Although Sanskrit appeared ear-lier, Vedas were written at a subsequent period. One can date it back to Asoka’s period, or 273–232 B.C. Rigveda is the earliest Vedas to have been written. Though one might find oral traditions in Israel or China, the Indian system appears to be different. For example, in treating the texts of Homer (the Greek one), the scholar Milman Parry carried out a study of traditional Serbo-Croatian oral poetry in Yugoslavia and found traces of this oral transmission.86 Howev-er, the Indian case is generally different because Indologists believe:

Bellah’s very elaborate description of the Vedic religion leads one to discover the importance of ritual in the life of the ancient Indians. Above all, Rigveda mainly deals with the rituals and the first of all rituals. The different types of rituals mentioned in Rigveda are also classified hi-erarchically. The most obvious motivating idea of Vedic religion is the Roman principle of “ do ut des”, “ I give so that you will give”, or in Vedic terms, “Give me, I give you”, dehi me dadhāmi te – that is: reciprocity.88 The most important reference in denoting the social and religious contexts during the earliest-known period in India is the Rigveda. According to Witzel, “The Rigveda thus represents, above all, the history of two royal lineages (Pūru and Baharat) toward the middle of the Rigvedic period.”89

The intellectuals of India were always identified with the Brahmanic class who were also the natural, ordained possessors of sacred knowledge. The priestly class even had an upper hand over the monarchy.

Brahmanism was the religion of the elite and Brahmins were often considered the best part of society.

However, challenging this intellectual hegemony, the Buddhist movement arose in the Indian subcontinent. This birth of Buddhism92 gave society a new perspective. What was until now considered normal, for example the supremacy of Brahman religion, had to face rivalry from within the same society. Notably, Buddha did not belong to the Brahman class, but rather to the Kshatriya class. We should also be aware that the Varnas only denoted the type of work they were doing and not the caste system that is widely prevalent even in modern India. Bud-dhism shed light on the misery caused by Brahmanism in trying to impose on the people who were performing menial jobs. The idea of life as a misery for these people was challenged by Buddhism: “not that Buddhists think that daily life is completely miserable, but that those who reflect seriously on life may find that it is, in spite of many rewards, ultimately unsatisfactory, and that for those not looking beyond daily life at the moment, there is still much the Buddha has to teach.”93

It further one step further and rejected the entire Vedic tradition upon which all of the en-tire Brahmin tradition was based. In fact, Buddha tried to go back to the origins of Brahmin texts and to understand them with full consciousness: “[…] understanding the words and their logical connection is only the first step, it is only when the teachings have penetrated deep into one’s consciousness that they can be transforming”.94 I would like to identify this period as a period of transition, because the great Upanishads, which are characterized by metaphysical discourses, appear in the later part of this axial age.

Hence, instead of bringing the whole theme of the axial age to a conclusion, I would keep it open for further discussion following this chapter. This discussion on the axial age would serve as a link with the forthcoming chapter. However, I would like to refer to Bellah, which will give us the scope to continue my discussion in the following chapter:

2.4 A Revolutionary Age

The Axial Age as expounded in the above discussion, could be summarized conceptually as a revolution in human thinking. The axial age could be seen as an age of revolution. With the emergence of various new religious consciousness and expressions, their aim was to present a new perspective of religion. It was clear in the first section that religion was an essential element of the society that held members of the society together through the ritual practices having common goals. As established before, society is the protector of an individual. Religion is, however, the only non-political organized body that engages itself in the betterment of indi-viduals. Therefore, in the following, part I would elaborate on the basic characteristic of axial age in terms of religious movements. This reveals how the axial intellectual formations in the history of mankind converted religion into movement, which almost became the nucleus of society that dealt wholly with its affairs. 2.4.1 Analysis of Religious Movements

The different charismatic groups are rooted in different ancient religions. The axial age as dis-cussed in my introductory part prompts us to consider various religions from this perspective. Taking into consideration the three main religions: Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism in the Indian continent, it is observed that all these religions had their phases as “movements”. Due to political engagement, religion was always considered a saviour of the people from their earthly miseries. But this redemption was basically owed to an unknown and unseen power named as God- a Saviour, and Redeemer.

One can observe that during this time, society was “heavily burdened” as Jesus would say to his people.97 They were burdened not only by the political field; rather, the so-called comforting element of the poor and needy “religion” also became very burdensome.98 It was at this point that all the traditions formed religions which did not just concentrate on a one-on-one rela-tionship, like just the God and an individual; rather, the focus was on the relationship between God, individuals, and society. God was supposed to be acting in the lives of the individual and society.

The appearances of prophets in the Judaic culture and the reformatory icons in India like the Jain Tirthamkara99 or the Buddhas100 were indeed robust pillars of great movements that gave hope to the downtrodden and marginalised sections of society. The following discussion will focus on the three movements in the history of religions that emphasised the liberation of those who were burdened. In modern parlance, they denote the liberation movements or religious reformations.

Though Durkheim believes that religion began as a moment in individual’s life in reference to a societal aspect of coming together in order to celebrate “a thing”, it gradually grew and be-came all-encompassing, covering various dimensions of human life in totality. It became very much the central part of people’s lives. The term “solidarity” used by Durkheim in defining religion suggests that these movements too base their central ideology on this fact of solidar-ity.101 Durkheim’s idea of solidarity as the central aspect of religion very much considers the intrinsic societal dimension. In line with the Greek philosopher Aristotle who says that man is a social animal,102 implying that we need one another, religious movements also affirm that an equal distribution of societal benefits is paramount. This, in turn, is based on the principle of righteousness, which serves as the starting point ( Ausgangspunkt ) for the religious movements.

Hence, I would like to consider religion to be a movement based on the three important movements in the history of religion: The prophetic role in Israel, the Jesus movement, and Buddha’s reaction to the Brahman Religion. 2.4.2 The Prophetic Movement

This movement has been centred on religious heroes who were able to stir societies. The prophets in Israel were not men who could be limited to temples and the field of religion. On the contrary, they had the power to denounce the king and his actions while also call-ing the people back to God through repentance. The voice of a prophet was very strong and could at garner the attention of everyone in society. The biblical prophets served in this role of leadership, which gave the community, as Durkheim calls it, a collective con-sciousness moving towards a collective goal.103 A religious theme, which was addressed to the nation, was also a national and political theme. A call for the king to repent, asking him to turn towards God and his ways, meant a call to righteousness and justice in society. Simultaneously, a warning to the priests to turn towards one God is also a call to eliminate nefarious religious practices and to know what is truly important in religion. For example, the prophet Jeremiah said that God wants a merciful heart rather than the bloody sacrific-es at the temple.104 It is a direct denouncement of all the priestly abuses in the nation. As another instance, prophet Amos’s prophecies demanded social justice and righteousness.105Here, I would like to crystalize this prophetic movement in a single terminology, commonly known as social justice. Though the prophetic movement has its roots in the Jewish religion, we cannot make a clear distinction between the national and religious history of the people of Israel. From this standpoint, social justice was always spoken in relation to religion. Put differently, religion spoke out against social injustice, which is offensive to the laws of God. This can also be noticed in the Torah, where the Law given by Moses as the law of YHWH, was the law of people of Israel.106

In referring to the prophets and their movements I would like to consider some salient charac-teristic of these prophets according to Haralson:

Plato describes three elementary functions of prophets in politics. Firstly, prophecies come into play at the very origin of politics. Secondly a prophet serves as a bridge between the divine and the human sphere in governing society. Thirdly, God transmutes and acts as politician through instances of prophecy, which is called the divine moment. This is also called Theo-pol-itics. As Plato would put it prophecy is a way of God to act upon human affairs, in an unmedi-ated manner. It is God who acts and the prophet possibly serves the role of an appointed agent. The words of the prophet are considered the voice of God. Therefore, the decisions taken within this framework are said to be guided by the voice of God.109

These prophets in Israel had a very special voice and the prophecies were considered to be the voice of God speaking to the Israelites. However, even in this area, they were profession-al prophets who trained themselves to be prophets and who proclaimed God’s word as they had learnt it. The kings often consulted this group of prophets and were psychologically satis-fied with their responses, which were often very pleasing. On the other hand, some prophets emerged from the normal class of society, who claimed revelation of the Absolute. These proph-ets did not belong to the line of so called professional prophets. Instead, they were touched by the spirit of God. These prophets always appeared at very crucial moments of Israel’s history. They were regarded as the true mouthpieces of God. These prophets were characterized mainly by their spirit of boldness, which they never possessed prior to having received their mission from above. This gave them the power and ability to speak to the kings in a tone which would often cost their lives (Rf. Prophet Jeremiah). Paradoxically, they did not give in to fear and continued to prophesy against the wishes of the kings. They proclaimed the message given to them in the presence of the kings and the people of Israel. They claimed that it is the Word of God that spoke to them.

This can be obviously seen in the Old Testament where the God of Israel, YHWH, did not fa-vour double moral standards. Right and Wrong applies equally for both Israelites and non-Is-raelites. Instances in the history of Israel speak of wrongdoings committed against their worst enemies. God did not even spare Israel for this wrongdoing. YHWH demanded righteousness and hated injustice, even if it was done to their enemies. Prophets spoke of sin as an offence to the deity, which is fundamentally a thing of pure moral character. This encapsulates the inten-tion that morality is for the sake of which all things exist.111

One can cite famously the prophet Amos as one of the important prophets whose work calls us to a purely societal revolution. Prophets like Jeremiah present the will of God to the nation of Israel, beginning from pointing out to the king about his evil nature and demanding a re-turn to God and his ways.112 One of the famous verses from the Book of Amos, which is often spoken in reference to him is: 5:24: “But let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.” This clearly projects the central message of Amos characterized by social justice oriented towards the needy and the poor.113 In considering the motivation of Amos or his intention in delivering such a message, we could observe the results of research by the recent social anthropologists who claim that the prophetic movements centred on social ethics pertained to the egalitarian revolution. This was a revolution, which occurred during the time when Israel did not have a king. These pre-monarchical times were very much led by the prophets as they were the direct agents of YHWH, who was their king, and no other earthly person was considered to be their ruler. These anthropologists contended that no other earthly person was considered to be their ruler and that the nation of Israel was formed from various rebellious groups, which were mainly agriculturists and pastoral people from Cana. They op-posed the centralized structure of their city-states in which the people, the agriculturists or the pastoralists, and were deprived of their rights and social justice.

The essential ethical message, which is considered to be the central message in Amos, rep-resents a call for justice and righteousness in Israel. These two words, however, sum up the attack of Amos on the rich and God’s compassion towards the poor: “They are paired in three passages, and justice appears alone in one reference (5:7; 6:12b, 5:24). Justice ( mispat) and righ- teousness (sedaqa) are rich theological terms used to characterize Yahweh and to describe the covenant relationship between him and his people.”115 2.4.3 The Buddhist Movement

All the three movements with which I am looking into have a commonality in their aims or goals: To liberate societies from both religious and social oppressions and suppressions. How-ever, a closer look at them tells us that their formation was always reactionary to the existing well-established religions, be it Judaism or the Vedic religion. Buddhism can be considered or compared to the protestant reformation in Europe. The main aim of Buddhism is to enlighten ignorant folks or educate them to attain a self-enlightenment. This concept of enlightenment is central to this movement. It is actually a key opposing movement in the Vedic period, which gave rise to the upanishadic community.

Dating Buddha accurately and historically is ridden with contentiousness. Most of the sources rely on the Asokan Edicts which cite that King Asoka had sent ambassadors to the Hellenistic Kings dated at c. 268 BCE; one of the traditions of Buddhism, the Theravada, says that Buddha died 218 years before this. Some of the scholars however, opine that he lived c. 566–486 BCE. But there are also different dates according to some of the Sanskrit sources in East Asia and again in Tibet, which dates Buddha to 881 BCE.116

Buddhism founded by Gautama Buddha was indeed an individual’s effort to attain the state of Bodhi, the enlightenment.117 He claimed to experience enlightenment after six long years of asceticism. It is a movement, which does not give metaphysical explanations or establish the facts of the existence of a particular deity or god. Instead, it encourages people to work towards enlightenment. However, its genesis was attributed to the Brahmin forces, which kept society in ignorance while as a priestly class, they became the superior class of society who had the ul-timate authoritative say over many things concerning societal traditions too.118 “Since Buddha was the subject of numerous legends and because the earliest Budhdist chronicles were written two hundred years after the events, it is impossible to write a historical biography of the Master based on written documents”.119 The chronicles of Sri Lanka ( Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa ) and Sarvastivadin avadanas can provide us with some details of his life.

Buddhism, unlike the other two movements, which I have dealt with, did not arise from per-sonalities or figures who were engrossed with the daily struggles of human life. It neither arose from a person who belonged to the normal strata of the society. The founder of this movement was a sheltered prince who was kept away from the miseries of the world. According to an old prophecy, he was not supposed to be exposed to the evils or the misery of human life, which would only have drastic ramifications in his life. However, this prophecy was fulfilled in Gau-tama the prince, who left his palace to see the world and experience it.120

The term Buddhism referred just as Christianity to a group of people who became the fol-lowers of a certain Gautama. Christianity too derives its name from Christ who is the anointed one of God, a character assigned to Jesus. Buddhism centres itself around Gautama, as I have mentioned before, who is said to be enlightened one. This obviously presents the idea that all men are called to this awakening process and the ones who achieve this enlightenment are called Buddhas. Which means “the term ‘Buddha’ is not a proper name, but a descriptive title meaning ‘Awakened One’ or ‘Enlightened One’. This implies that most people are seen, in a spiritual sense, as being asleep or unaware of how things really are.”121 The aspect of awakening is, however, central to Buddhism. His role in society was to teach people to re-discover their original nature as human beings and this led his followers to revere him as a great teacher. When society is on the verge of losing its core values and truths, and when human beings cease to recognize the dignity of other human beings, this process of awakening helps society revive the lost element of humanity. “The key role of a perfect Buddha is, by his own efforts, to rediscover the timeless truths and practices of Dharma (Pali Dhamma ) at a time when they have been lost to society.”122

It is said that Buddha arrived the state of Nirvana through deep meditation. In contrast to the Hindu’s understanding of the Brahma, the Absolute one, Buddha gives a new picture and understanding of this Being. He has understood this Brahman in terms of goodness, helpful, and one who is close to the humanity. Congruent with the presentation of Brahman as the ab-solute Being, it was also necessary to realize Brahman in one’s own life.123 The existing religion of the time, (the highly Brahmanic or the priestly religion), in comparison to the revolutionary Budhhist teachings, paid less attention to the individual self. Religion was unfortunately high-ly identified with a certain class, and the knowledge of the scriptures became the sole right of this priestly class. The example I have cited about Jesus can also be applied to Budhha and his society. The existing priesthood represented by the Brahman class was corrupt and burdening the society as any other priesthood elsewhere globally. The priest also became the ruler of the society. Having a very special place in the king’s court, they had power and authority.

Habermas observes that Buddhism with such a backdrop was able to present an unusual un-derstanding of religion.125 As an appealing aspect towards emphasizing the equality of society, the reform of Buddha not only rejected the authority of the Vedas but also denied the religious meaning attributed to caste. Consequently, Buddhist monasteries were open to all, irrespective of their social status.

Speaking of axial age with reference to the Jesus movement would be certainly confusing as this movement does not fall into the time period set for the axial age. However, I would like to adduce this movement here as it contains the traits of the axial movements.

This was undoubtedly a way of life that was proclaimed by the disciples of Jesus. Jesus, as is commonly known and claimed, was a historical figure and is not considered to be a mythical one. His birth in Israel and his attachment to Jewish ancestry naturally was an important el-ement in his mission. However, the movement as it was commonly called in the earlier times, was similar to many other movements, which often arose in the society of Israel. For many generations, the people of Israel had been for waiting for a messiah who would save them and rescue Jerusalem from foreign powers. No figure like Jesus can be found in any other secular sources as he is depicted in the Bible. Nevertheless, besides the Bible, one can find a reference to him in the writings of a well-known source of Josephus.126 However, the movement was said to be founded by this so-called Messiah, whom the people of Israel were expecting in accordance with the prophetic promises that found in the scriptures of the Jewish religion. He too belonged to the line of prophets, thus implying that he was a self-styled prophet. This figure has apparently garnered more attention in the history of Israel than any other prophet. His movement was the proclamation of a divine kingdom. This proclamation featured the theme of the appearance of the Kingdom of God in their midst.127 It was almost a keyword or an arresting terminology used by him. For the people of Israel who were eagerly waiting for a messiah who would accommodate or return the kingdom to the Jews from the Romans, this message indicated a political kingdom or just an earthly affair. However, the movement of Jesus by nature is essentially religious. Jesus often hinted that it was about a relationship with God, who is pictured as a loving father and a benevolent provider. This was basically the message of Jesus – to proclaim a different picture of the old YHWH, whom the Jewish people looked at with utmost reverence and fear. This is important to realize because the concept of a loving and gentle God was uncommon back then. It has its genesis almost with Jesus. As it is commonly known in the history of Israel, people were often burdened by the existing religious practices. The religion as well as societal norms imposed difficult demands that were expected to be fulfilled. Put differently, religious leaders often presented a God who was demanding in exchange for sacrifices. Sacrifices for the common man were tantamount to a financial burden. The foreign Roman rule also oppressed them. Their constant desire or fight for freedom gave them a reason to await for a messiah who would resuscitate them from such a societal burden. Contrary to this, through the appearance of Jesus in the Judean countryside, all their dreams of redemption were being fulfilled. His deeds and actions were totally at variance with those of the religious leaders and the political leaders. Miraculous and generous acts such as healing on Sabbath, rescuing a prostitute woman, etc., could be seen as the foundation of his mission. Though Jesus’s appearance on earth was rather short, his teachings and life have influenced many and shaped different cultures. His disciples, who were basically all Jewish, spread them-selves all over the world to proclaim the message of Jesus as he had commanded them to do so. “Go into all the world and proclaim the gospel to the whole creation.”128

In a certain text based on the historical description of the Romans around the time of Flavius Josephus, the following description as available about a man named Jesus:

Unfortunately, most of his life has been described only in the four Gospels, which do not count as historical texts, rather just religious ones. Therefore, researchers cannot base themselves on the gospels in elaborating on the personality of Jesus. However, the dispute about the place of his origin or his family is intriguing. It is commonly known that Jesus is called a Nazarene, which can denote the place called Nazareth as it is known in the gospels, or the word Nazarene, meaning the anointed one. There is also another explanation: “Nazarene, Nazarite […] was the name given to a community that rejected the bloody ritual of the Jewish temple cult and was hated and persecuted by the orthodox Jews.”130 Ultimately, one cannot prove that Jesus was indeed a Nazarene from a historical context, but given the universal acceptance of the fact, let us consider the title given by Pontius Pilate, which was nailed atop of the cross on which Jesus was crucified: “Whether Jesus belonged to these Nazarenes cannot be proven, but the fact that he was called a Nazarene in his trial and named as such in the inscription on the cross suggests that he was considered a Nazarene and therefore persecuted.”131

There are a lot more controversies about the existence of Jesus, leaving us a very minute evidence of his true existence through historical texts. But that does not give us the legitimacy to completely disregard his life and teachings or his importance in the global history. A fairly recent research about the historical Jesus has made some startling revelations. Despite not gaining much recognition in research, one can still consider it as a piece of research based on the texts found in the Tibetan valley in a Buddhist monastery. The Russian researcher named Nikolaus Notowitsch, out of his curiosity to fill the gap of Jesus’ life from the age of twelve to thirty, about which the gospels remain silent, found astonishing texts. These texts provided him with enough material to fill the gap of Jesus’ life between twelve and thirty. In 1906, a book was published by an author named Ahmad Shah, who served as a resource for the German scholar, Albert Grünwedel, to translate the texts of Notowitsch.

Apart from the traditional “ Glaubenstext – die Evangelien ”, we have this controversial text, which presents Jesus as someone who was deeply involved in societal issues. This refers to the legend that Jesus preached against the inequality in society based on Caste.“ … to follow an excerpt from the controversial text in which Jesus, like Buddha five hundred years before him, opposes the caste distinctions that only the priestly Brahmins and the Kshatriyas – the caste of princes and warriors – are allowed to study the holy scriptures.”133 The text sheds more light on the way he reacted to the inequality that existed in the society.

Jesus belonged to the middle class. The relationship that Jesus had with the insignificant mem-bers of society is reflected in his wonderworks. The various miracles that one can read in the Gospels make it clear that he had very much been in contact with the marginalised sections of society. Though Jesus had also demonstrated his miracles before foreigners and the Roman officials, he was primarily responsible for looking after the poorest and the underprivileged. Needless to say, this movement of Jesus was carried out not by Jesus alone but also by his fol-lowers. Together with them, he moved around in Galilee as a wandering preacher.136 Even here one can notice that his disciples’ preaching centred on poor of the society. “The addressee of the proclamation of Jesus is the whole people, especially the simple and uneducated women and men of Galilee.”137 Jesus’ life and his movement became very contradictory from the very beginning. Unlike other preachers, neither he nor his disciplies were ascetic. They ate, drank, and feasted, which was not something that could be said about the religiously dedicated or mo-tivated people of the time. He did not want his movement to be insulated from the prevailing societal problems.

Jesus and his movement was in contrast to the existing groups in Israel, namely, that of the Pharisees or Sadducees. These groups stressed on cultic practices and the purity of the people through sacrifices in the temple. However, this was not given importance to by Jesus; rather, he presented a new understanding of the God of the Old Testament to the people of Israel. Jesus’ movement attracted an increasing number of people from other cultures and countries owing to its ability and willingness to accept one and all apart from the Jewish people. Thus, it separated itself from many of the Jewish religious practices. “With the coming of more and more gentiles into the fold of the Jesus movement and in their efforts to accommodate them, the Jesus people began to give up increasingly the practice of sacrifices, circumcision, and other Mosaic customs like the observance of the Sabbath and food laws.”139 Therefore, of the message of Jesus remained the focal point at all times. 2.4.5 Anthropological Intentionality

After having analysed the phenomenon of the above three movements, it could be inferred that the rationale of these movements is conceptualized as human dignity in an anthropological terminus, which was the salient concern of all these movements. Religion, which made the transition from rituals based on nature to mythical gods and offerings to them, now seems to be entering into a different phase.140 On the one hand, it became more intellectual in inquiring the truths about the absolute. On the other hand, religion emerged as a vital instrument in saving the people. A succinct explanation about the movements and their context shows clearly that human dignity was always at stake. Both the rulers of the state and the leaders of religion failed to protect the human dignity. In all the three movements, it can be seen that people were at the receiving end. In the case of Buddha’s context, the society was divided into different classes. The concept of human being as imago dei, is, however, not an explicit concept in the Indian context. Nevertheless, as an important product of these movements, ‘human dignity’ has been revived in our modern times, especially through the church documents. Therefore, in what follows, I will briefly describe the upholding of human dignity based on religious teach-ings. It is more concretely based on the Christian teaching, especially that of the development that took place within the church in the modern era.

According to Konrad Hilpert, the Human Rights comprises three important elements.141Firstly, we discover the rights of the person and look at them as basic rights. Closely related to that is the challenge of being aware of them and protecting these rights. Secondly, having con-sidered the discoverability of the rights and having recognized the rights, we need to respect the person as he or she is, i.e., in her Dasein und Sosein. Thirdly, it is important to support religious movements with strong arguments. He thus, speaks of the rudimentary Christian arguments for human dignity. Every human being is created in the image of God and that’s the foundation of all human dignity. Hilpert further explains that man is just not God’s creation, but he is valid as God’s picture in this world. Man was endowed with a special privilege of even naming the other creatures, as seen in the Bible.142 Man is also a creature of Responsibility: Responsibility with Freedom. This freedom that he was given makes him solely responsible for his doings. Human being is a being-in-relation. Our existence on this earth is not supposed to be an exercise in isolation. We are called to as a family in society. So, man is a communicative being who must establish his communication not only with the people but above all with God, who created him. However, in all these aspects, the concept of human dignity that plays the most important role in the life of every citizen must not be undermined. The German Repub-lic seems to have stressed these roots of human rights and human dignity from a very clear Christian background. Every person or community or society expects to live in freedom and righteousness and that is basic to human life.143

The church distinctly asserts that the poor and underprivileged will not be able to enjoy their freedom when the elite classes are earning much more than normal people and when the rich can control things in society, while the poor have no agency or voice.144 This is exactly why we need human rights. History is replete with examples that suggest that when society does not define human rights and human dignity, there is always a danger of the weak and the fragile being exploited by the strong . To expand my contemplations on the question why we need hu-man rights, I would like to express myself through these lines of Jürgen Habermas:

Jesus saved the adulterous woman from being stoned unjustly. He was quite comfortable in dining with the tax collectors and stigmatized sinners, and was ready to become a bridge be-tween the Israelites and Samaritans. He spoke against the injustices in society and urged the rich to be charitable and compassionate to the poor and weak. “Amen, I say to you, what you did not do for one of these least ones, you did not do for me” (Matt. 25:41–45). This is the moot point of Jesus’ social teaching which the church upholds, because it is in doing so that we recognize the rights and dignity of every person created by God in his own image and like-ness. The church has striven from the very beginning to uphold these teachings of Christ her Bridegroom and Master. She has taken a very special stand in recognizing human rights and dignity just after her Master and Lord. The text from Konrad Hilpert gives us insights about the church’s attitude towards human rights and the rediscovering of the roots of this attitude in the teachings of Christ – das Evangelium. 146

The movement of Jesus in the plains of Judah was a co-incidence similar to that of Buddha’s appearance in the Indian world. The historical facts of the Jewish religion, which can be known through the reading of the Old Testament, present a God who cared for his people. Simultane-ously, he was also mostly presented as a deity to be feared endlessly. Every societal activity for the Jews depended on the Law of Moses, which they believe to have been dictated by God on Mount Sinai. The historicity and validity of these practices across societies are naturally ques-tionable. The demands of the temple cult for a common man were heavily burdensome. In the Indian society, the Brahmin groups had the same position as the priests in the Jewish tradition. However, unlike these priestly groups who became a burden to society, there appeared wan-dering monks, who questioned the validity of these practices. “However, among the Brahmins as well as among the new religious class of ascetics, critical spirits arose who sharply criticised the life concentrated on greed and alienation. Even the existence of the gods was questioned by many.”147

The appearance of these movements in contrast to the existing religious beliefs tried to en-lighten the people about God or the Absolute Being. In the case of Jesus, one can clearly point out how he presented God to the people of Israel. In a context of fear and oppression from foreign invaders and the burdening religious practices, Jesus was guided by the mission to tell them that the most important thing in life was to love and be loved. This, in turn, gave them an understanding of a God who is also loving. The Beatitudes, the famous teachings of Jesus on the Mount, are intrinsically rebellious in nature to the existing religious authorities. (Mt 5)

In particular, the Sermon on the Mount, which famously characterizes his mission, divulges the anthropological intention of Jesus. What is it that Jesus through his life and the movement that he began, would like to change in the lives of people? Jesus wanted to use a terminology that presented God who is merciful and compassionate. Though this picture is not new to read-ers of the Old Testament, the Israelites ostensibly did not take this attribute of God seriously. The religious leaders placed their emphasis on a punishing God. Here are some examples that depict God as compassionate. “The Lord, a God compassionate and merciful ( oiktirmon kai eleemon )’ He is a ‘merciful Lord’ ( oiktirmon kyrios ) who does not forget the covenant with his people. Asking for God’s mercy is an important feature of Jewish prayer and is often linked with his forgiveness of sins.”148 The teachings of both Buddha and Jesus were oriented towards the betterment of human beings. However, intrinsically, the ethics of both these personalities seemed to include many similarities.

In the above discourse, I have attempted a reconstruction of religion from a rational perspec-tive. The transformation of human cognition was remarkably experienced in and through reli-gion, which extended its sacred complex by engulfing the whole of society. Therefore, it serves to extend my discussion further on Habermas’ philosophy of religion that now explicitly ex-plores the concept of postmetaphysical thinking and its linkage with religion in society.

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PART IV: HABERMAS’ RELIGION II – POSTMETAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY AS BRIDGING THE SECULAR AND RELIGION

In a further refinement of the Habermasian religious philosophy, it is important to base oneself on what is referred to as postmetaphysical thinking. This line of thought essentially accom-modates a way that could (in principle) reconcile both secular and religious-minded people through mutual acceptance and learning. This chapter deals with how Habermas tries to un-ravel commonalities between the two rather than concentrating on emphasizing the differ-ence. In this manner, it becomes an important argumentative structure that contributes to my research. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will discuss the various principles of postmeta-physical thinking and the manner in which it works in society. The underlying sociological condition that supports to explain postmetaphysical approach is however, postsecular. Ac-cordingly, it eventually becomes also an important concept of this chapter to discuss.

What follows from here is an intellectual readiness to accept constantly that a mistake is possible anytime. Even though a piece of knowledge that has been well reasoned could be ridden with incorrect elements. A postmetaphysical attitude looks towards to constantly re-vise knowledge, which becomes a requirement of constructive and better refined knowledge.2Another important character that could be traced in this line of thinking is what Habermas refers to as the concept of discourse, which forms the basis of his famous discourse theory. The participant here does not merely analyse various arguments and validates them as good but is also open to all other newer forms of arguments. “Incidentally, such a discursive openness to new arguments would accommodate the fallibilism that Habermas emphasizes as a hallmark of a postmetaphysical theory of society.”3

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1 Faith ( Glauben ) and Knowledge ( Wissen ) as Points of Orientation

I will commence this discussion by basing myself on the talk given by Habermas on the recep-tion of the Friedenspreis .4 Here, he makes his postmetaphysical intentionality clear by opening up the possibility of a dialogue between faith and knowledge. Consequently, I make it as a point of departure for my further investigation that exposes the commonality of rationality, which is a salient attribute of both philosophy and religion.

The discussion about faith and knowledge lays the foundation of a rationalistic religion. To grasp elements of rationality that formed faith traditions, we need to analyse its process of worldviews. This process of building up worldviews forms the link between the axial pro-ductions and the postmetaphysical views of religion. Undoubtedly, the worldviews emerging within the discipline of metaphysics produced by the gradual development of human cognition was clarified through the discussion of the axial age. According to Hans Albert, Habermasian postmetaphysical thinking is a dualistic metaphysics. Habermas clearly distances himself in producing worldviews and it is an approach that requires philosophy to distance itself from such worldview productions.5 Albert claims that if one closely observes the Habermasian post-metaphysical process, it becomes accident that what Habermas treats as postmetaphysical is metaphysical dualism.6

However, in order to explore postmetaphysical thinking, metaphysics becomes a vital point of discussion. Hence, I will briefly explain the basics of this process of metaphysics and the principles that underlie such ideology as worldviews. For this purpose, it would be helpful to construct the following part of the Habermasian postmetaphysical approach towards religion.

1.1 Metaphysical Inquiry as the Production of Axial Cognition

The following inquiry into the basics of metaphysics envisions the continuity between the ax-ial age and its cognitive production. The word ‘metaphysics’ appeared in the western world around the time of Aristotle and his collection of writings that encompassed the themes of nat-ural sciences and aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of theology and wisdom. Andronikos of Rhodos was the first editor of Aristotle’s work. He compiled various works of Aristotle, which is called the first philosophy, and named them ta meta ta physika, meaning ‘ Schriften nach der Physik’. He named them so because he placed them behind the works of natural sciences.8 However, over time, this was understood as metaphysics, an area that deals what is beyond physical appearances. Aristotle, while dealing with this subject, places knowl-edge as apriori to experiences i.e , we understand certain phenomena through intuitive knowl-edge before knowing more about them via experiences. This is, for Aristotle, is the very natural faculty of a being. Knowledge is essentially an understanding of the underlying principles and reasons of truths. Consequently, Aristotle uses the terms arché (Prinzip) and aitia (Ursache) as synonyms. “Metaphysics, however, is the most general and therefore the highest of all sciences, because it deals with the very first causes and principles, with those which determine every-thing else, on which everything else depends.”9

The whole inquiry is fundamentally about these first principles, and reasons. Moreover, one should be able to acknowledge the speculative characteristic of this science about the first prin-ciples: While speaking of this first principle or the reason of all being, Aristotle called it the divine principle, or in other words, God.10 Put simply, it pertains to knowledge about God. Consequently, trying to enquire and know the first principle is ultimately trying to know God, who is transcendent. This is exactly what the religions were trying to do. The axial character-istic of religions reveals that they arose from the normal societal explanations and reasons of religion to a transcendent one. Thus, they wanted to give a substantial meaning. This is ob-viously what the Upanishadic sages were pursuing. “The Upanishad Rishi (seer) is not yet an Arhat (early Buddhist ascetic); he still sees in the world the abundance of the divine Brahman and not exclusively the result of ignorance and lust for life.”11

Metaphysics, on the whole, is the study of the ultimate reality. According to the metaphy-sicians, the reality is what one deems to find beyond the appearances in the world of visible objects. Nonetheless, one can foremostly speak of this reality only in reference to the empirical appearance followed by an inquiry beyond these appearances. If there is no ultimate reality, then metaphysics is reduced to a study without a subject matter. Metaphysics must be distin-guished from the most general and all-embracing of the physical sciences. 12 This is imperative to know what lies beyond these appearances. Though the cosmological sciences helps us attain certain conclusions, they cannot lead us to the ultimate reality, which is often represented by religion.

However, the physical sciences cannot disapprove the thesis of religious groups concerning ultimate reality. Simultaneously, metaphysicians themselves cannot prove through the mittel of scientific methodology the existence of ultimate reality. Thus, it remains an unclarified area. It is here, however, that Habermas through his postmetaphysical approach, distances himself by being open to cognitive contents of religion. He differs from a traditional critic of religion, which is mainly based on this metaphysical tradition of philosophical theodicy.13 However, at-tempts have been made to rescue religion from a situation wherein traditional religious critics base themselves on the irrationality of religion as opposed to scientific inisghts. In a very vivid manner, postmetaphysical philosophy considers this problem and gives a scientific basis to religious traditions through discursive methodology.

1.2 Habermas’ Summarization of Metaphysics

After having presented the themes and discussions about metaphysics, we can infer that meta-physics plays a very important role in understanding and basing religious beliefs. Metaphysics gives us the reference point for our beliefs and especially to our values. Surely, it is mostly a theoretical world that focuses on picturing the unseen realities as realities only through spec-ulations. With the development of physical sciences, which give valid and empirical evidence, metaphysics failed to satisfy the minds of the new scientists. In this case, will philosophy, actu-ally still be relevant in dealing with the themes of metaphysics?

However, with the development of discourse theory and ethics of Habermas, it is often per-ceived that one does not require metaphysics, as discourse ethic develops morals and ethics not in reference to an existing element outside the purview of physical actuality. Rather, it calls for concreteness of various ethics, morals, or even societal beliefs by means of rational discussions and conclusions, which are to be arrived through a process of consensus.14 Probably Habermas had underestimated in line with the Frankfurt school the role of religion, which is intertwined with metaphysics. Nevertheless, his development of understanding the role of religion in soci-ety gives us clarity about the widening of his horizon with the understanding of metaphysics and its essentiality and vitality in society. Whether he arrives at this point from a believer’s point of view, for whom the existence of a personal god is substantial, the explanations tend to be very vague. However, in his own words, he tries to defend himself in his dialogue with Eduardo Mendieta. Habermas’ further discussions on his postmetaphysical thinking do not, in any way, deny the metaphysical arena; rather, he corrects himself saying that it only comple-ments metaphysics. This seems to be attributed to his thought, which shows that as a philoso-pher Habermas is still seeking to understand the phenomena of metaphysics. It is, however, an uncompleted project.15

Metaphysics becomes enormously vital in society owing to the whole concept of morality and law. Morality and laws nevertheless base themselves on transcendental concepts, which renders them valid. Religion gives legitimacy to politics, which explains why politics, a con-trolling and organizing factor of society, has to base itself on religion. Notably, religion presents metaphysics; it provides explanations for things, which do not find explanations in themselves or any social organizer, or politician. Human cognition nevertheless moves forward towards scientific proofs and there is another side of the society, which leans towards the sentimental and transcendental world.

Seeking a precise definition of Metaphysics in a Habermasian sense would only lead to frus-tration. However, we can still explore this theme in which I shall try to sumamrise his exposi-tion on metaphysics based on his book, Postmetaphysical Thinking part one .

Habermas claims that the position of positivists who tried to enquire or respond to the ques-tions of the metaphysicians ended up in absurdity. He refers to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and even Adorno whom he considers philosophers who made sincere attempts to describemetaphysics but resulted in a negative metaphysics. In dealing with the new age movements which consider the scientific theories concerning the absolute and attribute the highest authority to them, Habermas tries to explain Metaphysics in this manner:

It can be said that the philosophy of consciousness is the inheritance of Metaphysics. When speaking of metaphysics, Habermas basically alludes to the philosophy of consciousness. He speaks of this consciousness in two different contexts or ideas viz ., mentalism, and subject phi-losophy. Based on this conception, he divides the history of philosophy into three stages: Sein (ontological thinking), Bewusstsein (reflexive philosophical thinking), and Sprache (linguistic philosophy). This change from the first stage to the next one is called the Paradigmenwechsel and the latter is referred to as the linguistic turn. Thus, one can derive the knowledge that the first two parts described in the metaphysical thinking, namely, Identitätsdenken , and Idealism , come under the ontological field. Therefore, the symbol of the form of metaphysics could be conceived through Identität and Idee .17 Identity thinking, which is the theme of unity within the philosophy of origins, deals with the origins of the world. Philosophy does consider the idea of the origins of mythology. However, it does not remain static with the myths in con-sidering the time. Philosophy transcends this idea of the time of origin, ad focuses more on philosophical methods. This point of beginning is, however, seen either in the relationship with the inner being of the world or deemed separate (which is dualism). Ultimately, different views exist when it comes to considering this origin; lastly, “the many are reproduced as an ordered multiplicity.”18

The idea of the whole emerges from a thought developed from the language or grammatical form before reaching the conceptual level and then, the idea is finally deduced. Plato considers the conceptual nature of the whole that resembles the whole order as pre-existing ideas. There-fore, it is the philosophy of Plato. Ideas represent the abstract being. However, Habermas says:The two-world-teaching (dualism) in Kant sheds light on this aspect. The priority of the iden-tity against the differen ce and the pivotal role of material within the idea exemplifies the re-flexive philosophical thinking of Habermas. This, however, emerges as a key bone of contenton Habermas has against Kant. Its systematic expression can be seen in the de-transcendentaliz-ing of the Kantian ethic.20

Daniel observes that according to Habermas, different problems such as the circular nature of the theory of self-awareness, the normative deficits of critical theory , concerning philoso-phy of conscious could find a solution through the change to Sprachphilosophie . Even though Habermas is interested in this philosophical shift of Bewusstseinsphilosophie , the practical phi-losophy of Kant represents the deciding conceptual factor of example for the discourse ethic.21

Lastly, the metaphysics of Habermas can be characterized by his Theoriebegriff or “concept of theory . ” He bases himself very strongly on the principle of Aristotle, bios theoretikos, “En- twurf eines theoretischen Lebens”, which translates to “outline of a theoretical life.”This per-spective nevertheless interprets the discussion about the very strong concept of theoryas the confidence of the philosophy as a whole. It provides the ultimate foundation and reasoning for answering certain philosophical questions. Indeed, as a postmetaphysical thinker, Habermas understands that his claim of reasons should be appropriated under this dimension or view.22This strong concept of the theory refers to the redemptive significance of the contemplative life. As religion proposes different ways to attain salvation, philosophy proposes the way of con-templation (life dedicated to contemplation) . Theory necessiates a renunciation of the natural attitude towards the world and promises contact with the extra-ordinary. This theorypaves the way to the understanding of the orbits in nature as well as the universe and the phenomenon of the totality of nature. “In the modern period, the concept of theory loses this link to sacred occurrences, just as it loses its elite character, which is moderated into social privilege. What remains is the idealistic interpretation placed on distancing the everyday network of experi-ence and interests.”23

1.3 The (Non)-Occidental Approach of Connecting Faith and Knowledge

In the philosophical discussion, according to the western approach, faith and knowledge are treated as two different entities. However, in the eastern approach, especially that of the Indian, both these concepts are treated under the same umbrella of religion. If we closely observe the axial age phenomenon, the Indian axial age seemed to have its cognitive productions mainly ensconced in its intellectual productions which are commonly available in texts of religion and texts of knowledge. Whereas, in the case of Israel, the proclaimed word was primarily considered a religious text. A similar type of philosophical productions, as in the case of Upa-nishads, is not evident. The west has taken over the traditions of Israel and appropriated them while developing ‘philosophical texts or texts of knowledge’ as a separate entity from that of the religious texts. A western philosopher does not consider the Holy Bible as a philosophical text; rather, it is essentially a religious text. If a western scholar had to search for philosophical texts in the past, he would certainly refer to Greek philosophical texts. The scholastic theology itself is an example that revels the extent to which they base on Greek texts of philosophy. In the eastern (Indian) regions, one would surely base herself on the (Holy) Upanishads. So much so that westerners went to the extent of claiming:

In Christianty, Augustine and Aquinas developed philosophical discourses to strengthen its dogmatic position based on philosophers who were unrelated to the Bible. Therefore, consid-ering this reality, there was a constant need to treat faith and knowledge primarily under two different roofs. However, an attempt was gradually made to unite these two disciplines. Yet, in reconstructing the history of philosophy wherein he also finds the genealogy of religion, Habermas brings to light this similar line of thought in which both faith and knowledge could co-exist.25 Therefore, I will briefly describe how the human mind could capture both faith and knowledge under the same premise by stating that true knowledge consists in the recognition of oneself as part of the universal spirit. “In Western philosophy man wants to know reality or the truth, in Indian philosophy, one wants to be or become-to be identical with-that Being or Truth.”26

The concept of the absolute in the history of religion is the most important concept that renders it valid.

Having discovered such a being, religion places itself beyond all societal explanations. It is in this manner that religion keeps itself higher than all societal norms. Therefore, a discussion about the absolute being is considered necessary. There is a gradual growth of the idea under-lying this unseen power that controls everything. Or at least as the humans thought that there was a power that can control things that are beyond their control.

The idea of an Absolute refers to an infinite being considered the absolute being and the ground of all beings.28 Various philosophical traditions have tried to establish the principle that all things proceed from this being and everything has its basis in this being. Therefore, it is considered as the absolute being. The Upanishads basically refer to the Being of beings as the Brahman. In other words, the concept of the Absolute is explained in terms of sat-cit-ananda translated as “Eternal Consciousness Bliss . ”29

Sankara is one of the earliest interpreters of the Upanishadic teaching who sheds light on the concept of Brahman. His teaching is characterized as Advaita, which is in contrast to dualism. For him, only Brahman is real and everything else is unreal – Maya . Sankara uses the term Maya so that the world explains itself rather than he having to make an explanation. When he says that the creation is a maya , he intends to explain it as a condition which is vielfalt and something which cannot be explained. He does not want to explain and gives reasons for how the world came into being; instead, he wanted his followers to get rid of this world – maya as soon as possible.30 His famous writings, commentaries, and exegesis of the Upanishads are found in one of his famous works known as Brahmasutrabhasya. One can give a gist of his entire philosophy in the following phrase: Brahma satyam, jagad mithya, jivo brahmaiva naparah (Brahman is real, the world is illusion; the Self is not as Brahman alone). Here, he stresses the importance and reality of Brahman as well as the identification of the self with the Brahman. This statement denies dualism that denies the world or says that the world is false. It is just an illusion, or Maya. Thus, he concludes that there is only one reality – the Brahman.31

The concept of Brahman could be further characterized into three elements viz., sat-cit- ananda . The word sat is translated as Being, cit as Consciousness, and ananda as Bliss. The Brahman, who is Absolute, is projected through the world. Brahman is all-pervasive and ex-ists in every being in the universe. Being is consciousness itself. Consciousness accompanies one’s cognitions. Through my subjective consciousness and the objective world, the same Be-ing shines. The ultimate Being that is consciousness is Brahman itself. Brahman is the highest transcendental truth in which all subject-object distinction is obliterated.32 In conclusion, the following citation summarises the thought behind the above discussion:

1.4 Co-existence of Glauben und Wissen

According to Habermas, the genealogy of modern philosophy and religious reforms have a commonality. He opines that both have evolved simultaneously. To emphasise this point, Habermas returns to the concept of Axial Age by Karl Jaspers, which gives him a connec-tion between these two areas. Habermas cites the exapmple of the Jewish-Christian roots for secular values like human rights.35 This process for Habermas is a Lernprozess 36that emerges from an attempti to maintain a mutuality between Glauben and Wissen . Joas, who addresses the sacrality of person, also mentions a similar approach. For instance, a similar thought runs through Hans Joas’ discourse on the very concept of sacredness. This is the core aspect of every religion, which has the potentiality of being translated into non-religious circumstances. Hans Joas, in his book, Die Sakralität der Person, introduces the topic of human rights in which he attributes the character of sacredness to persons. Moreover, the violation of this person’s rights is similar to that of violation of the sacredness in a religious circle. Joas considers the origin of human rights to have existed in the Christian tradition. However, he then accepts that it was invented even before the Christian tradition was laid as its foundation.37 Nevertheless, it is important to mark the process of translation of a religious concept to a non-religious concept. This idea of human rights, however, is deeply embedded in the concept or understanding of the worth of every person.38

In analysing the genealogy of reason, Habermas observes that religion serves as a founda-tion in which reason has its first elements of appearance.39 The development of human history is rooted in religion itself. The aspect of this reasonable dealing with religion began by his recapture of Entzauberung and Entsakralisierung of sacred practices. This, in turn, provid-ed the impetus for the application of reason. Habermas observes a bindende Kraft between morality and the sacred sphere.40 He reconstructs the paradigm change so that religion and philosophy might come to an overlapping origin to discover their common genealogy, which also becomes the aim of postmetaphysical thinking so that it contributes to an “aufgeklärten Glauben”41

Religion becomes a point of departure to the orientation of the life world in which Haber-mas binds rationality with the linguistification of the sacred. This gives us an occasion for thought. The sacred, which removes certain areas of social organization from thematization, is gradually dissolved into a communicative ethic, the religious forms of reasoning are re-placed by discourses, and religion becomes a fossil of the history of rationality.42 Further-more, religious reasons in public are functionalistic in their nature when it comes to the func-tion of rendering meaning in society with regard to morality. Religious members, however, represent or stand as having the potentiality of presenting reasons which are fundamentally moral in nature.43

As far as philosophy takes care of the procedural rationality, it interrogates the arguments in which the validity claim is represented and not the truth of the claim itself. The postmetaphys-ical thinking, therefore, designates firstly a paradigm change from the theory of truth to va-lidity theory. In this form, the truth appears in the plural and the rationality as a procedure.44Habermas reconstructs this development of these paradigms to reach the shared origin of both philosophy and religion. In this manner, Habermas leans towards the theory of an Axial Age.45

Placing the basic structures of consciousness in both faith and knowledge, it could be an-alysed that they do not stay as opposite poles, albeit with a condition that as long as they rise from the same roots. In establishing the genealogy of faith and reason, Habermas too arrives at this point of agreement. Max Planck says:

Although it is claimed that knowledge is mostly identified as results of experiments by natural scientists and consequently judges religion as irrational, some natural scientists and physicists disagree. Arthur H. Compton, says: “Far from being in conflict with religion, science has be-come an ally of religion. Through better insight into nature we also get to know better the God of nature and the role we play in the drama of the cosmic world.”47 The relationship between religion and knowledge intrinsically indicates a relationship between state and religion. For Habermas, what lies centrally in this relationship between Glauben and Wissen is a construc-tive mutuality from either side, which, however, receives its source from the dictum of the the-ory of communicative actions.48 A careful distinction between these areas is also suggested ac-cording to Reder, as he understands that religion remains opaque from a secular reason, which is why translation is proposed as a medium through which religion could be available even to those non-religious members.49 However, for Schmidt, it is right to furthermore question as to how a philosophy that is agnostic can reach the path of comprehension of this opacity, which characterizes religion rather than just leaving it to its opaqueness. To this, he says:

To understand that postmetaphysical philosophy is an approach to religion, it is fundamental to analyse this dialectic between Glauben und Wissen . Though Glauben and Wissen stand as two contrasting poles, and they have their own specialities and one can observe a possibility of mutual exchange between these two areas. By bringing this into light, Habermas firstly opens up a possibility of a discussion with one another and secondly, he indicates that religion itself must be able to recognize the scientific authority of reason.51

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2 Postsecular

At this point, I begin exposing the socio-philosophical condition that generates postmetaphys-ical thinking. In order to further understand this thought, various social, religious situations and the role that they play in influencing even the politics and their principles are to be con-sidered as important factors. Thus, it aims at analysing reasons required to engage in a post-metaphysical discourse.

2.2 Postsecular as the Religious Signature of the Present

In Habermas’ reflections and analysis about religion and the role of religion in our society today, it is important to discuss the concepts of postsecular and postmetaphysics. Although these terminologies could divert our attention to two different areas, they are interrelated in their philosophical approach. Habermas describes the role of religion in postsecular society under the conditions of postmetaphysical thinking. He does this from an outsider or observer perspective and the participant’s perspective as well.52

However, postsecular is a term relevant to those societies which imbibe the character of sec-ular societies in the western understanding of secularism.

On the one hand, we need to observe that there is no concrete or visible growth of religion in these societies. In the case of Europe alone, churches are becoming empty by the day. On the other hand, new religious movements are popping up all over either from other parts of the world or other re-ligious movements springing up from within the European context. An individual’s search for the divine or a religious experience without falling into the traditional religious systems or structures is also a reality. “Habermas notes that the religious system has become more differentiated and is lim-ited above all to pastoral practice, which fits in with the trend of individualised religious practice.”54

However, based on such observation, one can say that religion has not lost its significance. It has neither lost its influence and place in the political or public life nor in the lives of the individuals. With these observations, the secularization thesis about religion and the vitality of religion needs to be revised and explained beyond the sheer understanding of secularization as the disappearance of religion . 55

Hans Joas argues that this understanding of postsecular has been deepened with the Habermasian approach in his speech at the Paulskirche. Many intellectuals concluded that secularism would be part of modernity or modernity leads to secularism. It was indeed a very comfortable situation for these intellectuals who did not feel the need to clarify secularism. However, Habermas makes it clear that their expectations are unfortunately not met. This came as a setbaxk ( ‘Schlag’ ), to this group of intellectuals. To this, he offers help or even a solution to understand this phenomenon.57[…] ‘Postsecular does not then express a sudden increase in religiosity after its epochal decline, but rather a change in the consciousness of those who felt justified in considering religions as moribund. For Habermas, “postsecular” is a society that is preparing for the continued existence of religious communities in a society that is becoming increasingly secularised.’58

This interpretation of Joas about Habermas’ stand is central to the Habermasian thesis of postsecular. He explains it by stating that it is a change of consciousness characterizing the postsecular phenomenon. Furthermore, Casanova refers to Habermas’ definition of postsecu-lar that abandons the modernist understanding of religion as primitive. Based on the previous understanding, as a change of consciousness, Habermas calls it becoming aware of “secular-istic self-misunderstanding”.59 In a modernized scenario where secularism tried to annul to ignore the contents of Judaeo-Christian traditions, Habermas steps up to rescue these mean-ingful contents that shaped societies. To deal with such an approach, he presents the previous understanding of secularism now as a “ rettende Säkularisierung ”.60 He does this by returning to Immanuel Kant and his philosophy of religion.

2.1 Postsecular as a Process of Recognition

The term postsecular is commonly misunderstood as an era or age that follows the secular age. However, let me begin this discussion by presenting what Habermas means by postsecular. He uses the expression ‘postsecular’:

The passiveness of the general secular public towards the existence of a greater and influential religious public has to be now worked through, so that a general change of consciousness might be able to recognize the active presence of various religions in a secularized world. Postsecular is considered to be the religious signature of the present times according to Habermas. It is more than a claim that religion exists in the midst of secular society; rather it is a coordination between secular and religious.63 In his talk about Faith and Knowledge, concepts relating to religion and secular were the central ones. He used these concepts above all concerning the moral content of religious discourse. In this way, he reminded the secular citizens of the im-portance of religion that contributed to the most important aspect of a just and stable society i.e, morality. He argued that the process of secularization was not just a matter of damage to the religion and its members but also affected democratic liberalism. This is because in a dem-ocratic society, a just and righteous society cannot have a robust foundation without having its resources or funding from religion itself.64 Thus Martin Stobbe gives a gist of Habermasian postsecular as , “Societies in which religious communities continue to exist in a secular envi-ronment and at the same time can transfer the semantic potential of religion into a secular language are now called ‘postsecular’ by Habermas.”65

Furthermore, postsecular could be analysed in the following societal reality. Religion, which is transformed in its presentation, is trying to give meaning to the inhabitants of a modernized world. This transformation is more visible in the various forms in which religion currently ex-ists. The organized form of religion viz., Christianity, has experienced a significant decline in the past decades. However, religion, as Charles Taylor points out, is taking different forms. The religious members need not now stick to an organized body to express their faith or practise their faith.66 There are more opportunities for them to express their religious spirit in society. The western European and the American/Canadian societies assume great significance in this regard. Though adherence to organized religion is declining, the content and the function of religion is becoming increasingly relevant in the secularized society.67 The expression of reli-gion or the phenomenon of religion in a secular world is not just a matter of social reality. It is, however, a cognitive challenge to the modern world of reason. Religion itself is undoubtedly a part of the history of reason.68 Postsecular is a story trying to present the connection between today’s modernity, its culture of reason, and the age-old phenomenon of religion and its con-tent of reason. The contribution of religion to the society in areas of morality and the social as-pect of living together is, however, being brought to the forefront by this project of postsecular. It should also be realized that above all, ‘postsecular’ does not refer to society in a general manner, rather tries to present its image or self-concept. The concept postsecular is, however, a sociological predicate and it is a counterpart to its genealogical predicate postmetaphysics. This is measured through its role firstly from an observer’s role ( Beobachterperspektive ) and then followed by the participant’s perspective ( Teilnehmerperspektive ). Thus, it could be said that a postsecular society is a follow-up of a society, whose members come to an understanding within themselves under the premise of postmetaphysical thinking.70

2.3 Does Modernity lead to a Religious Erosion Process?

Another perspective of analysing postsecular is to place it against the modern illusionary thinking that religion is deteriorating. In his book, Gesellschaft im Umbruch, Hans Höhn discusses various perspectives of religion and its sociological effect in the society.71 He uses the phrase, for example, the ‘religious erosion process’ to express the current situation in many modernized societies. The Cambridge Dictionary gives the following meaning to the word erosion: “the fact of good qualityor situation being gradually lost or destroyed.”72 When we discuss the process of religious erosion, it implies that the good quality or a good situation is being adversely affected. In other words, Höhn opines that religion, which has made significant contributions to society, is being destroyed. However, he further points out that it is a one-sid-ed impression, probably indicating the weakening of the established religion, Christianity. He argues in the line of Taylor that religions instead are taking new forms and continue to exist by incorporating elements from other religions from other cultures.73

It is also necessary to avoid a general understanding especially among the most modernized or westernized worlds, that the era of religion is over and that we are living in a new era. This could even be considered to be just an imagination against the reality. On the contrary, “Rath-er, there is also […] the challenge of a cooperative processing of the consequences of seculari-sation, which can be attributed to a ‘derailing modernisation’.”75

The expression of religion in a secular world is not just a matter of social reality. It is a cog-nitive challenge to the modern world of reason. It is clear that religion itself belongs to or is a part of the history of reason. Postsecular is a story trying to establish the connection between modernity, its culture of reason, and the age-old phenomenon of religion and its interplay with reason. The contribution of religion to society in areas of morality and the social aspect of liv-ing together, is, however, being brought to the forefront by this project of postsecular.

If it is more humane way of mutual living together is to be identified, then both the religious and the secular need to work in tandem. Modernity’s intention to replace the authority of religion and make its own, can now make a place for religion once again with the process of mutual Lernprozess. Above all, the saving appropriation of religion’s cultural inheritance can continue so long as its moral relevance continues to be recognized. However, it could not sim-ply mean the continued existence of religious forms of traditions. Instead, it implies a transfor-mation of these into moral traditions.76

2.4 Postsecular as a Neutral Space

This point reflects on postsecular as a neutral space in the Augustinian sense of secularism in De Civitate Dei as postulated by Jose Casanova. As per Casanova. Habermas was not ready to accept the theory of post-modernism as he claimed that the modernity remains an unfinished project. So, how could he propose postsecular? The word secular is derived from the Latin Saeculum , which is interpreted in an Augustinian sense. The idea of the parousia is inserted here, in which Christians and non-Christians come together to pursue the common interest of society. Secular in this perspective does not mean being against religion or even the sacred. It cannot be equated with ‘profane’ according to this original sense of the introduction of the term secular. Secular is just a neutral space, especially in the Augustinian sense.77 This is also more in line with the Habermasian sviewpoint.78 Later, in the medieval times, the term un-derwent a gradual change in meaning that concretely separated what is currently known as the earthly and the heavenly.79 Casanova clealry states that postsecular is not becoming again religious and not in the Habermasian sense.80

The City of God written by Augustine could be viewed as an analysis of the situation in Rome. He reads through the pages of history to refute their claim of Christians bringing misfortune to Rome. Augustine implores them to look into the past and confirms that misfortune has nothing to do with the belief in a particular god or abandoning a god. This is indeed how he observes the natural phenomenon of misfortune without attributing it to religious beliefs or superstitions. By enlightening the Romans in this manner, he could avoid prejudicial feelings towards the Christians, who were considered by the Romans to be secularists or who did not believe in their type of gods.81

2.5 A Reflective Religion

In discussing the concept of postsecular in the Habermasian philosophy it is vital to shed light on religion as a reflective one. So one can begin from asking the basic question, why do we need in the first place a reflective religion? Reflection indicates one’s consciousness, which is referred to by Casanova as stadial consciousness.82 Therefore, when discussing a reflective religion, we are intrinsically discussing the religious practice of a person in relation to the reflective nature of consciousness. This refers to the practice of religion on a conscious level. Religion and its practices as I have discussed in my earlier chapters arose from various social situations with a deep historical background. However, certain religious practices are no more relevant in the present times or they have been proved to be on the wrong path, which does not contribute to the building up of human society. This is precisely why Habermas asks the religious members to be reflective in religious practices and in comprehending beliefs.83 Certain religious beliefs, which are considered to be important by particular religions, are nevertheless destructive opin-ions, traditions, and interpretations of their scriptures, especially in reference to religious fun-damentalists of various religions who believes that certain acts of religion are destined by God.

Habermas observes that modern religions have taken two forms of religious consciousness: Fundamentalism and Reflective faith.

Jose Casanova attempts to enlighten the position of Habermas concerning the term postsec-ular “as a change in consciousness, as an altered self-understanding of the largely secularized societies of Western Europe, Canada, or Australia.”85 Furthermore, according to Casnova:

Well, this is what Klaus Müller might also mean as important in a postsecular period: the value of reflectiveness. Klaus Müller, in his contribution to Glauben und Wissen symposium, explicitly expresses the danger of a probable destructive nature of monotheism if not for the reflectiveness of this trend in the modern society.87 Religion could go into the hands of the abusers and will be hijacked by terrorism. However, due to this vulnerability, religion should stay in close contact with reason.88

Therefore, both Habermas and Ratzinger are convinced that reason and faith play a com-plementary role in the universal process of purification . “ Without this thrust of reflection, monotheisms in ruthlessly modernised societies develop a destructive potential ”. 89 This might be in, for instance, the Hindu fundamentalist behaviour that demands the return of those citizens – who were converted to other religions like Christianity and Islam – to their home religion of Hinduism. This is called Gharvapasi. ‘Return to Home.’ This can also be said about the Christians who try to convert people with allurements, under which they conceive that they are gaining more souls for Christ and contributing to the growth of their religion.This quote teaches us that religion itself is the basis of reason, which ultimately proves that we must infer the contents of reason in every religion to combat the unreflective (fundamental-ist) elements of religion. This is brought out in his earlier phase of communicative actions by “ Entzauberung und Entmächtigung des sakralen Bereichs ”, which translates to Disenchantment and disempowerment of the sacred realm.91 The so-called secularized western world still has a strong presence of religious communities. Such a reality is an invitation to begin a dialogue between the non-religious and religious. For a society to function well, the sentimental aspects of various groups are to be taken seriously. Being the basic sentimental aspect of humans, re-ligion has to be considered with all attention. The non-secular agents do not have the right to ignore their presence, because their contribution to society is equal to that of the others. In this sense, Habermas proposes a cooperative work between the two groups.

Thus, post-secular bases itself on three important basic rules or laws:

This is how religious citizens are demanded or coerced to take public opinion seriously as opposed to clinging on to their religious convictions, which sometimes violate societal rationality.94

178

3 Postmetaphysical as Saving Religion

After providing the layout in which postmetaphysical thinking works, I will further analyse some postmetaphysical patterns. I will especially discuss how Habermas attempts to detect the genealogical roots of religion and philosophy. “Tracing back their genealogies reveal that they originated as ‘appropriations’ or ‘translations’ of religious ideas. Investigating these genealogies illuminates the occluded history of the continuous interchange between philosophy and religion over the centuries.”95In the course of this discussion the transition from Rawls to Habermas would be demonstrated. As the background of this research con-cerns religion and it’s functioning in the public sphere, the investigation leads us to analyse the religious reasons and their importance in the public sphere. Besides, this part also func-tions as a defence of religion. According to Wolterstorff, postmetaphysical philosophy is not a new project for Habermas. However, he discovers that there is more to what has been begun in his postmetaphysical thinking work. He describes this as “Habermas’s preoccupa-tion with the relation of such philosophy to religion, and with the relation of both of these to political discourse.”96 The various sections in which religion takes a positive stand in the philosophy of Habermas consequently highlights its contributions not only in the spiritu-al area, which is often related to religion, but also reflects society’s complete dependence on religion. The postmetaphysical thinking of Habermas also allows us to discern how he understands rationality. It goes without saying that his understanding is non-ontological and non-metaphysical. Nicholas Wolterstorff provides a common understanding of this postmetaphysical rationality by pointing out Habermas’ engagement of public reasons97as “reasons that have the power to convince also beyond the boundaries of a particular re-ligious community.”98 In this manner, postmetaphysical philosophy clearly distinguishes itself from metaphysical claims, which have produced various worldviews developed by religious rationalists.

3.1 Postmetaphysical Thinking as Translation

I shall firstly expatiate postmetaphysical basically in terms of translation: A translation of se-mantic contents from religious to secular. Habermas discusses this theme of translation in his book, Postmetaphysical Thinking II in reference to Maria Herrera Lima. He also quotes Adorno, who considers that it is very important to translate or transform all theological con-tents to secular to ensure the survival of religious experiences deeply rooted in history and to safeguard this phenomenon. And for such an activity, a postmetaphysical thinking premise is accurate, according to Habermas. However, he asks whether such activity is desirable.99

Habermas originally developed the postmetaphysical thinking in a context where he wanted to go beyond the engagement of metaphysics on a supplementary position to Dietrich Henrich whose thought Habermas characterizes as the Rückkehr zur Metaphysik . It was this occasion that allowed Habermas to develop and defend this pattern of postmetaphysics.100 It refers to an evaluation of a various range of philosophical theories. Two important aspects need to be noted here. He denies the possibility of a speculative metaphysical theory that there is an expla-nation to everything or reality. However, he refers back to such theories, which are considered to be redundant in the postmodern context.101 Notably, a postmetaphysical approach leans towards an atheistic approach in its methodology.102 With this perspective, it should, however, try to avoid criticising religion. It should do so; otherwise it could dilute the element of reason in religious traditions of postmetaphysical thinking.

Now Habermas states that a philosophical translation of the religious contents should nei-ther be operated nor driven as just explanatory reductions nor as logical destruction of the semantic contents and the cognitive challenges of religion. It is also important to note here that Habermas distances himself from such traditional concepts of religious philosophy, which were processing their philosophical traditions in response to the criticism of metaphysical tra-ditions of philosophical theodicy. It is not just the emergence of the philosophical idea of lib-eralism as a response to understand the religious wars. At the same time, it is also necessary to comprehend the genesis of religious philosophy.103

The substantial content of both faith and reason could be understood by conducting a de-tailed analysis of the sources of their content. Religion is, however, engaged with convictions, which are elements that tend to be believed. Contrary to that, philosophy and science engage themselves with elements that can be verified and validated. This difference, which is parallel to both faith and knowledge, could be derived from the historical problem constellation.104By analysing the Kantian religious philosophy, Habermas comes to the conclusion that the boundaries between faith and knowledge, religion, and philosophy are to be interpreted in the context of a post-secular situation. To solidify the understanding in this direction, he proposes that both religious and non-religious citizens should be self-critical in their approach towards a religious person. They need to distance themselves from the basic convictions of a religious person so that both the groups will have the possibility of exchanging ideas and reciprocating in a fair manner.105 These conditions are nevertheless vital for Habermas so that the religious convictions could be translated into a language that can be comprehended by the non-religious citizens.106

Postmetaphysical thinking could be differentiated beyond the philosophy of conscience and the subjective philosophy of religion. In this sense, it also extends to the political arena. This is seen in the non-metaphysical project of the political liberalism of Rawls. Habermas howev-er, differentiates himself by adopting a cognitive perspective towards religion. He recognizes the semantic power with a deeper cognitive capacity that religion possesses. This religious resource could philosophically translate the underlying reasons into a language which is ac-cessible to all also.107 How is Habermas different from Rawls? Habermas says: “ aus religiöser Überlieferung kognitive Gehalte zu bergen”, which translates into salvaging cognitive content from religious tradition.108 This particular statement reveals the difference that one can have within the religion. On the one hand, there is a religious experience, which is considered some-thing difficult to comprehend in its content for the non-religious persons.109 On the other hand, Habermas proposes the possibility of translating the religious language into a more under-standable one.110

However, Habermas tries to bring to light commonalities between religion and philoso-phy to make both religious and secular to ‘co-work’. In this manner, they accommodate the possibility of a desirable translation, which looks for elements that could be utilized in this exercise.

3.2 Kantian Models for Postmetaphysical Translation

Here, I shall explore various foundational aspects of Kant that contribute to the concept and working of translation, which is nonetheless, further developed under the discipline of post-metaphysics by Habermas. I will briefly present Kant’s basic reflections of the philosophy of re-ligion. This is indeed a connecting cord that reveals how he formulates a premise to the theory of translation through the dichotomy of morality and religion. 3.2.1 A Dialectical Relationship between Moral and Religion

“For Kant, religion is basically nothing other than the recognition of all (moral) duties as di-vine commands.”111When it comes to looking how close both morality and religion stand together, it is important to refer Kant’s thesis and his antithesis. Kant’s works shed light on di-alectic between Religion and Morality. Many Kant interpreters propose the thesis that religion requires morality but not the moral.

However, there is also an antithesis that suggests morality automatically leads to religion or re-ligion is the basis of morality.The practical guarantee of the existence of God as a moral author of the world and eventually, the world as a moral kingdom in which man lives as a moral being allows us to decipher the consequence the moral law of one’s own practical reason at the same time as God’s law.113 This is exactly what Kant suggests as a definition of religion: “Religion is the epitome of all duties as (instar) divine commandments.”114In English, this translates into: Religion is the epitome of all duties as (instar) divine commandments . There are some other Kant’s interpreters who find that morality requires religion in order to base itself. Therefore, religion is the foundation of morality. Some interpreters of Kant like Schopenhauer point out that Kant’s famous morality theory also lead to the development of a Christian theological branch known as moral theology. E. Brunner attempted to represent the thesis that religion is the basis of morality.

It is claimed that man is a reasonable being who is moral and religious. However, this claim by the philosophers is also controversial due to the conjunction that differentiates both the natures of a person. To reach a consensus in understanding these claims, Kant gives us a sort of clarification:

This could be interpreted as projecting or giving us the clarity that a material identity between the two branches and a formal difference must be recognised in trying to understand morality and religion. However, man has these two as a common fundament, the material object of re-ception. “According to Kant’s conception of their relationship in human reason, morality and religion are mediated anthropologically.”117 His claim is that religion and morality meet at the central part of man’s existence. Accordingly, Kant proposes religion to be reasonable and ratio-nal by placing the emphasis on moral obligations. “In order to escape existential senselessness, religion will have ‘man’s duty towards himself’.”118

The relation between morality and religion could be further clarified when we analyse the end purpose of these natures. According to Kant, both the branches lead to the fulfilment of the same moral obligations, i.e., moral itself. All moral actions without an end purpose con-tradict themselves. Such purpose-oriented actions themselves have a transcendental weight. “Their demand is a priori, i.e. universal and necessary: indeed, it ultimately coincides with the moral law, at least in so far as it is ‘introduced by the law itself’. In this sense … that for Kant morality and religion are anthropologically linked.”119

Here I present in three different categories the element of religious ethics. These elements are taken from Christianity, which forms the basis of Kantian critique of religion. These categories serve as examples to compare or make clear how we can use religious categories in secular terms. Conse-quently, I would claim that Kant uses the language of reason. Kant uses a language of morality based on reason and in this manner, he also tries to translate the very Christian principles into a moral domain, which is available beyond the boundaries of religion. By doing so, he attempts to contribute to the moral domain and propose a positive utility of Christian theology. The translation thesis of Hare and Reardon, for instance, sheds light into this model. They investigate how Kant uses religion, especially that of Christian principles in exposing them in moral language equipped within the sphere of reason. According to Hare: “Kant intends to translate the core Christian doc-trines into terms that are acceptable to the moral philosopher, and he attempts this translation to show the presence of rational religion within the broader sphere of Christian theology.”120

When Habermas says that postmetaphysical philosophy helps in a pluralistic society, it stresses the requirement of a language that is comprehensible by both religious and secular. As religious principles certainly contributed to the growth of moral values in society, they occupy an important place even in the secular area. However, to consensuality of both the parties must be aimed at avoid offence to seculars and at the same time maintaining and protecting the reli-gious values and principles. Therefore, this brief exploration of Kant shows a model that comes closer to making such an exercise possible. 3.2.2.1 Sin as Bad and Virtue as the Principle of Good

The terminology used in religious circles to represent what is offensive to both individuals and society is called sin.

On the contrary, virtue represents the goodness and benevolence intended to individuals and society.

In this manner, they function as the basic principles of justice. If I concentrate on Christian-ity or Semitic religious traditions, I would certainly cite the Ten Commandments received by Moses.123 These commandments are descriptions of man’s attitude towards oneself, God, the other and society in general. They function as principles based on which the Semitic religions developed their concepts of sin and virtue. One can certainly observe that these categories were developed in a homogeneous society with one religious belief. Therefore, these principles were not just religious principles. Rather they also had a societal function, which could be said to serve a secular function. However, here Kant clearly develops the same principles in secular terms, which could be applied irrespective of particular religious reference. But what he con-siders as the foundation to these principles is reason. “The sole objects of practical reason are thus the concepts of good and evil. For by the former is meant a necessary object of desire, by the latter of detestation, but both according to a principle of reason.”124

In Book Two of the Religion, Kant develops a view of Christian doctrines as being symbolic of the conflict of the good and evil principles expressed in man’s freely chosen ultimate max-ims. Thus, the Devil symbolizes the power of one’s own evil choice: Heaven and Hell symbolize the radical gulf between the pure and impure will; the Holy Spirit becomes our confidence in our moral disposition, and Christ symbolizes that moral perfection which signifies the end of creation. Here, it is observed that the language which Kant uses is theological, but he also finds alternatives in his language. These alternatives serve as terminologies which are acceptable beyond the limits of religious language. The second example that follows is presented through a Christological language. The two categories of Böses and gutes Prinzip are explained by making Christ as the ideal personality in comparison with whom these principles are measured. 3.2.2.2 Jesus: The ideal of Moral Perfection 125

In Christianity, “It is Jesus of Nazareth, rather than anybody else, who is the personified ver-sion of the rational principle, residing in all rational beings, that turns out to be the basis of our hope for moral regeneration.”126 The prototype of perfect humanity in secular terms could be originally intended by the Christian religious groups to project a holy personality. Jesus Christ is the holy Son of God for the religiously oriented persons; however, he is also a personality of perfect human living as suggested by Kant. He makes use of this personality to explain the concept of guten Prinzip and its personification.

Kant uses two different terminologies interchangeably: the good disposition and the good principle. These two terms entail the same connotation of presenting the prototype of hu-manity. This good principle is personified, which is viewed from a cognitive point as trying to capture the idea of an ideal of perfection. However, this comes across as a contrasting idea to what we humans are in nature or at least expressed sometimes as evil or corrupt natures.127 In Kantian ideology, humanity is placed in the direction of full moral perfection. Kant puts forth this ideal that needs to be aspired for. This ideal is now to be found in a person, which is called a personified ideal. The materialization of this ideal is concretely expressed by placing Christ as the personified ideal, which he refers to as ‘prototype’ ( Urbild ). He sees this person, in whom moral perfection comes to fulfilment, as the only one capable of pleasing God.128 3.2.3.3 Kingdom of God: The Republic of Virtues 129

The expression “Kingdom of God”130 found in the Holy Bible was used by Jesus himself. Thus, this phrase fits into a religious circumstance and context. However, the assignment of philosophical translation that Habermas proposes is making these religious phrases available to the non-religious contexts as well. That is why I have cited the example of this phrase to demonstrate how it could be possible and above all, with the support of the Kantian approach, which interprets this religious phrase into a non-religious context. This idea underpinning the kingdom of God has a visible structure in our context, the Church, which is considered a community of Virtues ( Tugendgemeinschaft )131 “[…] the concept of the church (accompanies) only one function in the development of our morality, namely that we regard what should be as realizable.”132So when I speak of the kingdom of God, the following question arises: who is a citizen of this kingdom or who can become one ? Based on the principle of the community of virtues, every ethical human becomes a citizen of this kingdom of God, which, in turn, is translated as an ethical city . For Kant, we are all called to be part of this ethical city and this call is something ursprünglich , which means orignial. It becomes an innate part of us because we cannot be separated from being a moral being and we are disposed to follow the moral laws. Accordingly, the process of entering into the kingdom of God has already begun in us. It continues with the cultivation of own self towards this moral world. In this regard, Kant was able to cite the scripture, which implies the kingdom of God is not a material object that dwells outside of us.133

The highest Ziel for man is the moral fulfilment, a pure, unadulterated love for the law. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the three forms of love, respectively. Their veneration is eventually the threefold articulation of each one’s desire of union with the Law. For a reason-able faith, it does not mean anything more than this. For Kant, in presenting the idea of a mor-al being or a moral ruler, he appeals to our reasoning faculty, which is intrinsically engaged. This places the importance on comprehending what is he to us as a moral being instead of in-vestigating the nature of this moral being (god).134 In addition, a rivalry is involved between the members of a just society ( Rechtsgesellschaft ) that compares the society of self-love and virtue with one that entails the following of a moral law out of one’s own volition. This following of a moral law out of one’s own will is identical to the love of God.135

Man is obligated to establish a common ethical being, which is materialized into an ethical society. As a consequence, he must also fulfil the obligation to be part of this society. However, this obligation is characterized by its uniqueness which does not direct to the other but rather to one’s self. Baumgartner explains it further:

The interrelatedness of this ethical-moral law and the religious love of God could be seen in the Augustinian understanding of the love of God. For Augustine, the destiny is that God is all ( alles ) in everything ( allem ) ( Omnia in omnibus ). This virtue is founded on the love of God, which cannot be cultivated by man himself. Rather, it is given to us by God. Augustine believed that God is the beginning and end of everything and he is the subject of all.137 Kant realizes the profundity of religious texts and therefore, his intentionality to make it available in rational language is palpable. The mechanism that Kant uses is visible in categories of reason expressed in ethical semantics. In this manner, the texts considered by religious as motivating texts find accessibility in a non-religious content too.

3.3 The Functionality of Translation

attempts were made to push back religion into a private sphere without much public signifi-cance. The various anti-religious movements in Europe from the Middle Ages to the 19th centu-ry are a clear example of such approaches towards religion. This was supported above all by the elite of society or at least the philosophical schools that regarded religion as an unreasonable element in society. Various elements like rituals, belief in a supernatural power, an organized community of believers, the accumulation of power among the leaders of this community of believers, are some of the important elements opposed by the opponents of religion. However, in opposing these factors they missed the factuality of religion that it grew up with society hand in hand from ancient times onwards. Thus, religion in totality was being suppressed and pushed aside. In this process, society, however, missed seeing the important elements of reli-gion that contributed to the growth of society.138

Habermas, on the other hand, points out the importance of religion in society. He moves from the idea of ‘ Aufhebung’ to Übersetzung.139 He also calls for a total re-evaluation of the secularization process in society and extracts the value of religion that contributed to society by analysing and putting together some of the important sociologists and their insights about religion and society. He thus proposes this idea of Übersetzung to look back into religion as a possessor of treasure that contributes to the growth of the society and provides a basis for various positive elements.140 According to Schmidt, Übersetzung is exposed by Habermas in contrast to Rawls political liberalism. Religion is above all “a potential resource of cognitive insight that can also be philosophically ‘translated’ into the language of public reasons.”141 This theme is especially stressed in his important work, Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion .

Klaus Viertbauer clearly demonstrates this aspect of translation, which attempts to make reli-gion – having the sacred form – to be available in a postmetaphysical form:

Sakrale Form (Sacred Form)Nachmetaphysische Form (Postmetaphysical Form)

Der Mensch ist Ebenbild Gottes

(Man is made in the image of God)

Er ist ein mit Freiheit begabtes und der Freiheit verp-flichtetes Wesen

(He is a being gifted with freedom and committed to freedom)

Der Mensch ist Geschöpf Gottes

(Man is God’s creature)

Der Mensch verdankt sein natürliches Sosein nicht einem anderen Menschen. 143

(Man does not owe his natural being to another man)The following point is a continuation of the above-mentioned process of translation. However, it further attempts to explain the manner in which the sacred could be maintained without losing its essentiality in a secular ambience. 3.3.2 Translating into Secular without removing the Core of the Sacred144

Habermas reflects on faith and knowledge in reference to an opaque reason. Faith and Knowl-edge are like two different worlds, namely the religious and the secular. In discussing these two realms, he needs to find a constructive way of dealing with both sides. This is exactly what he aims to do in his theory of communicative actions. Thus, it is vital to make the difference whether we speak with one another or we speak about another. However, this approach needs to be diligently applied without getting mixed up. As both the departments have their respec-tive methodologies, it is to be taken care that, “the rift between world knowledge and revelatory knowledge must not be repaired.”145

Habermas refers to Hegel by saying that he makes the death on the cross as the centre of a thought that incorporates the positive content of Christianity. The incarnation, for instance, symbolizes the life of a philosophical spirit. The absolute or God in a religious terminology must relinquish himself or reject the self with a consequence that the absolute will experience the power when this self can again work out from the experience of the painful negativity of self-limitation.146 Notably, in some cases, this process of translation takes over the authority when the content has been delivered from a religious resource.

In postmetaphysical thinking, it is necessary to be aware of recognizing the important religious traditions even in the very most modern societies or even when societies func-tion differently from those of the past. It does not suffice that postmetaphysical recogniz-es these traditions. Instead, it is necessary to consider them as values in which religious communities have the capacity to provide fundamentally sources for binding societies together. Besides, even the secular societies could profit from them in the face of an eco-nomically endangered derailed modernization. If the new ethics do not refer to religious traditions, then they continue to search for a solid basis for the moral values of societies but not definite to find one. This solid basis is required to be a rationalistic foundation for modern societies that could have access to religious traditions, which, in turn, place themselves under strong rationalistic traditions.147 Übersetzung is considered in this con-text as something that projects itself as a saving methodology of the religious contents and above all the humane aspects of societal life.148 Habermas nevertheless, makes an effort in concretising his direction of considering the religious contents as valuable without disre-garding the normative religious potential for the present generation through the concept of Übersetzung.149 In contrast to Kant Habermas sees ‘ Kirchenglaube’ as a source of histor-ical source of inspiration, from which the practical reason must draw the ultimate purpose of a reasonable being.150

A postsecular consciousness points to a secularistic misunderstanding of modernity in which religion is completely denied its place in the public. However, this approach to religion is transformed through a dialectic that shows the power of expression of the religious traditions, which form important resources for both religious and non-religious citizens. Above all, it helps them in the normative contents of truth.151 3.3.3 Religion: A Beacon of Motivation

The following discussion could be initiated by posing the question of whether one could deny the motivational power of religion experienced within societies.152

Religion has had been motivating societies, be it in a positive or negative way. The human society from ages past has numerous examples of religious people who dedicated their lives to the service of humankind based on their convictions. Various religious societies have been established in various parts of the world to serve people. This motivation provided by religions could also be experienced in the political arena, where members of society express their po-litical opinions based on their religious convictions. On the negative side of it, we experience the fundamentalist and destructive expression of religion in society. The actions of members belonging to such groups or categories are based on their stern religious beliefs. Therefore, one cannot deny a religion’s power to motivate societies. Habermas, too, considers these two elements of religion either as destructive or helpful to society. Above all, he limits himself to Christianity while analysing this phenomenon. For Habermas, a liberal state is bound up within the history of Christianity and its culture. Due to their power to destroy the democratic nature of the state and society, religions which move in the direction of fundamentalism and are engrossed in irrationality are counterproductive to society. Contrary to such religions, he considers, Christianity, at least, in its official teachings seemed to be more helpful and produc-tive to society. It is a religion that serves the democratic nature of the state.154 “Christianity is the synthesis mediated in Jesus Christ between the faith of Israel and the Greek spirit.”155 That is why it would be important for any religion to have a balance between faith and reason (or philosophy) so that its motivational power could be used constructively.

Religions in general also motivate cultures in their approach towards social milieu and be-liefs. Consequently, Habermas recognizes the importance of Christianity and Judaism and their contribution to the European system and culture. Their contribution could in no way be denied owing to their focus on the equality of all members before God and their emphasis on the freedom of every individual. Habermas had to voice out his opinion against Heidegger, precisely because Heideggerian principles and convictions led to the concretization of Nazi ideology, which stands opposed to the principle of equality of human beings in front of God.156In case of instability in society through a loss of political credibility, society needs to hang on to a source that gives them some form of credibility and stability. At this juncture, Viertbauer rightly points out that Habermas refers to religion as a saving element.

Religious language has the capacity to produce inspiring semantic content, which goes beyond the power of a philosophical language. This powerful potentiality is expressed through a com-bination of rationalistic content that runs through expressions that represent various existen-tial issues. As long as religion maintains it, philosophy will not be able to replace it anyway, even in its postmetaphysical content.159

The highest priority of Judaeo-Christian language is to be a resource for the humane meaning of life, and consequently, it has the theological responsibility to establish justification for the elements of truth in these institutions.161 Theology or religion has the power to express the innermost experiences of human beings. The language used in the scriptures demonstrates that depth – the profoundness of semantic power, which has the capacity to express various aspects of human life – especially, that of human suffering, which could be explained and given meaning in the light of a transcendental experience. Scriptures, as in the case of Israel, pre-serve human history coupled with instances of revelation and human comprehension of these moments. These expressions of various existential situations highlight the cognitive potenti-ality and human worth. They have the capacity to articulate the self-reflection of the divine. A performative function is visible by analysing how the negativity of human experiences that could lead to frustration and create an atmosphere in which one would not be able to under-stand one’s situation could be converted through religious language into terms and expressions of a positive and constructive approach. One such example is the life of Job in the Christian scripture. For a religious reader, the depiction of his life is definitely a strong ray of hope. It is a purely human experience that could be attributed to anyone, either to a person of faith or not. In the bible story, it is the religious terms and expressions that add meaning to Job’s suffering and becomes the source of his morale. His utterly desperate situation could be relatable even to a modern man who claims himself to be in a secular person. Nonetheless, as the human mind perpetually seek answers and meanings, we have a reservoir of such content that only religion can possess, according to Habermas.162

It could be said that religious language has the potential to express the development of humanity in its various sensitivities and consciousness. The second part of the dissertation deals with the role religion has played in becoming an instrument for speech development in human beings. Religions often have the nature of contributing towards human history and traditions and in particular, their speech (Robert Bellah). This semantic potentiality of reli-gion protects various communitarian dimensions within our society. Its emphasis on com-munitarian living is directed towards the development of cultures and the use of rationality in making progress towards modern societies. Therefore, the semantic power of religion could be considered as a great contributor towards the movement of modernization and modern societal life.163

Habermas considers that the translation of religious traditions, which unambiguously have a semantic potentiality takes the form of rational argumentative language of secular philosophy. This mechanism becomes indispensable for the modern generations to be able to understand the religious contents well and to make the traditions live further. He questions the possibility for the concreteness of this translation without it causing a loss of the normative substance. “The process of a critical appropriation of essential contents of the religious tradition is still in progress, its outcome difficult to predict.”164 Habermas also observes that if philosophy takes up the assignment of translating the religious contents more or less, then it would become sheer intellectualism.165 3.3.5 Concept of Tat Tvam Asi : An Expression of Religious Semantic Neutrality

The concept of Tat tvam asi serves as an example of how the semantic contents of religion reach beyond its faith contents. The detrimental nature of this concept forms the basis for the conception of man and the transcendental reality that brings the results as expected by Haber-mas. This concept explains the basic nature of humanity in relation to a metaphysical reality that forms a religious foundation. However, what we can observe in analysing this concept is the neutrality of language, which is exactly what Habermas desires. The applicability of this concept goes beyond the particularity of religion and culture, which thus equates itself to the philosophical nature of its idea. This demonstrates the opaqueness of religious experience and the clarity of reason that appears through the concept of tat tvam asi .

As the author(s) of the Upanishads – which contain mostly these metaphysical discours-es – are unknown, we need to refer to Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and his disciple Swami Vivekananda, in order to comprehend these great writings. Through their exposition, they have attempted to bring the teachings of the Upanishads very close to society. The following citation elucidates what the Upanishads are:

The foundation and basis of the Vedas and the Upanishads are the Brahman self, which is indestructible and timeless in its creation. This type of conception about the Vedas and Upa-nishads automatically differentiates itself from religions of revelation like the Israelite religion or other monotheistic religions. In monotheistic religions, a clear historical perspective plays a very important role because the prophets receive the message in a historical context. Contrary to that, the Upanishads do not give us a historical account of the appearance of a God who imparts his message to particular humans. Such types of instances can be found in later my-thology. The Upanishads are discourses about the divinity, das Göttliche .167 However, unlike monotheistic religions, the Upanishads does not deal with ethical laws and commandments dictated by a God. They are more concerned with teaching people how to strive to be able to realize the presence of the divine in themselves. In other words, mysticism and self-realization are a hallmark for it. Consequently, one has in one’s lifetime to realize this divinity in oneself and try to achieve it.168

The Indian classical writings are mainly referred to in Upanishads. They deal with the basic idea of presenting the absolute in a monistic sense, which is monism. The word atman , for ex-ample, gives the basic conception of understanding the true self of the individual being, which is identical with the absolute being. This absolute being is called the Brahman . The concept of immanence is very much in this idea present as Brahman is considered to be Urgrund of ev-erything transcendental and immanent. “In the Upanishads, Brahman is naturally mentioned as the first and last source of the universe: At the beginning of this world was ‘Brahman’, the ‘primeval ether’.”170 In this sense, one can comprehend the basic idea of monism referring to the unity of all beings. Therefore, the two important concepts of the Upanishads are Brahman and atman . Brahman can mean to be a ‘power’, Macht, which is not just immanent rather above everything. However, with time, it began to be understood as the creator who was responsible not just for what is called mundane or earthly but also for the godly, the Göttliche :Gods were created by this Brahman, so was the whole of creation. Nevertheless, “in the Mundake-Upani-shad Brahman is called God Brahman, the creator of the universe, the ‘guardian of the world’, who is first from the gods.”171Yet, there are also instances where one would not exactly be able to describe or tell who this Brahman is. Great kings and seers tried to understand this Brah-man and some of them portrayed Brahman as Language, others as Life-giving Breath or Spirit, still others as the Seeing, the Hearing, the Thinking, or as the Heart.172

There is, however, another aspect of understanding Brahman. The concept of Atman or the identification of Brahman with Atman . Atman , as the individual and personal source of all Urgrund, is transcendental and can be identified with the all-encompassing spiritual cosmic source, the Brahman. The word atman is translated in German as das Wesentliche or the Es-sence. It could be understood as the most important or that which is the essence of the human being. Naturally, the word atman can be easily identified with the G e rman word ‘ Atem’ , which means ‘breath’ as it is the essence of the life of all creatures. Thus, atman could also be repre-sentative of the essence of the universe or, in other words, the Universal soul.173 Sometimes, the word atman is also used to merely denote the human soul. But the Upanishads give us a wider understanding of this concept. When Gautama Buddha was posed with the question of what Brahman is and what atman is, his reply was this: the universal atman is not just what we can identify as multiple appearances, but rather a single entity that is expressed through multiple appearances. He further identifies this atman with the inner consciousness and human knowl-edge, which is ultimately the source of all creation.174 A certain Yajnavalka, when asked by his contemporaries to explain Brahman, replied as such: “Truly, this great unborn soul, endless, immortal, fruitless, is Brahman … the soul (atman) that pervades everything …is Brahman. This identification of the brahman and the atman, that is the soul, expressed in the famous dic-tum tat tvam asi  – that is you ….”175 This identification of the Brahman and the atman is thus expressed in the famous dictum ‘ tat tavam asi – das bist du’. 176 Throughout human history, seers and monks have worked strenuously in understanding this eternal soul. The conclusion of their search is supposed to have brought them the knowledge that this Brahman and the soul which is identified cannot be found outside of oneself. It is within the self that one finds this great soul. And the process of arriving at this stage of self-knowledge is known as jnana . There is a story of a certain Maharshi (sage) who was unable to understand the real truth of Brahman even after studying the sacred texts. Provided below is the discourse that passed between him and his teacher, which shows how he was enlightened:

The above description is an example of the concept of Tat tvam asi and represents how religious language incorporates itself into a neutral language. In this description, we find that which is simultaneously a part of a religious text as well as a philosophical one. Moreover, this concept goes beyond the theological framework of one specific religion as it ultimately deals with one person and one’s inner-self. Therefore, it could be argued that the acceptance of this ‘religious’ concept does not put dogmatic barriers and demands that require one to be a believer of a particular faith. Texts such as these fulfil the condition of neutrality of religious language in the public sphere as they are more available and acceptable to members of a different faith or those who do not believe in any particular faith as well. Within the Indian context, texts such as these that integrate a postmetaphysical reason with regard to religion could help in reconstructing a religious approach that is free from the gaps in the current understanding of religion. I would say that such an approach would help unearth the lost treasure that exists within the subcontinent. 3.3.6 Religious Base of Human Rights

The translation of the image of man in the likeness of God into the equal and absolutely re-spectable dignity of all human beings is just such a saving translation. Beyond the boundaries of a religious community, it opens up the content of biblical concepts to a general audience of people of different faiths and non-believers.178

Christianity has laid the foundation for what we understand as ‘Human Rights’ in the mod-ern world. In comparison to Christianity, Hinduism does not, however, explicitly express one’s rights. Within the Indian context, the consciousness of exercising one’s rights came into being after the Indian Independence movement. It was also during this period when the people of lower-classes became more aware of their rights for equality within a society. It is important to consider the Jewish roots concerning human rights dating back from the Abrahamic or the mosaic times. The Jewish law was framed within a context of slave and master relationships. It provides a lot of sanctions with regard to the freedom of the slaves and their rights.179 There-fore, the concept of human rights dates back to such an ancient period. Although clear indications do not exist in most religions, Joas identifies connotations of such ideas, which serve as the basis of human rights in our modern times:

Habermas emphatically exposes that Europeans would lack any firm foundation if it were not for Judaeo-Christian roots for human rights.

By stating this, Habermas refers to the monotheistic religions as the basis for ethical respon-sibility. In a scenario when the status of religions has changed and the profane world looks for an outside meaning or resources, it is necessary to look up to these religions, which serve as foundations for the non-religious world to build upon its ethics.182 When we speak about hu-man rights in the history of the western world, we cannot but refer to the Catholic Church and its involvement in actualizing human rights. It could be traced back to the French revolution wherein the Catholic Church’s role is very relevant. It was an occasion for religion to question itself about rights when it had been attacked at that time. The papal documents, which followed in the years thereafter, supported and laid more foundation for the concept of human rights and dignity based on the scriptures. They emphasized that man is formed in the image of God and thus every individual has a right to dignity from the time of their birth. And the church considered itself as the interpreter of God’s will.

Pacem in Terris 184 proposes different connecting factors that could be found in the document. In the very first place, the document addresses all people of goodwill, irrespective of creed, race, nationality etc., and above all, the people who seek peace. It highlights the dignity of the human person and gives him a very important place while considering dignity as a significant foundational principle for living a harmonious life. It seeks to understand this Christological perspective of the person in other religions too. The document tries to highlight the relation between obligation or duty and rights, “unauflösliche Beziehung zwischen Rechten und Pflicht- en” (indissoluble relationship between rights and duties). 185The concept of human rights is, thus, basically founded upon this principle of imago Dei .

Habermas connects it to Kant’s idea regarding equality of human dignity. He draws on more distinctly the image of God, which could be translated as the identical dignity of all people who deserve unconditional respect.

By such expressions, the idea of religion could be accessible to the general public without reservations. As human rights are necessary within a society, they need to be protected by ref-erences as such so that they might find a significant basis. At present, we also witness human rights and human dignity being violated in various parts of the world due to a fundamentalist representation of religion. However, Habermas tries to show the very opposite of that as he identifies the origins of human rights and human dignity in religion.188 In this manner, con-trary to the fundamentalist approach towards religions, a deeper religious understanding of human rights would help us protect the rights of the vulnerable. It could be stated that all religions safeguard the dignity of the human individual in different ways. Different religions express this differently while emphasizing different aspects surrounding the importance of a human being. This could be based on them having the status of being the children of God (in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), or their manifestation of the Divine (in Hinduism), or the common and original nature of human beings and their desire for happiness (in Buddhism). Thus, for Habermas, the genealogy of human rights could be traced back to the understand-ing of human dignity, which becomes a moral source.189 Habermas elucidates on it from his concept of “linguistification of the sacred”. As a result, human dignity is universally rational and morally justified.190

Common sense is a concept that could be derived from our daily lives. It is concerning our social relationships and our responses to various situations in life. This happens in the context of an intersubjective area. Persons who have learned to grow up responding to the given norms of the society also can respond outside the given normative frameworks within a republic and democratic society. This common sense is intrinsically related to the consciousness of a citi-zen.191 Common sense becomes more meaningful in the background of secular decision-mak-ing and debates. While partaking in these discussions or debates, one has to distance oneself from one’s personal worldviews, but rely on another criterion that is attainable to all citizens. In this manner, common sense becomes a middle path.192

Common sense is introduced by Habermas as a concept that stands between religion and science. And he names it as a third party, “which paves its own way between science and reli-gion”.193 In explaining the various perspectives and views of secularization, Habermas refers to a type of thought that makes an effort to substitute religion through reason, which could be placed as an equivalent. The other type of thought considers modern thought as a discredited one. So, these two views, according to Habermas, fail to understand the issue.

Therefore, such a position cannot befit a post-secular society. Consequently, Habermas sug-gests common sense as a third party that would play a zivilisierende Rolle in a democratic scenario.194 This approach of Habermas appears to be an overlapping idea with the concept of dialogue as Lernprozess. According to this concept, every group should be allowed to express their views and everyone could learn from one another. So, he describes it as a “mental state of a polyphonic public”.195Common sense has to distance itself from the secular and the religious groups and take the place of an observer to understand both sides of the argument. However, common sense should be ready to be enlightened by science or Wissenschaft . Though common sense needs to depend on science to make conclusions, it is not required for it to depend com-pletely on empirical or natural sciences way of reasoning. Instead, it has the capacity to form its own impressions of human actions. And exactly at this juncture, Habermas sees a special meaning and relevance of religion due to its ability to maintain or protect the values, which is not possible in other areas.196He considers it to be important that this translation takes place in an area, which is the ground area of human experiences (or the society) that he names as vorpolitischen Raum . Translation begins at this level and then proceeds to the political level where it has the capacity of being administered.197 “Religious content and traditions can only be preserved in the process of social decision-making if there is a cooperative translation pro-cess in the pre-political sphere.”198

4 Re-viewing Postmetaphysical Philosophy

Hence, the Habermasian postmetaphysics is neither a branch of philosophy that has overtak-en the past (what is called metaphysics) nor does it encourage an attitude of overlooking or judging the metaphysical criteria. Instead, postmetaphysics is a philosophical engagement of dialogue. Postmetaphysical rationality does not categorize itself as a method and approach that ignores elements of metaphysics or metaphysical areas. Rather it takes an approach of discur-sive rationality that facilitates entry into a dialogue.

Therefore, postmetaphysics uses rationality that accommodates rather than ignores, opens up dialogues and values potential rather than being stubborn. Ultimately, it characterizes itself as a wise person who wishes to learn from the experiences of the other rather than upholding a strong belief in oneself as a perfect being. Postmetaphysical religion means a reflective religion that enters into a dialogue in knowing its secular counterpart and is ready to recognize the rationality of science, and at the same time, contributes to its growth as well. Just as Habermas affirms that the idea of postmodernism is to be seriously considered; because the project of modernity itself is not yet over and is a work-in-progress, postmetaphysics also should not be considered as an era of atheism or as only that which goes beyond the metaphysical rationality. Rather as explained above, postmetaphysics helps the metaphysical religion to consider and reflect on its own ways and functioning. In other words, this is to say that postmetaphysics is not going beyond metaphysics. Rather, it enables religion to go back to look into its origins. To emphasize the nature of postmetaphysical philosophy, I would like to repeat the clarifica-tion given by Jütte R. Stefan: “Postmetaphysical thinking is not the abolition, outbidding or replacement of religion. It does not represent a form of rationality higher than religion per se, but is the philosophical-historical counterpart to enlightened faith.”199

Habermasian commitment to religion is expressed in his new publication that brings into light the solid reconstruction of the rational tradition of religion. In this manner, it is made clear to both religious and non-religious members of society the substantial and profound rational traditions of a religion that became the foundations of human society. “With a nod to Emil Durkheim, George Herbert Mead and Max Weber, religion is thematised as the prelimi-nary stage of reason.”200 Now, postmetaphysical philosophy has taken up that task of bringing into light this rational side of religion to combat its dark side manifested through religious fundamentalism in the public sphere. Through an engagement with postmetaphysical philos-ophy, religions that have lost their rational perspectives in practice can once again have the opportunity to become self-reflective. “Religion could go into the hands of the abusers and will be projected under the sign of terrorism and exactly because of this vulnerability, religion should, however, stay in close contact with reason.”201 When Habermas uses postmetaphysical philosophy to unmask or disclose religion of its rational traditions in our times when religion is losing its originality, it is indeed obvious that he is giving a call to the religions to go back to their roots. He exposes the aspect of self-criticism and reflectiveness of religion especially by his discourse on axial age movements, whose sole purpose was to lead the religious members to a reformative understanding which ignores the existing religious practices and thus called back a form of reflective religion.

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PART V: SECULARISM AS POSTMETAPHYSICAL MODUS OPERANDI

To continue from where I have begun in the previous chapter – the exploration of Haber-mas’ religious philosophy – a reference to secularism serves as an example to demonstrate the functionality and rationality of postmetaphysical thinking that plays an essential role in his analysis of religion in the present times. In this chapter, I will attempt to present the secularist approach towards religion, in other words, I will consider what postmetaphysical philosophy could contribute towards religion with the help of Hans Joas and Charles Taylor. Basing myself on the views of these two authors, I shall attempt to bring together various aspects of under-standing secularism, which is an important element for religion to be able to look into itself. Thus, the postmetaphysical approach of self-critique and its take on epistemic stances is more clearly expressed in understanding secularism. Towards the end of this chapter, I will get back to the epistemic stances expected in the public sphere. I am stating the case for religion at this point – that religion has not lost its function even within the profane sections of society. This argument or case stands against the convictions that religion is irrational and is an instrument of disharmony and fundamentalism in society.

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1How does Secular Reason Function for Religion?

The logic of the secularist approach to religion could be analysed considering in mind its criti-cal method in its engagement with religion. In the following discussion, I would like to demon-strate the functionality of secular reason within the premise of religion. This is elucidated by exposing the transformation of religion concerning secularistic rationality and its influence. To put it in other words, religion is continuously taking newer forms and progressing or re-positioning itself within society. Charles Taylor’s discussion on this theme serves as a ground-work for me to build upon this discussion to expressively indicate that religion is blooming in the present scenario. Inevitably, this discussion also concerns itself with American societies, which are generally considered to be secular. Anyhow, Indian society’s perspective towards re-ligion – in the light of secularism as a constructive instrument – could be questioned through an exposition of a newer approach towards religion. Nevertheless, the constructive secularism that will be dealt with in the following passages – with emphasis on the neutrality of the state’s position with regard to the religious presence in society – is not just limited to the Indian un-derstanding of secularism.1

1.1 Re-reading Secular

In the earlier parts of my thesis, I tried to present the genesis of religion and the various streams of analysing religion based on its sociological perspectives. We have discussed the origins of religion described by Durkheim, which is intrinsically related to the views of Habermas on religion. It could be argued that religion, which was once the centre of man’s life, is being replaced by newer ideologies in many parts of the world. This replacement is due to the pres-ent understanding of religion from a secularist perspective, which either ignores or wishes to dispense religion from society. This section will, consequently, deal with this secularist view towards religion which surmises its downfall. However, I agree strongly with Habermas and his contemporaries like Charles Taylor or Hans Joas who disagree with this notion and recog-nize the blooming of religion within a secularized context.2

Based on historical experiences, many of the European states have expressed explicitly the separation of religion from politics and even the wish to completely eradicate religion from social life. The banning of religious symbols is a matter of controversy in many European and American societies. On the other hand, it can be noticed that the members of various religious groups wish for the presence of religious symbols in public spaces. Whether these citizens themselves are aware of the reasons for a general ban on religious symbols is a matter of ob-scurity. One can also observe that the modern European states have become more pluralistic in the recent past about accommodating believers of Islam, Hinduism or Buddhism. These religions, unlike Christianity, have hardly undergone the process of secularization, which comes through in their lack of comprehension of the position of the state’s secularity or of the public nature of secularity. The European nations, which were for a major part of their history Christian in culture and nature, apparently wish no signs of religion in public spaces to avoid its powerful re-emergence in society.3 To the European nations, an awareness of those citizens belonging to “foreign religions” becomes a part of a mutual learning process. This helps them comprehend the reasons that lie behind the secularistic nature of the state (which is again dependent on their historical background and the reason their policies avoid the extravagant public expression of religion). The theory of neutrality as analysed by Charles Taylor gives us a reason for a secularistic state to ban religious symbols in society.4

Contrary to views mentioned above, my claim is that religion is the yardstick in a secularist society to seek resources through which modern society can hold fast to human values. The reality that religion blooms within a secular society surely includes factors such as the par-ticularity of cultural logic. As religion is viewed and discussed within a public sphere in the Habermasian sense, it is important to analyse how the epistemic stance will be effective in bringing to the surface of the public sphere the intellectual aspect of religion. It will in turn contribute to the emancipation process that had been the central ideology of both axial and enlightenment periods.

1.2 Positioning Postmetaphysical with Secularism

I analyse here the various approaches towards a secularist attitude and a clearer and distinct standpoint of Habermas about secularism. As the key concept of this chapter is secularism, I shall begin with a citation from Thomas Schmidt who differentiates what Habermas has in mind concerning secularism, which will help us to comprehend secularism5 from a different perspective.

This part of my thesis is an attempt in connecting the postmetaphysical with secularism. The postmetaphysical approach, as we have discussed, gives a direction in which both the religious and the secular ideologies will have an opportunity to look onto the bright side of each other mutually. The postmetaphysical rationality accommodates a dialogue between Glauben (Faith) and Wissen (Knowledge) which is concretised in a secularist ambience. It is equally a context wherein the secular reason poses itself as a challenge to religious rationality. Postmetaphysical thinking, which is agnostic in its nature, poses a critique of the self-reflective attitude towards religion. This particular characteristic of self-reflection could be explained through the process of a secularist outlook in society. According to Schmidt, Habermas uses the notion of imma-nent transcendence to express his newer understanding of religion that differentiates itself from the earlier form.7 This transcendence from within “denotes the systematically central relationship between the facticity of local validity claims and their transcontextual generalised normativity … This distinction underlines the fact that postmetaphysical reason, which can-not take the place of faith, must remain abstinent.”8 This could be regarded as the summary of postmetaphysical thinking through which an epistemic attitude is produced.

The Indian society needs to learn from the west in this regard because an epistemic atti-tude towards religion or an intellectual religion resulted in a changed western society. A close analysis of western societies shows that they became models to the world for modernism and attitudes of emancipation. If the west is ready to learn from Indian values based upon ancient traditions, then India should also be ready to be receptive to learn from the western past that led to its current modern growth. This itself could be seen as a characteristic of postmetaphysics, that is, a mutual process of learning involving both secular and religious views, in which the re-ligious also make space to the authority of science. Religious India, perhaps, has to submit itself to the secular reason through which it might know itself better and at the same time should aim at ‘ aufgeklärten Glauben’ . “The religious person too must … be willing to correct her view and be open to rational critique. In short, she must acknowledge the general requirements of reason.”9However, I argue here that it is an epistemic attitude towards religion that indeed contributed to the growth of the modern emancipatory society. Therefore, the discussions on the secularist attitude of the west towards religion in this chapter contribute to my research in supporting the thesis for a need for a rationalistic religion in combating non-epistemic attitudes of religion.

Linguistification of the sacred: this becomes a primary aspect to claim the differentiation of Habermasian inspection into secularization. This concept, which has been captured from Durkheim by Habermas, operates in making the sacred which was in the area of untouchable or unreachable to something tangible that occurs in our daily lives. However, this led to the justification of Habermas’ discursive theory of communication, including the possibility of the sacred law expressed through the consensus and common will of the members. In this manner, he gives more power to the public sphere where this communication takes place fundamentally. Secularism could also be traced back to the axial-age movements. In the sense of Charles Tay-lor’s view of secularism, it all started by doing away with any sort of mediation between an individual and the divine.11 This, pointedly, questions the position of the church or any other religious institution that claims to be the important mediator between God and man. As I have mentioned in the first chapter about the religious movements, their aim and goal were anal-ogous. They denied hindrances that strained the relationship between an individual and the divine. These religious movements were sceptical about the religious authorities or the priests who claimed their special position within their religion. Secularism could also be understood in this manner, as something that denies this mediation. Instead, it looks for an experience, a direct divine experience. In analysing this view, Taylor tries to portray the age of secularism as an age or era in which religion itself is getting transformed. This process of transformation is visible in various ways of societal transformation, too.12

However, countries like India have a different understanding and outlook on secularism. One of the reasons that lead to such a perspective could be that it has not undergone the process of secularization in the “western sense of denial of religion”. How could one address the theme of secularism in a society where religion plays a vital role and is deeply essential to the lives of the people? Indian societies are clear examples to demonstrate the major role that religion plays in one’s daily life. It has, however, in the recent past also become the central theme of politics and civic life. The political system has been influenced by religious backing or religious reasoning, which goes against the principle of separation of state and religion.13 Religion with-in the Indian culture cannot be seen from a perspective of disenchantment ( Entzauberung) ; instead, it remains profoundly enchanting. Therefore, in such a context, it is naturally difficult to speak about a godless secularism. So, then what would be the best way to interpret secu-larism? At this juncture, could a hypothesis be brought into being where both European and Indian secularism could meet each other? Does an Indian attitude towards religion be helpful in understanding secularism in the west without excluding religion?

1.3 Secularity as an Option

Secularization, secularism and secularity: These three terms are sometimes interchangeably used and consequently one may fail to observe hardly any distinction between these terms. Secularization is a process in which the church and the state were being separated and it is mostly understood in the early European context where the church and state have functioned almost like one institution. It could be difficult for people of non-European or non-western backgrounds to grasp this phenomenon because a similar pattern of the union of state and church was not part of their culture or history. Secularism is the phenomenon or attitude of the moderners, especially those in societies that were previously purely religious, for whom the question of faith had played a central role. The word is used in reference to those members of a society who were previously either believers or came from a family of believers who now consider themselves either as atheistic or agnostic. And, the last word, secularity stands for the attitude of such persons.14 According to Casanova, it gives the sense that “the concepts of secularization and secularity make sense as an analytical framework for a comparative re-search agenda that aims to examine the historical transformations of all world religions under conditions of modern structural differentiation.”15 Joas further elucidates Taylor’s concept by pointing out that just as we have an option in our world to be religious – to believe – 16 there is also an option not to believe. This is called the possibility of not believing. This idea had gained popularity during the 18th and the 19th centuries of the European enlightenment period.17

In an analytical exploration about the Ernst Troeltsch, Hans Joas reaches to the explanation of figuring out secularity as an option, which is of course also proposed by Charles Taylor in his Magna Carta , A Secular Age . Reductionism of religion through various explanations like that of psychological or even pathological reasons certainly makes way to the secular option: “(T)hey presuppose the ascent of a secular option”.18 In analysing Taylor’s writings, clarity of the idea of ‘Reform’ is discovered by Joas, which has already existed in the Catholic Church during the middle ages. The founders of various mendicant orders were in this sense also considered as reformers. Their assent on following the Gospel and living a life in accordance to it was a move towards the genuine following of the Gospel, which would only be a result of depriving religion of all its elements of magicality, or in other words, the idea is similar to the concept of disenchantment.19

1.4 Intrinsic Goal versus Extrinsic Goal

An analysis of secularism that exists today in our societies refers to the attainment of a goal by the individuals in the sphere of religiosity. Religion, as I have explored it until now, laid the necessary base for me to view it more profoundly as a sociological element. However, a wider outlook paves the way to analyse this secularist phenomenon in two different perspectives: within an extrinsic and intrinsic goal. The first one has already been explored through the defi-nition of Durkheim. It ultimately has as its preference a normative character that leads to order in society, which is given by religion. This order considers the ethics of society and values such as justice, righteousness and civic order. As opposed to this, the intrinsic goal places its prima-ry on the individual. Ulrich Steinvorth argues in connection to this in accordance with Weber:The preference for this intrinsic goal in our society is based on the philosophy of authenticity. Regardless of that, what is important for an individual is the personal relationship that they have with the absolute being. The secularization process is more aligned towards this partic-ular subject as the central aspect through which organized religion is liable to be side-lined or suspended. More and more individuals, as Charles Taylor analyses in his work, are leaning towards a personal experience of the individual, which would then be able to give them the satisfaction of being a religious person. However, the common understanding of a religious person as being affiliated to a particular established religion is definitely taking a different conception. This is because a person might not want to affiliate themselves to any particular religion and still can be called a religious person now.

1.5 Religious Liberalism as the Prerequisite of Secularization

As per the above discussions, I have tried to demonstrate that secularization is not a condition in which either faith or religion disappears. It is a process that moves society in another direc-tion, a direction towards modernity through the instrumentality of rationality. The traditional forms of religion and faith have changed substantially and continue to do so as they take new turns. However, one important aspect in their change is the rationality that an individual ap-plies to her religion. Ulrich Steinvorth considers:

In the following discourse, I would like to establish the fact that one requires freedom as the prerequisite in the process of secularization. Freedom creates an opportunity that leads to a different idea of the absolute and equally reinforces the sphere of autonomy of the individuals. 1.5.1 Secularized Idea of the Absolute With relation to the argument that secularism is a western affair, Ulrich Steinvorth brings forth the argument about the Weberian distinction of the world religions. He categorizes the world religions into three. The first is the type of religion that accepts the world and the second, the type that denies or rejects the existing world. This attitude of rejecting or fleeing from the world, Fuga Mundi , represents both occidental and oriental cultures. But we can observe that within the world-rejecting religions, the Middle East (Judaism) and the West (Christianity) have better chances of the move towards secularization owing to their conviction of not just rejecting the world but also wanting to change the world; which becomes the third type of religion.

Ulrich Steinvorth, in contrast to Weber’s distinction of religions, proposes that the attitude of the people towards their abilities is important. In the process of secularization, it is im-portant to consider the usage of one’s potentialities or abilities; “It seems more appropriate to distinguish religions by their attitude toward the use of our abilities.”22 Religion can be an in-strument promoting secularization23 or even preventing it. It is dependent on whether religion presents an idea of the absolute that opens up the horizon to use abilities in autonomy and au-thenticity.24 The idea of the absolute that is presented by religions is often seen as an obstacle to the process of secularization. Here, it is to be observed that the secularized idea of the absolute allows individuals to use their abilities and appeal to authenticity. But when religion presents an absolute that prevents the individuals from using their own abilities, then it would merely push the society either back to its primitiveness or the society would be stagnated. This type of religion identifies a conservative model that becomes a hindrance to social development. Ulrich Steinvorth cites the example of India: “Indian religion favoured conservatism and pre-vented the development of social change that might have provided opportunities for using the various human abilities in autonomous action spheres. So, there was not sufficient stimulus for secularization either.”25 An appeal to the absolute through authenticity and autonomy is a phenomenon in the secularized world.

To give an example, artists and philosophers generally consider the foundation of their craft in association with the authenticity or autonomy that they exercise. However, it is nature that provides them with the opportunity to analyse the world from an open perspective that would lead to the development of society. Religion, here, plays a very important role because it shapes the social thinking of the citizens. When a religion presents an absolute that would stand as an opposition to the process of social changes, it should be placed as a religion that compels its adherents to subject their abilities and powers to its authorities.26 1.5.2 The Autonomy of Sphere Agents

The impression of the secularized idea of the absolute is followed by the autonomy of the sphere agents. This sphere autonomy requires a conducive ambience where its agents can flourish. This sphere autonomy is an understanding that arises from a secularized idea of the absolute, which I have already discussed in the previous section. It gives validity for the sphere agents, like artists, scientists, politicians or even religiously gifted persons, to help society in some way or to be a spokesperson for it.27 The spere agents have exercised much appeal to the autono-my and have had the circumstances to exercise their freedom in the western societies. Above all, there is a collective phenomenon one can observe in these societies that one could work towards. On the contrary, non-western societies had found it difficult to create a situation for these sphere agents to flourish. They are either stifled, as Ulrich says, by the authorities them-selves or possibly grounded on the conservative religious attitude that does not allow them to be productive and contribute positively towards the modernity of the society.28

However, it is indubitably observed that the autonomy of the sphere agents is radically based on the type of the absolute that is presented in a particular society. But why would I stress the autonomy of these sphere agents in our modern secularized society? I find that the activities of these sphere agents contribute to the development of any particular society in its various fields. It could be said that the most important value in society is human dignity. This (human digni-ty) is fostered through these sphere agents through the production of their ideas. Philosophers constitute one such example of sphere agents as they have the potential to transform society by protecting and advocating human values, especially that of human dignity.29 If there are reli-gions that do not explicitly speak of human dignity and demonize certain classes of societies, the sphere agents could take it upon themselves to produce adequate arguments against such inhuman tendencies as they are not affiliated to these particular religions. But if they live in a society where they do not have the right to place their arguments because of conventional religious thought, then the way towards freedom and dignity of individuals is also at stake. “To fight for their autonomy, sphere agents need faith in their right to pursue their intrinsic goals, faith in authenticity. Such faith can be supported by religious ideas of an absolute if the ideas allow individuals to appeal to them.”30

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2 Varieties of Modern Religion

2.1 Taylor’s Threefold Analysis of Secularism

Charles Taylor traces back the story of secularism to the beginnings of Christendom. It is mostly seen from a Christian perspective or within the circles of Christianity. He refers back to the early times of Christianity when the church distinguished itself from the worldly.

This mode of comprehension of the term ‘secular’, however, depends on a Christian outlook. Further explained, this term distinguishes itself from the worldly affairs to that of the other-worldly. In earlier times, Christians were a sect of religious people awaiting the Parousia or the second coming of Christ. Christians considered themselves as those who should keep them-selves away from this world, which was deemed profane because of its sinful activities.

Over time, this nuance of the meaning of secular took another direction in the context of a multi-confessional society. After the reformation in Europe – both in Germany and England – various confessions of Christianity arose within European society. These confessions created a commotion within the society that gave rise to religious wars. Therefore, within this con-text, the public standpoint was expected to be a neutral one that does not favour a particular confession but rather strove to achieve peace in a multi-confessional context. Furthermore, in modern times, secularism tries to project a complete separation of the state and the church, where “the state upholds no religion, pursues no religious goals, and religiously-defined goods have no place in the catalogue of ends it promotes. This is one of the meanings of the principle widely accepted in the west today of the separation of church and state.”32 This could be con-sidered as an extreme reaction by the state in modern times as it ignores the religious citizens and their role in society However, this position of the state has also been analysed as a positive one: “Here the goal is not to make religion less relevant to public life and policy, in the name of an independent ethic, but rather to prevent the state from backing one confession rather than another”.33 Here, I will be analysing the three types of secularism that Charles considers. He goes beyond the understanding of the separation of state and church to an elementary and substantial level. This analysis presents how religion today could be analysed against the back-ground of secularism. 2.1.1 Phenomenal Change

Contemporary western societies are a perfect example to expose this change further. The sta-tistics of the churchgoers and of believing Christians show us that the numbers have drastical-ly come down. There is a fear in many of the western societies that religion is on the way to its complete disappearance. The closing down of the churches or even their sale to be converted either as living apartments or in the worst-case scenario, as clubs. The regular Sunday atten-dance by believers is now limited to a certain age group, which is mostly, the elderly. Church had indeed played a very significant role in the lives of the people. Religion was once the prime element of society where all activities of people were centred. Taylor gives the example of par-ishes, which were the models of local governing bodies. They were both the centre of the spir-itual and the social lives of the people. “In those societies, you couldn’t engage in any kind of public activity without encountering God.”34 In other words, the disappearance of religion from the public sphere is a phenomenal change. 2.1.2 Profound Change

In relation to the phenomenal change, one can also observe a change in the attitude of people towards religion and religious beliefs. While we can consider the disappearance of religion from the public sphere as a phenomenal change, the change surrounding the problem of belief is a profound one. To believe in a supernatural being, God, was not a matter of difficulty in pre-modern times. However, to believe in a transcendental Being or any God or a particular religion today is a matter of difficulty. This is what Taylor says: “Secularity consists in the falling off of religious belief and practice.”35 This can be observed as a central and important factor for the disappearance of religion from the public sphere. The reasons for this disbelief could be attributed to the modern-day scientific and technological developments. Science has an explanation for the mysterious aspects of religion and, consequently, replaces the concept of a transcendental being. I would like to connect this change and further discuss it through the theory of disenchantment or Entzauberung .

This profound change thus implies a problem, a difficulty or an uncertainty which leads to an agnostic attitude towards the conception of a divine presence. However, Taylor invites us to think of secularism, not as a system of beliefs, principles or mode of organizing state and society (though it certainly includes these things as well): “… but instead as a matter of human experience in the most profound sense.”37 2.1.3 Optional Change

Religion was once a part of every individual, which is not the case today. “The shift to secu-larity in this sense consists, among other things, of a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace”.38 Here, Charles is portraying the present-day scenario of religion incorporating the western perspective. This view could also be seen as one-sided because in the non-western parts of the world, the situation and state of reli-gion is different. Religion or belief in God is not yet an option as Charles points it out to be in the eastern part of world. Nevertheless, he also recognizes this phenomenon of the non-west-ern world and cites American society as an example where religion occupies a major role in society through and through. Thus, he places our society in this third sense, where religion becomes one among many other possibilities.

2.2 Secularism as a Transformed Religion

Based on the analysis that Taylor gives about the state of religion in our modern world, I would like to further my discussion in viewing secularism not as a period of godlessness, but as a period in which religion is undergoing transformation from its traditional roots. With the gradual disappearance of the institutional religions in the western world – which is where it has its grounding – one could surmise the fall of religion or the beginning of its termination. However, Charles fights this case through his explication that religion has been taking a new form by being transformed. He does not consider secularism as an element that leads to athe-istic tendencies. Neither does he consider it as a total disappearance of religion in society.40 He understands it as an opportunity that leads to transformation. This transformation is visible in the public expression of faith and religion as in the previous times. His argument, in this case, can be read in the following lines: “many are looking for a more direct experience of the sacred, for greater immediacy, spontaneity, and spiritual depth.”41 2.2.1 Transcendence to Immanence

The idea of immanence, as opposed to transcendence, fits the idea of secularization in the sense of experiencing the transcendence in the normality of life. This is a vital part of the secularized world. Especially, based on this phenomenon, religion is being transformed or is being fostered in various other forms than the conventional ones. This thought of philosophical stream had been attributed to Spinoza, whose philosophy takes a very important turn in presenting the transcendent. He found the divine presence within the immanent frame. “We come to under-stand our lives as taking place within a self-sufficient immanent order”.42

The following points refer to this approach of the modern believers who consider religion as something filled with dogmas and doctrines, keeping tremendous distance between the con-cept of the soul seeking an agent and the transcendent. This also implies that religion is be-ing deprived of its element of belief in an unseen transcendent being and is proceeding to be reduced to a daily existential situation. However, this particular notion towards religion could also be an opposing factor for the very concept of belief in a transcendent being and, thus, the normal understanding of a religion which places a divine being as the centre of its functionality.

Nevertheless, one needs to question whether this stream of thought poses even more difficulty to the very foundation of ethics within a religious context or whether this could even deny completely the transcendental when one seeks only the immanent. Therefore, the very idea of immanence is to be understood within the context of Hindu philosophy. How could one find a God elsewhere when one does not find Him here on this earth within the daily life situations? It also seems correct to me to find this idea of a transcendental God pictured as an immanent divine in the Judaic religion. For example, God was more of an immanent being within the history of Israel than a transcendental being. The history of Judaism demonstrates that Yahweh was constantly communicating to the people of Israel through the kings and prophets and, in the course of time, he has also communicated through his son. Thus, the idea of an immanent God can also be traced back to Judaism, in addition to Greek philosophy. This Judaic religious history, therefore, depicts a divine being who is perceived to be both immediate and personal.45 2.2.2 Spirituality versus Religion According to Taylor’s description of secularism, the traditional and the institutional religion is disappearing.46 However, religion today takes its form to seek a more direct experience of the divine than in its conservative sense. Organized religion with its traditional set of rules might not be a possibility for many but an experience of the transcendental being or the divine. This religion is not understood in the sense Durkheim proposes; rather it should be understood as a move towards spirituality. It could be asserted that spirituality heralds an era that deals with the well-being of both soul and body, thus representing a holistic approach. This involves the individuals search for a divine experience or for a sense of personal divinity. Taylor describes this actuality by differentiating between spirituality and religion. “Spirituality is an inner feel-ing … religion tells you what to do and when to do it when to kneel, when to stand up, all of that stuff”.47

On the other hand, Charles also analyses the present generation’s inclination to seek a com-munitarian sense in the religions that they follow. This inclination arises because these com-munitarian centres allow individuals to have an experience. Consequently, this experience can be said to lead one to the divine or the sacred. One is drawn to religious practices through one’s own spiritual life. But one finds this spiritual life through various practices, which may not be directly related to the official religious institutions or confined to the ethos of the established conventional religions. They might reach to the regular religious practices by taking inspi-ration from experiences that they might have gained in the past by going on a pilgrimage or even from meditative or prayer groups, etc. As Durkheim points out, these experiences share similarity to the religious experiences people underwent in the axial age. An example from our modern times would be our participation in great events like the World Youth Day or the funerals of great personalities or Taizé centres.48

Despite of its confinement within the territories of an organized body, religion can still provide for individuals circumstances in which their search could be continued. However, contrary to an organized religion, which already has certain norms to limit the individual search to, spirituality is a sphere where individuals can exercise their personal search in an unconstrained manner. “Foucault set out a definition of spirituality as the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself to have access to the truth.”50

Spirituality has based itself on the concept of freedom: to set oneself free from the organized bodies and fundamentally embody “a trend toward disaffiliation concerning religious organi-zations.”51 This is exactly what Taylor is also intrinsically trying to posit. Though he does not name it, we could call this generation the generation of seekers, which shares similarity with the title of a book by Ward Clark Roof. He refers back to the period of 1960s as a period in history that opened up many ways to spirituality.

This is an overlapping idea that I want to present here. Although partially the basic idea of diffusive religion is present in the points made above, I wish to extend this argument to the individual who wishes to be part of an institutional religion. The previous section outlined that people seek a sort of spirituality in order to have a divine experience. In other words, they deny the established or organized religion and find their own way of experiencing the divine. However, in the context of diffusive religion, it is not the case. Diffusive religion creates an opportunity for an individual to rediscover their traditional religion. The funerals of famous monarchs, memorial services held for terrorist attacks etc., could be considered as examples for this. These ceremonies could be said to give the individuals a sense or feeling of religiosity. To explain this phenomenon, Charles borrows the term, ‘vicarious religion’ from Davie:

This is a type of religion that is mostly seen within the context of immigration. American society could be taken as an example for this along with some of the European countries at present. This is, of course, not only a phenomenon in these societies but rather a common oc-currence in most of the cosmopolitan societies. A common factor, which they often search for, is found in religious gatherings. Church has often been the centre for such strength. But this is not always the case. This shared religion in the context of migrants poses a problem for secular societies. This shared sense of religion could lead the individual migrants into ghettos as this could create a possibility for them to be victimised through religious fundamentalism. For the immigrants, this could even create a sense of separation or alienation from the majority of society and they could be in turn labelled as the minority group. Ultimately, this could further problematise the integration of migrants into a given society. 2.2.5 Religion – Nationalism

Nationalism is a term that reminds many westerners of the period of Hitler. Individual citizens were allured to unite in this period through another powerful force besides religion. This spirit of “nationalism” overtook religion, which had been considered up until then to be the force that united people. And the consequences of this nationalism, as history has shown us, were indeed gruesome.54 But, there are examples that affirm a nation could be united in the name of religion in order for it to have a national identity instead of race. Taylor provides Ireland, Poland and even India as examples of such nations.55

With regard to Ireland and Poland, Catholicism is the major religion that gives the native peo-ple their national identity: being catholic and being Irish, or being catholic and being Polish is ingrained with their sense of self. Recently, this sense of a national identity based on religion has also been emerging in India. However, in this case, it is slightly different from that of Ire-land and Poland. In the case of these two countries, we do not hear about the suppression of the minority groups or their persecution. However, in the Indian scenario, it is different as being Indian and being Hindu seem to be necessary in the present to evade persecution. Suppression of the minority communities such as those following Islam and Christianity has become the target of the so-called nationalists. In this case, religion is alive but it is still being “cynically manipulated to mobilize people”.57 Such type of active religion has little to do with the aspect of the inner search for the divine. The quest of the individual for the sacred or the union with the sacred is completely wiped away; and the exterior goal I have mentioned earlier seems to be the only vital aim of this type of religion.

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3 Intrinsic Role of Religion

Here, I would precisely deal with the basic relationship between civil society and religion. It is a further analysis of how both religion and society are interwoven with each other, irre-spective of the existing secularist attitudes. I intend to further establish that religion serves as the nucleus of society in materializing its sense of morality, justice and righteousness. The following evaluation attempts to prove that through the exposition of religion as a point of reference for various societal realities. The analysis will focus on how religion is considered against the speedy and visible growth of secularist attitude to the extent of discarding reli-gion in the public spaces. It will further consider the secularist claims regarding the fall of religion and how such false notions could be corrected through an epistemic understanding of secularism.

3.1 Could Modernity weaken Religion?

Joas argues against the concept or idea that modernity leads to secularity.58 Moderners have believed, according to Joas, that religion has lost its ground and it is on its way to disappear-ance.59 Adding to this, he points out that we need to enquire into the common prejudicial understanding in society that modernity leads to secularism. Joas strongly argues against such claims.60 This is because secularism is not a thing of the present-day society; secularism is an idea that has existed even from ancient times ( ref. to prophetic times, reforms in religions) . This could be more concretely elaborated with the example of Christianity. It was a term initially used within a pure (Christian) religious circle referring exclusively to the transformation of members of religious orders into ‘secular priests’.61

Joas explains modernization as a reality that had also been an element of the past. If mod-ernization means a matter of “economic growth and scientific-technological improvements … then modernization has occurred in every historical period – to varying degrees, certainly, but not just in recent times”.62Nevertheless, he gives reasons for why we can expect modernization to weaken religion.

So, in such conditions, modernization could overtake religion. Modernization also includes an improvement in the area of research and that can give answers to all sorts of religious be-haviours from a psychological point of view.64 Modern sciences are also able to explain various phenomena in religion, which were not previously explained due to a lack of research and knowledge. Other conditions or structures such as cultural homogeneity or the educational system – which is surrounded by authoritarianism – were important to transmit religious tra-ditions and faith within a particular context. These conditions are being replaced in the pres-ent-day society. European cultural homogeneity, in particular, has undergone drastic changes over the last few decades and there is much pluralism within their culture and values now. With the increase in immigration to Europe by people of different cultures, it is no longer plausible to consider a European society to be culturally homogenous.65 Even the educational system is not anymore characterized by the age-old authoritarianism. Students and scholars exercise more freedom liberally now and are encouraged to be free thinkers without fearing punishment for what they think and write.66 No religious watchmen will be a threat to their lives, which was not the case during the past ages when they were hunted down for anti-religious writings.67 Joas continues to assert that no such conditions could weaken religion; on the con-trary, religion could be weakened through the politicisation of a particular religion or it should entail new risks of religious exclusion. 68What he means here is that when religion is connected to national identity and engages itself for political gain, then it could be a problem. This is be-cause “if national and confessional identity are closely related, then following the achievement of national independence, it is difficult for a confessional minority not to be identified with the old repressive power. This is applied, for example, to Protestants in independent Ireland”.69 An-other example that could be presented here is the case in America. America is widely consid-ered to be the most modern society in the world. However, one can also experience a vigorous growth of different religions within their society. There are also societies other than America and Europe that are much modern but yet retain religious activities.70 There have been also claims by sociologists asserting that the postcolonial societies would gradually lose the pres-ence of Christianity with the departure of the colonisers. Nevertheless, the empirical data from the countries in Africa, Asia and America show that the colonial religions continue to exist and with even more vigour than among the colonisers themselves. Owing to such realities of other modernized societies, Europe stands as a matter of exception for secularization. There-fore, he concludes that secularization often occurs even without modernization.71 The religion which was supposed to be a matter of experience between the divine and the individual, in fact, became a matter of law. Religious practices were laws that burdened the people. Church has acted till today as a lawgiver that sometimes forgets religion could be a matter of personal experience, as well. Therefore, if people consider it to be a law that needs to be followed, it could automatically follow with a phenomenon of a decrease of religion and a tendency towards sec-ularism or by distancing oneself from the institutionalized religions.72

3.2 Religion for Contemporary Values

Whether religion is required for the process of imparting values is often debated, mostly in the westernized nations. Habermas’ argument uncovers this puzzle through recognizing the basis of religion that has contributed to the moral growth of the society. For the society to uphold values such as justice and righteousness – which in turn provide the opportunity and chance for every individual to have his right – a motivational factor is required. This motivational fac-tor gives the members of the society the impulse to orient their actions towards a commonly accepted norm that promotes equality. To promote such actions, Joas proposes the need for religion. “Values have a value. Their social relevance is more strongly emphasised, and thus a corresponding (new) value education must also be (re)profiled.”73 Besides , we also see this aspect very much stressed by Habermas when he speaks of religious basis that could help soci-eties by informing their values.74

In a multicultural society, various religions serve the role as motivational factors to their mem-bers to live a value-based life. Values in society are linked to one’s convictions and what one learns in its surroundings. This implies that an active role of cognitive acts is involved in this process of forming one’s values. Furthermore, it is explained through the example of integra-tion within a society in the context of multiculturalism. One’s religious convictions are rather helpful in forming personal views on values. If a person belonging to a particular religion rec-ognizes the relevance of this religion in his personal life, he will be able to join a very long and living tradition. This is like belonging to a chain of believers who share the same faith.76 “From this tradition, which is constantly being critically reflected, a standard emerges, along which one can succeed in finding one’s own identity and value.”77However, it is observed that it is not so much important to just imitate the way the predecessors had lived, which involves the Art und Weise, rather one should also arrive at the competence to cull-out the contents of these values that have an on-going connection from the traditions. The values are to be rediscovered in a given context, which will consequently become different in appearance and practises too. “But a potential of orientation, kept possible and open through religious affiliation comple-ments and enriches the process of value education.”78

Religion motivates various values in society like that of compassion, which implies some-thing along the lines of feeling one with the other or to be one with the other. It is about feeling one with the other person in moments of pain or suffering. It is a value that arises from an empathetic impulse. “Compassion is seen ‘as a feeling and an attitude that urges action’”. Religion offers the motivation for such an understanding of “compassionate” ac-tion.”79Related to such a value one can speak of charity or love for the neighbour.80 The love for neighbour is more commonly widespread as a central concept or tenant within Christi-anity. “The honest and deeply felt interest in the other – in religious terminology, charity – is the basic impulse from which value education should be centrally determined.”81 Joas gives importance to this in the role of religion and religious traditions, which promote such val-ues. It could be noted that the fact that religions do promote such values themselves is a clear indication that they are, in general, essential for forming values in a society. Religion has the capacity not just to promote them but rather to keep these values continue irrespective of time and space.

Whether this motivation is required in order to promote values in society could be fur-ther debated in the light of Joas’ arguments. It does not just suffice to have a cognitive ex-change or discussion with regard to values. Instead, it needs to be recognised that a religious point-of-view for such values gives more weight and expression to them. Moreover religious contribution could be seen as a prerequisite for such cognitive dialogues and discussions. On the other hand, we should also be careful in dealing with the religious motivations behind actions as religious fundamentalism emerges from non-reflective religions. “Religion, which contributes to value education, must be an enlightened, reflective and pluralistic religion/religiousness.”82 Ultimately, it is argued that fundamentalism is a burden to the society and, above all, becomes a hindrance in maintaining values that contribute to the positive growth of society.

Religion has a central place in forming the values because it has the experience that it prompts from tradition, which is again related to the historical perspective of its origin. From a historical perspective, religion is an element of society that grew simultaneously with society as I have demonstrated through the preceding chapters.83 The scriptures themselves give us examples of how the experiences of human beings have been passed on from one generation to the other generation ( Book of Wisdom ). They have always protected, promoted and taken sufficient interest in passing knowledge to the following generations. It is also important to note that their personal experience with God did give them the foundation and orientation in forming these values and in promoting them. Their basic orientation, thus, goes back to their divine experience. Therefore, this experience that religion offers is, unquestioningly, valuable and contributory to society.84 “Religion thus provides a wealth of experience, its code of values as a benchmark. Religion offers value education this dimen-sion of orientation.”85It could also be said that the formation of values through the help of religion definitely helps one to appreciate the value and importance of every single person. However, it should not lead to an egoistic understanding of oneself; it should rather build a consciousness to reach out to other people, which is expressed through its focus on altruistic nature. “What is needed is a religion that strengthens the self-esteem of the individual with-out making it selfish. From one’s personal self-awareness the view must be widened to the value of every other person.”86

3.3 Is religion an Indispensable Element to Society?

In answering this question, I would like to refer to the societal experience that contained reli-gion as an element of strength to moral values. This intrinsically indicates the need for religion in our society owing to the growth it has provided throughout human history. This is because religions are not just newly invented institutions. Complex knowledge and experiences from generations have been passed on to them and a deep inner experience of the divine has produced the growth of values in society.87 It has its foundation basically in human experience. And this religious experience is further made stable and worked on through the communication pro-cess between people.88 One can also refer to the different stages that Robert Bellah mentions in his development of religion in human history.89 However, without a social construction of the individual experience, it might not have been stabilized. So, it is important to recognize that religion in our modern world is a sort of reconstruction of the various religious experiences of the past or the different models of transcendental experiences of human beings.90

As man is, by nature, a being who has an inclination towards the transcendental, religions facilitate a person to access this spiritual need or craving. It does so by helping the person with the collective experience of the transcendental of the previous generations, which are stored through traditions in religion. Joas highlights this aspect of religion as an important and much-needed element of society. It is not just a need that fulfils our physical wants, but rather a deeper aspect of one’s self-experience.

Joas also considers this need to belong to a religious group as something natural to human beings. Thus, this natural need has to be given a chance to be put into practise in society by the support of the state. Religion cannot just live by itself when it is not supported or pro-tected by the state. It grows and brings its experiences within the framework of a society, which can then be opened for its growth and contribution towards humanity. “From this point of view, it is therefore a task and obligation for state and society to give all citizens the opportunity of religion and to position it clearly in constitutional documentation of state and society.”93

Habermas also outlines similar arguments – for which he received the Friedenspreis – giving the reason why secular citizens should take an interest in the heritage of religion.94 Values like solidarity or social systems that contribute to the betterment of human life in our societies need to be begründet . For these values to be presented to society with a certain amount of credibility, it is required to find a source that is credible. Such sources can be found within religious discourses. Habermas draws upon the role of religion in social movements. Norman Birnbaum speaks of such motivations as generally unacknowledged.95

3.4 Religious Influence on Violence

Joassites the various atrocities that have taken place in the history of mankind. In his reflec-tion about religion and violence, he brings out the point that secular-minded people, too, are dangerous to society. He has difficulty in accepting the fact that religion causes violence. For him, the most heinous crimes of the past century are committed by the so-called secularists who had distanced themselves from religion. This could also have been motivated by the claim that religion is a hindrance to society.96

When properly analysed, violence itself could have various reasons. Religious violence does not necessarily need a religious motive, but it responds to other aspects of the society.

But it is an undeniable reality that there is an element of violence that takes place within the sphere of religion. Historical religions such as the Judaic religion has perpetuated their mono-theistic principles even to other Semitic religions. However, this unitary principle of mono-theism becomes an element of difference among other non-monotheistic religions that prop-agates violence. Such violent positions are more evident in the Indian history with the advent of Islam. Just as religion contributed to the growth of society, it has also become the occasion for violence and conflict. The claim of superiority of one religion or religious tradition over another is a constant phenomenon that is visible even in our present times.

Hans Joas argues that religion is required for the essentials of society. The religious forma-tion of a human person contributes to the formation of values in human society. Therefore, we need to recognize that the values have value in themselves. Religion is considered as an important element in the formation of human values because of its special contribution in this area so that human values will have better values.98 Religion is not a sort of concept that is beyond history. Rather, it is the historical and biographical aspect of religion as well as its advocates who are its very being. In other words, no religion can be just erased from its historicity.

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4 Reasoning Religion with a Secular Attitude

A postmetaphysical proposal, which is the centre of my thesis, could be achieved through sec-ular rationality. This chapter uses this approach to achieve the results that postmetaphysical thinking considers a religious attitude of self-reflexivity. The proposal of disenchantment anal-yses this element of self-reflection within the sphere of religious traditions. Consequently, the following discussion will concentrate on how religion purifies itself, analogously, to secular approach. In the process of secularization, it is observed that there is a critique of religion from an outsider’s perspective. However, here I emphasize a critique of religion that takes place through disenchantment from an insider’s perspective.

4.1 Secularizing Religion through Disenchantment

The concept of disenchantment is one of the important concepts in the debates concerning secularism and religion. This concept expresses itself though an already existing phenomenon dating back to the prophetic times.99 It is a continuing discussion and provides a renewed un-derstanding of this attitude in society towards religion. The term Entzauberung is used mainly in the areas of religion and secularism. Moreover, it is projected as a reason for secular attitude in the western world. However according to Joas, “Max Weber’s term ‘disenchantment’ cannot be simply equated with ‘secularization’; he was essentially concerned with the ‘demagification’ of religion, but saw a personal striving for salvation as inevitable.”100

Entzauberung , based on Weber’s description and Joas analysis, is an attitude of modern thinkers who try to aim for the perfection of religion. There is an apparent misconception that modernization automatically leads to secularization.101 However, the following discussion will shed light on this phenomenon and argue against such attitudes. The Zusammenarbeit of both modernization and the secular spirit gives way to a genuine religion, which is the aim of authors like Joas and Habermas. “Modernization must go hand in hand with secularization.”102The role of science is, however, at the heart of this process, trying to de-transcendentalize religion.103 As I have been often referring to religion as an ideology that sometimes becomes a burden to the individual and society owing to its duplicity and diversion of itself from its roots, Entzauberung 104 had been ever since working towards the purification and perfection of religion. In this following chapter, I would like to discuss mainly the concept of Entzauberung and contrast it with the modern world’s attitude towards religion.

Joas’ claim of the ‘power of the holy’ in analysing the history of Entzauberung is essential to recognize the substantial power that the presence of religion has in society. This observation is quite noteworthy and important for the religious members of society because their presence and contribution towards society and the world at large are given credit for after the storm of secularistic period,105 at least in Western Europe.

Entzauberung tries to interiorize106 the previously transcendental aspects of society. It en-ables a more human-centred world and tries to live in this world and work for the development of this world.107 In eastern traditions, one can see a phenomenon very contrary to this. The eastern worlds are more centred on the transcendental or the other-worldly. This attitude of the individuals gradually decrease their interest in visualising modernity. Once we stop visu-alising modernity, we do not work towards it. The individuals who live in this kind of a fantasy world may not be a contribution towards the modernization of societies.

Eventually, the disenchantment in the religious field leads religion to relieve its essentials from the cover of magic and takes its real nature away from it. In other words, Entzauberung aims at the decline of the aspect of magicality attributed to religion.108 The shift of the religious goal from just an achievement of the sociological purposes to the achievement of an intrinsic goal by working with oneself is one of the key ideas proposed by Max Weber through his the-ory of Entzauberung. 109 4.1.1 Entzauberung: A ‘Deconstruction’ Concept

The concept of Entzauberung could be understood as a deconstruction process. Hans Joas, in his recent work, Die Macht des Heiligen ,110 tries to give an elaborate explanation about this concept as a process of deconstruction using three important terms that constitute the whole concept of Entzauberung . They are: Entmagisierung, Entsakralisierung and Enttranszenden- talisierung. 111 These terminologies are referred obviously in the context of religion and its na-ture. Using these terms, Joas attempt to deconstruct three important aspects of religion by depriving it of its magicality , sacrality and transcendentality . In the course of history, religion has been considered or viewed as something that has a power, which could not be explained in human or societal terms. It was positively considered as mystical or mysterious and magi-cal. This kind of identification of religion also missed its sociological meaning. Therefore, this approach is aimed at rendering a lost or renewed meaning to sacrality and transcendentality. Nonetheless, with this ent approach, religion is no more sacred in the sense that it is something to be set apart from the society, rather it regains its original fuctionality in society.112

The concept disenchantment in itself – without any philosophical or thematic relevance – was not an invention of Weber himself. Instead, it has its roots in the old and middle stan-dard ( Alt- und Mittelhochdeutschen ) German. The German word Entzauberung is used in reference to bezaubern and verzaubern . In this manner, the word Entzauberung expresses its contradictory meaning.113 The words bezaubern and verzaubern belong to the same roots of the word ‘ Zauber’ , which means magic, spell or charm; the German Langenscheidt dic-tionary gives the word ‘enchantment’ as its meaning or translation. However, as the word Entzauberung is used to oppose what is magical or enchanting and is translated to English as disenchantment. There are different sources from which this concept could have been taken by Weber. This word has been interpreted in various contexts and fields. To cite one, Joas re-fers to a Catholic theologian, Peter Wust, who claims Weber to be the intercessor of moder-nity. He explains that this concept of Entzauberung could be elaborated by replacing it with three other concepts: “Disenchantment with desecration, de-divinization and de-Christian-ization.”114These also demonstrate the nature of deconstruction that is observed in the idea of disenchantment. 4.1.2 Demagification of Religion

Joas sees the theory of actions as basically involved with the interpretation of the usage of this concept of disenchantment. He explains further why this theory is so essential for understand-ing the latter:

However, disenchantment, whose aim and goal is a subjective orientation towards transcen-dence, plays a minute role with regard to the sense of magic for an individual. About this sort of understanding, the word enchantment hardly has any meaning that refers to: “a weakening or disappearance of religion.”116The basic discourse here is related to the change that takes place within the religion in connection with this disenchantment of the world. Therefore, putting this approach of disenchantment on the same side with secularism would be a false approach.117

The aspect of magic as it is attributed to religion by Weber could be analysed in reference to the various superstitious beliefs of people. It is a basic attitude of denial towards the attribu-tion of magical power to the sacraments. He emphasizes on “die Ablehnung der sakramentalen Magie als Heilsweg.” 118The appearance of the concept of disenchantment apparently has to do with the sociological aspects in the history of religion and, especially, signifies the need for an intellectual religion.

Nevertheless, Joas concludes that this inner need of a person is for unity with oneself, with others and with the whole of cosmos.120Disenchantment has to do with the pushing back of magic within the realm of faith. It could only be undertaken by a power that would be able to explain its phenomenon. This power, according to Joas, is the intellectualism that Weber at-tributes to intellectuals.121 Intellectualism, thus, strives to push back the magic that is obvious within religion. But this pushing back or putting away of the element of magic through intel-lectualism does not in any way lead to any sort of weakening of the faith. It is to be noted that this approach does not consist of “Ein Automatismus der Diffusion des Intellektualismus.”122However, a movement of opposition could be expected equally from the intellectual elites and the non-privileged classes as well. Nevertheless, this could play a role in distancing the intel-lectuals from carrying out the magical religion or lead to more insistence from other classes of society.123

Joas cites Weber’s retreat towards the Prophetic times, which was indeed characterized by this process of Entzauberung . He attempts to establish a connection or have a comprehensive un-derstanding between the prophets and the reformation. Apparently, they both share the char-acteristic of being opposed to the concept of magic or enchantment of religion. “Prophecies have brought about the disenchantment of the world and thus laid the foundations for our modern science, technology and capitalism.”124 There is a sort of process in these two move-ments: Prophets and Reformation. In the history of semitic religion, the earlier disenchanting process was started by the prophets. However, it did not last or had any continuing effect and probably could be the reason why there had to be another reformation. If this idea of demagifi-cation – Entmagisierung – was not at all a matter of concern for many Catholics or Protestants or even non-Christians, then this process of Entmagisierung would not be a matter of any im-portance in history.125 In this way, he associates the necessity for intellectuality that would free social lives. This process is thus extended outside religious circles as well.

The prophets were more concerned about the genuineness of religion.126 Though the prophet-ic activity initiated this process of Entzauberung , we can definitely know through the scrip-tures that this was not a process that led to ‘the secularism’ in our common understanding of the denial of God. Instead, it was a process that demanded people to orient themselves towards the genuineness of religion. Weber considers a priest as a magician at the confession and there-fore this theory of disenchantment allows him to present or propose it as “die Ausschaltung der Magie als Heilsmittel.”127 However, the radical disenchantment of the world is nothing more than what could be called the asceticism of the inner-self or inner world. This idea is deeply rooted not only in the prophetic teachings but in the teachings of Hinduism as well. Self-purification and following the divine with a sincere heart are considered very important in these teachings. The prophetic disenchantment could also be considered in association with what I have mentioned in the previous chapters that discussed prophetic movement. On one hand, the ecstatic character was natural to the prophetic attitude. On the other hand, it is to be taken note of that this prophetic ecstasy does not claim to be similar to that of pathological ecstatic experiences. Prophecy is understood as a divine experience that only some people could have. This experience was expressed naturally in an ecstatic manner, which includes emotional speech. The content of this speech was regarded as God’s message for the people, and it was indeed conveyed in that manner. Furthermore, according to Joas, Weber places this prophetic actions or history within a political context, which is an important perspective. Pro-phetic presence and their actions were related to the daily conditions of the people of Israel and their struggle to be or not to be a part of a political scenario. Though the prophets expressed themselves as enemies of this religious magification, the history of Israel in the post-prophetic periods shows that it was not successful in repressing this magic. “Magic did not disappear from popular culture in Israel any more than anywhere else.”128 Nevertheless, the purpose of the idea of Entmagisierung through the prophets has been preserved in the prophetic books. Maybe this whole process could not achieve the required goal of Entmagisierung of their reli-gion, but it led them to a deep sense of reverence and awe towards the holiness of God. Thus, what was radically important through this movement was to raise consciousness towards the genuineness of religion and the purpose of it.129

It is noteworthy to observe that Klaus Müller has inserted the theme Entzauberung under the title “ Aufklärung bei den Propheten ”.130 He specifies in that part the speciality of the gen-uine prophets who aim at disenchanting the concept of gods. The appointed prophets by the kings, who were called the beamteten Propheten could not do this job. This is how the genuine prophets have been differentiated from the others: these prophets were adamantly strong to defend the true God in the face of all other petty gods that Israel was ready to worship. The prophets were utterly powerful in their critique that they compared these gods to ashes.131 Such comparison arose as the so-called petty gods’ idols were made out of wood, which could also be used to light fire and thus be turned to ash after their consumption. Thus, they would stress the vanity of Israel’s attitude towards these gods. Instead, they stressed that the people of Israel must realize the reality of the true God.132

The Judaic History indeed projects a communitarian aspect – a communal sense of being together as a people of God. But we need to observe that in the whole history of a people, there have always been individuals who indeed played an important role: beginning from Abra-ham, Moses to every individual prophet. This collective aspect of Israel is now undergoing a paradigmatic change by prophets like that of Jeremiah, who stresses on the individual’s rela-tionship with God. However, prophets like Jeremiah also points out the importance of every individual’s disposition towards Yahweh. “Therefore the Torah makes possible not merely the existence of a society but at the same time also the formation of individuality.”133

Interestingly, as Joas cites Weber’s comparison of the prophetic times to Entzauberung, we could once again derive from this analysis that secularism is not godlessness,134 which has be-come a general understanding. Instead secularism could be exposed as a true search for trying to find oneself and thus find fulfilment in life. This is an intrinsic ideology that Joas uses to describe Weber’s disenchantment: “This is the idea that in the age of the Old Testament proph-ets, roughly, two and a half millennia ago, a process began which can be seen as a preparatory process for this modern secularization.”135 4.1.4 Disempowerment of Religion

The term Entmachtung in German refers to the deprivation of power. It could refer to the people in power who through – say, for instance, revolutionary movements – were deprived or thrown out of their power.136 This term could also be considered in connection to religion. The ability of science in explaining away the mysterious aspects of the world has taken away religion’s previously held power. Religion had explanations based on the scriptures. However, the scientific researches in natural sciences and the religious sciences resulted in depriving the might and power that religion exercised on the individuals.

Weber sees the process of the radical Entmagisierung not just as a radical form of religion but he identifies it as a necessary condition for the emergence of the spirit of capitalism through which the development of new science and technology is possible. Joas points out the position of science in the process of Entzauberung by Weber as the effect of science on religious meta-physical worldviews. This effect of science on religion does not intend to repress or repel faith in magic. Rather, it implies a change of the world in a causal mechanism, which implies, in turn, a change in worldview.137

This process obviously includes the Enttranszendentalisierung , which implies Immanen- sierung . A transcendental being who was considered to be outside human existence is through this process brought into the midst of human life. The interpretation of this kind receives more acceptance in a secular world,138 where the immanent is often sought after rather than the transcendent.139 In other words, the transcendent is experienced in the immanent. With such an idea one could claim the Entmachtung der Religion through the process of Entzauberung .140 4.1.5 Desacralization The word ‘sacralized’ indicates the most important element of religion. The nucleus of every religion is supposed to be sacred and thuscreates a sense of awe and veneration. The process of disenchantment, however, worked to take away the status of sacredness of a religion. Through the magification and enchantment of religion, the earthly objects were given the status of sa-credness, which according to both prophets and reformers, is not the right attitude. The proph-ets preached against such an attitude of the people of Israel who wanted to ‘experience the sacred’ very tangibly. They spoke against such an attitude because that takes away the sacred-ness that belongs only to the transcendental being. Joas argues that this attitude of limiting the sacredness to the transcendental being was the prime activity of both the prophet and the reformers.141

‘Sacralised’ is a term that refers to a religious sphere or all that is sacred. This sacredness is, evidently, about a god who is holy as opposed to profane. The scientific explanations of the world based on rationality deracinated God from being part of this sacredness. Thus, emerges the idea that a being or controller of the universe is unnecessary.

This process of Entsakralisierung has also deracinated the immanence of God. The world, na-ture and the universe were understood as having the presence of a divine being through which a sacredness was attributed to these. This removal of the presence of a divine being not only just desacralized the world, but also made it difficult to base a sound ethical argument founded on the profaneness of the world or even to maintain indifference to sacrality. The negative side of the period of enlightenment that removed God and his immanent presence from this world created a contrary conception of the nature and the sacred presence of God in nature: “The removal of God to a place of exile definitively converted an ancient and spiritually conceived conception of nature into something brute and desacralized.”143

Hans Joas argues that religion has not disappeared in the modern age. He demonstrates with various examples that modernity and the lie of secularism could not take religion away from human existence. What is important for Joas is the power of religion in its genuineness. That is why when he presents the theory of disenchantment, he is also trying to expose it as a theory that is not against religion. Instead, he uses it to ‘demagify’ religion. For this purpose, he ex-plains secularization with reference to it as a phenomenon that occurred during the prophetic period. The same could be said of the various reformative movements that helped religion to discover its origins. In this way, he ultimately uses it to aim at the perfection of religion. Thus, the above discussion gives us an idea of how religion is considered and analysed both in the present and the earlier times in the face of secularized societies. This perspective of Joas be-comes supportive in making a postmetaphysical stance towards religion as valid since a post-metaphysical approach also includes critical analysis towards religion and enables it to take a rationalistic position. This also includes one of the aims of the method of reconstruction that tries to appeal to elements of past in the process of a rational reconstruction of religion.

4.2 Epistemic Proposals

In the following discussion, I shall refer to the three proposals made by Habermas, which are known as epistemic proposals. They are presented in the light of religion’s role in the public sphere in his work, Zwischen Naturalism und Religion .

I aim to respond to the various problems caused due to religious irrationality in order to reconstruct various elements of rationality within a religion. This particular chap-ter has dealt until now the concept of secularism that treats religion from a rationalistic perspective, including genuine practices of religion. Secularization, which is commonly be-lieved to be an enemy of religion, offers an outlet for religion to undergo an interiorization and subjectivisation.

By focusing on the rationalistic approach, I do not intend to exclude what is unique to religion. It is surely argued that faith cannot be always considered exclusively from the point of ratio-nality. Instead, faith includes basic elements of personal experience and relationships as well as theological concepts such as grace. A philosopher’s perspective that seeks to understand religion purely from a rationalistic perspective could only lead to frustration. However, by leaving room for thought as postmetaphysics suggests, by having dialogues that could facil-itate an approach to religion from a religious perspective, hypothetically, will establish the ratio of religion differently. An epistemic stance, as Habermas suggests, within the discourse of postmetaphysical thinking aims exactly at such understanding. A closed analysis of the secularization theory in Habermasian tradition exposes a secularized life or world rather than the secularization of the state.

I shall try to expose this epistemic stance that plays a vital role in the reasoning of religion. The word ‘epistemic stance’ is self-explanatory as it points out to a position based on the epis-temological approach towards any particular element, in this case, it is religion. The basic dis-cussion on faith and knowledge lays the foundation in developing such an approach towards religion. As my research is situated in the context of religion in the public sphere, these differ-ent types of epistemic stances provided by Habermas are important in public reasoning. The public sphere is the area where religion makes its appearance influencing naturally the societal lives. Consequently, this epistemic approach comes from the understanding that religion, es-pecially, in Europe possesses a ‘changed consciousness’146 ever since the European reformation and enlightenment period. This change of consciousness is described by the sociologists as the ‘modernization of religion’147 or religions taking a modern position. However, Habermas names various challenges that have been posed which back up the reasons for this transforma-tion or modernization. They are “religious pluralism, the emergence of modern science, and the spread of positive law and secular morality.”148

This epistemic approach according to Habermas must take place in our times. However, it should also take place within the religious traditions themselves and that is why it is considered as a theological responsibility to the society. This is exactly the crux of my thesis and research. In the application of Habermasian postmetaphysical philosophy, the impetus that he gives to various religious traditions to look into their truth and validity claims reflectively becomes vital in the Indian context. By specifying such a philosophical-theological exercise he aims at reasoning religion. “This arduous work of hermeneutic self-reflection must be undertaken from within the perspective of religious traditions. In our culture, it has been accomplished in essence by theology and, on the catholic side, also by an apologetic philosophy of religion that seeks to explicate the reasonableness of faith.”149

Thus, I will further investigate the three epistemic stances that Habermas proposes concern-ing religion in the public sphere. 4.2.1 Epistemic Stance to Other Religions

One can see that Habermas distances himself from euro-centrism. European history has as-sumed an universally accepted societal set-up for the past few centuries due to which Chris-tianity hardly had any occasion to debate itself with other faiths. Or, as the pages of western history say, it discarded the presence of other faiths and became hostile toward them. One can-not deny the fact that Christianity not only failed to welcome other faiths but also even worked towards the eradication of different traditions and faith other than what was ‘Christian’. How-ever, with the modernization of European societies and economic globalization, this singular domination and truth claims came under serious scrutiny. This led to the advent of western societies becoming ever more open to other faiths and their truth claims. One cannot forget here the openness of the Catholic Church that became an active member or even an initiator of such actions that involved discourses with other religions.150 Though Habermas brings it out in our times, initiatives of such dialogues and attempts at discovering the truth in other religions were not alien to the Catholic church owing to its missionary encounters with other faiths and the involvement of missionaries who became agents of these encounters.

This encounter with other religions and traditions that emerges from discursive rationality, however, cannot be forced upon members of other religions. It is a need that has to be discov-ered by religious members themselves through self-reflection. This is what is recognized as “a genuine learning process.”152 This serves as an important element for my research, which aims at the vorpolitischen Raum , where religion can gain the capacity of transforming itself in the public sphere. 4.2.2 Epistemic Stance towards the Internal Logic of Secular Knowledge

To comprehend this stance, one must be able to (first) observe two different elements. One is the article of faith and the other is secular knowledge. Now, Habermas claims that an epistemic stance and an analysis of the internal logic of secular knowledge will only help the religious to realize that religion cannot come into conflict with secular knowledge. This brings out, once again, the rationalization of society as analysed by Durkheim, which includes religion as its nucleus.

This epistemic stance allows us to revert back to the axial age characteristic of reasoning. In both cases, the similarity lies in the precedence of rationality or reason. What secular knowl-edge internally engages with is rationalistic development. In the case of axial age or religious movements, believers were urged to become aware of reason or be reasonable in their faith. The prophets intrinsically followed the same principle of being rationalistic in their beliefs and practices by steering the people from ritualism to a transcendental relationship with God. The same phenomenon could be seen in all the different axial areas.

The internal logic of secularism mainly demands the capacity to formulate questions in ref-erence to human activity in society. This, obviously and primarily includes, the religious self of a person. The axial age witnessed the emergence of intellectuals who were not among the known groups such as kings and priests but were outsiders from a secular (societal) point of view. They analysed human life and posed questions.154 Ultimately, these questions had to be answered within a religious purview that project the singularity of the basis of both the secular and the religious. In other words, how could one articulate the cooperation between religious and secular reason, which happens through translation?155 4.2.3 Epistemic Stance towards the Priority of Secular Reasons in Politics

In the formation of laws for citizens, politics adhere naturally to secular reason so that it can maintain the secular nature of a democratic society. In such cases, it is the responsibility of religious members to make space for politics to refer or base itself on secular reasons.

Secular reasons are basic and vital for the modern states owing to their characteristic feature of pluralism. In reference to India, where the state is determined to be secular in accordance with the Constitution – that is, the former adheres to secular reason as opposed to religious reason – both the citizens as well as the political leaders ought to conceive the importance of secular reason. Such a disposition guarantees both the religious and the secular citizens their space. Meera Nanda’s156 arguments against the religious reasons taking over the Indian public sphere could be supplemented through this standpoint. The epistemic stance is an attitude and disposition that gives preference to the scientific methods which are currently in vogue to con-tribute to the modernization of human society. I do not intend to argue here the elimination of religion or the modernization of society, but propose a combined working of these two areas.

Why are secular reasons in politics to be considered or given priority over religious reasons? Secular reasons primarily hold onto science as points of reference, which are empirical and go beyond any one particular religion. This itself forms the foundation of neutrality of the state. In differentiating between Glauben und Wissen , Schmidt argues that religion offers its reasons with connection to revelation, which could be the only element that is seen by philosophy and Wissen as posing an argument against the validity of its rationality. It is fundamentally based on the experience of the individual and also derives its legitimacy from this experience of revelation, which is called heteronomy. In natural science, this phenomenon remains as unverifiable. “Philosophy and science are about reasonable and public beliefs, religion about private and therefore latently opinions not grounded on reasoning.”157 In any case, both these areas have their borders, which is to be noted and responded accordingly. This could be seen as an expression of each one’s contribution to society. Though religion is not strictly considered by secular reason as a scientific entity, by considering the autonomy and identity of religion for its basic contribution to human existence, there develops mutual respect for one another. Thus, both have their areas of functions or assignment, which is what the word Arbeitsteilung 158denotes. “However, this division of labor is both necessary and constitutive for the modern world.”159

In the face of religious fundamentalism that rises from political favouritism, strict adher-ence to secular reasons in the executive body of politics is, unquestioningly, a positive stance or solution to the acts of religious fundamentalism in society. But we need to ask the question of whether strict adherence of the state to secular means will annihilate or eliminate religion from the public sphere. In the Habermasian sense, it does not.

However, secular reason serves as a partner for the religions that provide impetus for the need to hold on to rational traditions. As it is mentioned in the above citation, secular reason cannot ultimately turn out to be a provider and resource for human situations; rather it is only religion that can become an agent and source having the functionality of meaning.

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PART VI: Postmetaphysical Approach to Public Religion in India

The following chapter is a crystallization of the Habermasian philosophy of religion in refer-ence to the Indian public sphere. The central theme until now has been the problematization of religion as something lacking rationality in the public sphere; the socio-philosophical ap-proaches that would address and lead to a consensus towards resolving this outlook have also been discussed. The spirit of reformation has served as an example and was exposed through the discourse on secularism that made rational elements of religion available to society. How-ever, as mentioned above, this chapter attempts to bring into dialogue and analyze elements of rationality between religion in India and Habermasian principles.1

Evidently, when the two elements –, namely, religion and reason – find a way towards syn-thesis, it could initially lead to an emphasis on the importance of religion to society. Further-more, religion can also pave a way for a modernistic or emanicipatory outlook by unearthening its hidden rationalistic nature. “Religious foundation of ethics was a defining issue for Hindu Indians; an attitude which was provoked at least in part by Christian and Utilitarian criticisms of their religious and social norms.”2 This section will further demonstrate how Max Müller brought into light the reformative character of Upanishads. Thomas J. Green capsulizes this reflection of Müller in the following quote:

Models such as these form the nucleus of this chapter in order to expose the challenges posed by Habermas to Religion within an Indian context.

In the early years of the new millennium, there was a trend and movement in all the Catholic Religious Orders as the world celebrated 2000 years of Christ’s presence in the world. These Orders’ intentions were to call their members for a return to the roots. There were workshops, seminars, etc., concentrating on looking back into the roots of each Order that would then help them to revive their lifestyle. Though it is just an example that could be sceptically looked at with regard its relevance into a philosophical area, it does reflect a postmetaphysical approach.

Unlike that of the west, Indian religion was never laid out to be an institutional type of religion. Just as Habermas finds it not right to have a functional understanding of religion in the line of secularization, the Indian concept of religion has never had any part in such an understanding of religion.4 It goes beyond that. However, India has in its past, unfortunately, lost this original understanding of religion through its contact with the colonizers and their idea of religion. As a consequence of imitation of the colonizers’ idea of religion,5 the coun-try has lost its substantiality and profoundness in the past few centuries. This is the reason why I want to stress this connection between Habermasian postmetaphysical philosophy and the ‘original’ Indian religion in this chapter. Habermas’s approach comes closer to the Indian understanding of religious philosophy, which is based more on discursive than instrumental rationality. Hence, examples such as Gandhi – who uses a similar methodology of Translation of Habermas and presented to civic society the idea of freedom movement from the ancient sacred Indian texts – are an addition to this chapter; together with some of the important re-ligious reformers of the modern age in India who have also pointed out this truth of religion. By doing so, I try to expose the relevance of Habermasian postmetaphysical thought in the Indian context. The aim is also to demonstrate that in order to exercise postmetaphysical logic towards religion, Indians do not have to look for outside sources, rather they need be aware of the internal sources which are available.

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1 Significance of the Habermasian Approach to the Problem of Religion

Basing his argument on Kant’s principle, the universal principle of right, Habermas argues that every individual can claim his or her own right but at the same time should also be aware of and value the other’s rights. Only in this case is there a mutual respect and acceptance of every individual’s right. This serves as the foundation for a liberal constitution which guarantees equal liberties for every citizen. In other words, it becomes a universal law that guarantees the right and freedom of every individual.6 However, this autonomous nature of individual rights does not lead to an end in itself, but rather “serves as a means to safeguard the equal private autonomy of members of society.”7 This equality of treatment could be a concern in India as the country contains people of various religions and cultures who have their own convictions with regard to ethical lives based on their religious backgrounds and beliefs. Every religion can be said to contribute to the way its members live but it is the state that guarantees individuals their right to live based on their cultural and religious convictions. However, the state also makes sure that these convictions do not affect or restrict the liberty of other individuals. It is, in fact, the moral law of the state to aim for everyone’s equal interest.8

While dealing with the pluralistic scenario in India, it is valid and important to focus on the point mentioned above. Such an approach is worth in the midst of a complexity of situations. One needs to aim at how members of various communities could be granted liberty in order to exercise their faith and present their reasons for social ethics. “The spirit of postmodernism is plural, but not non-binding. The motto of postmodernism is: be religious and let be religious.”10As Europe has found its valid foundation in Judaism and Christianity for ethical and moral values as well as for the protection of human rights in the modern world, it is imperative for the Indian society to give more weight to its own religious scriptures. By doing so, it would be able to contribute and conscientize the citizens on moral values and, above all, to concentrate on the protection of human rights. This is, however, an assignment that is to be taken with utmost seriousness. In order for a society to enjoy an atmosphere of ideals such as righteousness and justice, it needs to base itself on solid and vital elements of the ancient scriptures of the land. This is because they provide an amount of deposit on which the society can base itself.

1.1 Philosophical Mediation

A philosophical mediation is a necessary agent for our society which is currently unconscious-ly driven to religious forces both in a negative and positive manner. As mentioned above, a Habermasian methodology would serve as point of reference for finding solutions to dealing with issues such as religious fundamentalism and radical secularism.

In treating metaphysics in relation to Dieter Henrich, Habermas analyses that Dietrich returns to metaphysics denying or maintaining matter as opposed to spirit.13 According to Habermas, Henrich is one of the strongest advocates of metaphysics and claims he tries to deal with this common project “to vindicate its validity in the face of analytic materialism”14. Habermas points out Henrich’s concern to return completely to metaphysics denying or main-taining matter as opposed to spirit. This is, of course, basically a return to the platonic tradi-tion. Henrich, through his work, tries to define the modern view regarding a conscious being and how it can maintain itself. The self-realization of this conscious life can only be reached through metaphysics and thus, he connects metaphysics to modernity.

Habermas responds to his colleague under three various sections: metaphysics, anti-natural-ism and the theory of subjectivity.15 He considers metaphysics as ontological from the ancient Greek philosophical point of view. “Metaphysics had emerged as the science of the universal, immutable, and necessary, the only equivalent left for this later on was a theory of conscious-ness that states the necessary subjective conditions for the objectivity of universal synthetic judgments a priori”. 16 In this manner, Habermas sheds light on the shift of the terminology from metaphysics to consciousness in Kant’s critique of reason. However, there might be some opposition to retaining the term metaphysics based on the ancient Greek philosophy that deals with the theory of two worlds.

Habermas refers to philosophy and its role as an “interpreter” rather than as a “stand-in” one. According to him, the theoretical role of philosophy should provide an occasion for more profound differences in opinion. We can see Habermas’ shift in his position towards metaphys-ics from this. However, Habermas retains the role of philosophy as that which helps people to have a life that is “conscious and controlled”.17 He gives a concrete method for using the ancient religious wisdom and philosophical traditions. I assume that he has, in this context, already conceived the theme of appropriation. 18Forhe says:

Although there is a sort of disagreement about this appropriation of the ancient truths, Haber-mas sees that the European ideologies of morality, freedom and emancipation cannot be under-stood without the Judaeo-Christian religious foundation.20 It is hard to say exactly what position Habermas takes in dealing with metaphysics. He tries to elucidate on the different theories of the ancient as well as that of Kant’s positions. He basically tries to analyse the new modern philosophical situation and the trends: “[…] what remains for philosophy, and what is within its capabilities, is to mediate interpretatively between expert knowledge and an everyday practice in need of orientation.”21 But one cannot jump into any conclusion as he clearly states that there can be metaphysics no longer in the sense of ‘conclusive’ and ‘integrating’ thought.22

It is important to note that Habermas gives way to the conception that philosophy truly deals with the question of the whole. In contradiction to Henrich, Habermas posits that the world reli-gions do not take the place of the Usher ( Platzanweiser ); rather together with philosophy they hold the position as the Placeholder ( Platzhalter) . He notices that there is a constant invention of ideas in philosophy. This sort of understanding of the concept of philosophy can still serve to contribute to the challenges in the postmetaphysical societies. Through this attitude, Habermas however, proclaims a gesture of farewell from philosophy but he does not share the view of a philosophy which strives after a sort of systemic character. He differentiates between Pragmatism and Herme-neutics, which is a further development of philosophical ideas, which simultaneously move away or turn away from Kant and Hegel. Pragmatism and Hermeneutic discourse decline the deciding premise of the consciousness philosophy, Bewusstseinsphilosophie . Here, Habermas tries to find a connecting point between Pragmatism and Hermeneutics for developing his philosophical think-ing. Henrich tries to understand the concept of philosophy as a search to understand the ultimate reality, “ umfassende Erklärung des Wirklichen im Ganzen ” and thus basically giving religion the upper hand over philosophy, “ Philosophie zugleich als Nachfolgerin der Religion .”23

Besides the difference in opinion of the concept of philosophy and its role, Dieter (according to Henrich Daniel) continues with the clarity of the concept of metaphysics. Dieter clarifies that his intention is “to clarify a concept of metaphysics linked to the project of modernity.”24At the same time, Dieter is of the opinion that “Habermas in his own theoretical enterprise wrongly believes he is dispensed from thinking tasks for which even today there is no better title word than ‘metaphysics’ ”.25 Consequently, it is observed that he sees no alternative for this metaphysics in relation to the modern. Habermas, on the contrary, does not see a sort of – what could be called as an – integration between metaphysics and modernity. He finds out an inte-grative thinking in the project of modernism without relating it to metaphysics. Above all, he calls this philosophizing as nachmetaphysiches Denken (postmetaphysical thinking). “Haber-mas therefore sees the feedback of the problem-solving strategy to the consciousness-philo-sophical understanding of the concept of self-consciousness as a relapse into metaphysics.”26This out-dated concept of self-consciousness of Henrich’s forces itself to the restored attitude against the modernity on the whole.

Dieter’s special status of knowledge impels him to use the phenomenon of self-conscious-ness in order to indicate the necessity of metaphysics towards the project of modernity. It is unthinkable for Dieter not to strive after metaphysics. Therefore, Dieter considers Habermas’ way of philosophising in the line of nachmetaphysichen Denken as a bad metaphysics. Haber-mas represents a form of naturalism which is not satisfactory to the understanding of man, because, “the (naturalism) works towards the self-distance of conscious life, because in the end, by handing over the resolution of those primary conflicts to the individual and natural sciences, man is dispensed from an essential task”.27

This special form of presenting knowledge by Dieter Henrich is already an indication of social sciences’ relation to the property of metaphysical thinking. Metaphysical thinking, ac-cording to Habermas, is the claim of exclusive knowledge which is not to be questioned be-yond. Daniel, however, claims that the specific knowledge which, according to the philosophy of consciousness, the subject acquires of himself through self-consciousness appears as an ex-ample of that particular form of certainty which Habermas conceives as ‘metaphysical’.28

Habermas sees in Dieter’s criticism of natural sciences a reverse-tendency, which is a sort of neo-conservative attitude. In this way, an attempt is made to reach a scientific analysis of the surmounting or conquering of the fallibilism, through the reference to a theory of self-con-sciousness. This type of thought pattern corresponds to a rehabilitation of metaphysical think-ing and may not have any place in modernity. For Habermas, the concept of self-consciousness takes a new turn in relation to this boundary or demarcation as opposed to the consciousness philosophy and its political implication. After all, Habermas combines a changed concept of self-confidence with the claim to leave behind the metaphysical aspects of Dieter’s theory.29

Furthermore, the Theoriebegriff , which is used by Habermas in order to characterize his comprehension of metaphysics could be of use to us in this context of philosophical media-tion. He bases himself very strongly on the principle of Aristotle’s bios theoretikos, “Entwurf eines theoretischen Lebens”. This perspective interprets the discussion about the very strong Theoriesanspruch as the confidence of philosophy as a whole. It gives the ultimate foundation and reasoning for answering certain philosophical questions. Indeed, as a postmetaphysical thinker Habermas understands his claim of reasons should be appropriated under this di-mension or view.30 This strong concept of theory refers to the redemptive significance of the contemplative life. As religion proposes different ways to attain salvation, philosophy proposes the way of contemplation (life dedicated to contemplation or bios theoretikos ) . Theorydemands a renunciation of the natural attitude toward the world and promises contact with the extraor-dinary. This theory paves way to the understanding of the orbits in nature and universe and the phenomenon of the totality of nature. “In the modern period, the concept of theory loses this link to sacred occurrences, just as it loses its elite character, which is moderated into social privilege. What remains is the idealistic interpretation placed on distancing the everyday net-work of experience and interests.”31

1.2 Discursive Rationality: an Alternative to Apologetic Religions

The apologetic nature of presenting religion in our times is apparently a dangerous attitude that could be argued to cause more disintegration to human societies. Therefore, the relevance of its public manifestation is to be carefully analysed and questioned. The word ‘apologetic’ comes from the Greek word, apologia, meaning speaking in defence. It is a religious discipline of de-fending religious doctrines.32 In the given times, social media becomes one of the main forums where a lot of apologetic content is freely being uploaded. There are hardly any restrictions to put a stop to or examine the contents of religious material on social media. The greatest problem is that many of these religious apologists are still seekers who are not sure of a path. On the other side, we also find apologists who are learned men and women.33 In both the cases, the emotional status of the individuals who are taken up by these apologetical performances poses a danger. One needs to ask the question of how the world is currently working at in order to bring peace from a religious point-of-view? One best method that I would propose based on Habermasian postmetaphysical methodology is to question the need, the importance and relevance of apolo-getical performances on a public forum. An apologetic approach obviously aims at establishing the fact that one’s own religion is the final path that offers the ultimate truth. Consequently, it negates all other paths of religions. Because of this, in most cases apologetical performances demand an acceptance of (or conversion to) a particular religion while maintaining hostility towards the others. Blatantly, human history tells us that such attitudes are dangerous to the growth of a pluralistic society as they do not leave scope for pluralism. Mall refers to Friedrich Hölderlin, who questions the validity of one and only religion containing the truth.34 We know that owing to globalisation, pluralism has become the model of our present-day societies, which demand to leave space and scope for the other. This implies that we need to question apologetic attitudes in our times and propose, instead, discursive attitudes which would take the method-ology of mutual learning and result in the avoidance of the ultimate truth claims. When one is in this way directed towards a discursive approach towards religion, it also leads one to discover common elements in various religions. While making a comparative study of Christianity and Islam which are both monotheistic in nature, Indian religious reformers such as Ram Mohan Roy or Ramakrishna Paramahamsa would help the reader to find out that this element of mono-theism exists even in Hinduism. Thus, they do not become apologists but rather contributors to a discursive and dialogical comprehension of various religious traditions.

1.3 Constructivism against Fundamentalism

Hindu dharma embraces a universal religion and that is why Rabindranath Tagore, a philos-opher from the Bengal School of modern philosophy, expresses his dissatisfaction with the idea of one faith and religion. “If ever such a catastrophe should befall mankind, that his only religion would flood everything, God would have to provide for a second Noah’s Ark to save his creatures from spiritual annihilation.”36

However, fundamentalist attitudes are apparently different to this as they represent mostly apologetic attitudes. When it comes to religious fundamentalism, one cannot but refer to many such fresh examples. Examples may be cited from India in 2008 when the Christian minority was brutally attacked in Odisha by Hindu fundamentalists or the death of Graham Steins and his children or the attack on the Kashmiri Pandits. These share similarity to the recent fundamentalist events in the west, namely in France where the fundamentalists again identify to a specific religion; in their case, Islam. In both the cases, the fact that religion is the moti-vating factor is transparent. But there is also another side to it when we see that virtues such as forgiveness, attempts towards reconciliation among various religious groups, mutual respect for one another despite the differences based on caste, colour, race, etc. are also motivated by religious principles.

For Habermas, it is very clear that religion is an agent that has a performative function in soci-etal matters. Through the potentiality that religion has, it equally generates among its followers and non-followers immense attitudes of motivation.

In reference to today’s fundamentalist attitudes, especially in India, Mall says such attitudes imply a very narrow approach and understanding of India’s religious traditions. It centrally refers to a closed interpretation of its heterodoxy.39

1.4 Reflective Religion based on its ‘ Telos’

Firstly, this part of discourse on reflective religion is an extended discussion to what I have mentioned in Part IV about the same. Taking Habermas’ proposal on the importance of a reflective religion to our modern times, the following discussion will focus from an Indian perspective the possibility of such a reflective religion. Habermas does not use the Buddhist category of meditative reflection that contributes to the attitude of a reflective religion. How-ever, he makes an elaborate exposition on Buddhism in his latest publication, which comes under axial age reflections. A reflective religion40 in India is a necessary attitude of the people. One might question the need for such an attitude. Owing to the manner that the members of various religions practice their religions, it is obvious that this aspect needs to be stressed. Let us consider, for example, the various fundamental attitudes of religious members in various parts of the world and, in particular, India. For Habermas, a reflective model of religion is based on rationality that affects our life and the world at large. This rationality contributes to the renewal of cultures and socialization in a more meaningful manner. Thus, “[…] individu-als are motivated to criticize received wisdom and also capable of taking responsibility for life choices, reconciling conflicting demands of diverse social roles, and forging a life history that makes sense.”41

The origin and purpose of religion in general has been cited by Habermas in reference to Durkheim. In the course of time, apart from this origin due to the cognitive development of the religious members, the production of various scripts came into existence, which is in itself a proof of human intellectuality and the fact that human society needs to live and deal with his fellow men. The sacred scripture Bhagvadgita is considered as one of the most important texts of Hinduism. It gives its members a certain impulse and knowledge about being a human being and the wisdom needed to be able to respond to various situations of calamities.

Reflective religion could also be presented as a ‘meditative religion’. The life of Gautama, the young prince who turned towards meditation, was enlightened so that he could review his old religious practices. The path to reflective religion began by questioning primarily the existing practices and finding the true meaning of these practices. Buddha is supposed to have consid-ered giving his own interpretation of the writings of the ancient texts such as the Vedas. He himself did not lead any violent protests in reflecting these texts. Nonetheless, reflective man-ner taught him the way to ahimsa and showed him the way to understand the previous eras through meditation. “The path itself is marked by steps of a reflexive process to overcome the blindness of individuation process of knowledge, which should lead to enlightenment through meditative exercises, i.e. by disciplining body and mind.”42 On the contrary, one could note that the reforms in other religions, such as Christianity, took place in a bloody manner. It was a reaction without reflection and consideration.43 The reformation period stands as a witness to the aggressiveness expressed by both reformers and those in authority as well. However, we hear in the modern times that even the followers of reflective movements like Buddhism, too, take part in aggressive protests and bloody battles.

Bhagavad-Gita , Ramayana , the Vedas , the Upanishads and the teachings of Buddha are the most important texts of ancient India before it came into contact with other religions. These texts obviously speak more about the internal aspect of reflection of the human per-son. In the Habermasian sense, even though it is not so extensively discussed what it means to have a reflective religion, the Indian background with such texts gives us a wider perspec-tive of what it means to be reflective and the purpose of such reflection. Human existence is at the centre of these texts as they constantly refer to the type of life a human person needs to live. Let us take the example of the Bible, which mostly depicts the history of a nation or a race and conveys the message of God through events. The texts of India are philosophical in the sense that their concern is with the human person and how he or she achieves his or her original self. They are not mainly event-oriented, apart from the two epics Mahabharat and Ramayana .

Habermas’ proposal for a reflective religion is a purpose-oriented methodology for a re-ligious attitude. Being a social philosopher, whose concern is what philosophy can do for the society, this proposal lays foundation to an elite and reflective society. It is important for me to concentrate on this aspect of reflective religion because it has a massive impact on the social milieu. The current Indian situation tells us that there is an increase in the superstitious following of religions. The massive increase in certain religious practices that are obviously linked to superstition exist not only in Hinduism but in other religions like Islam and Christianity as well and could be regarded as a cultural factor. So, it could be proposed that religion, in general, is highly superstitious in India in comparison to other parts of the world.

When religion itself is not able to help its members reflect, educate themselves and impart the origin and purpose of their own religion, it might lead to the question of whether religion truly contributes to the betterment of the society. One could even question whether such a religion contributes more towards corruption rather than the improvement of society. A rationalistic outlook towards religion also leads to a rationalistic society which will even have the capacity and power to question not just aspects of religion but even issues related to the civic life. The church teaches its members of the fruits obedience can bring to one’s spiritual life. And this obedience is applied to all areas of life enabling members to question the existing system. It be-gins from the level of Parish where questioning the priest is against the virtue of obedience to that of the hierarchy of the Church to the religious orders where obedience is much-demanded. Such blind obedience weakens a person’s capacity to be rational and consequently their ability to approach religious practices with a rationalistic view.

Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, was an intellectual who envisioned India to be an intellectual society; he made an attempt to establish his vision and conviction by looking back to the religious sources of India.

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2 The Functionality of Epistemic Religion

Substantially, it is to be noted that postmetaphysical models use religion and do not discard it. As it was discussed in the chapter on secularism, postmetaphysical approach was employed in order to place religion on its original path. The following examples that I use are models found in India, which also employed this postmetaphyiscal approach to make religious content avail-able within a social scenario. Underlying this attempt, these models lay stress on ‘openness’, which is considered one of the most important characteristics of a postmetaphysical approach. This led them to engage in dialogue with Christianity that contributed to their postmetaphys-ical approaches. Their discussions and engagement with other religions also provided them an occasion to look into the contents of their own religion. This even led them to be visionaries for propagating a universal religion. Sometimes it appears that in a research like this, we are becoming agents in creating a universal religion and simultaneously also reinventing the old religion – humanism. Postmetaphysical research, on the contrary, has its speciality in placing religion at the centre in all its importance. Owing to the already existing openness and plu-rality within Hinduism, the religion has got immense capacity to adapt to postmetaphysical logic. If postmetaphysical approach is an attempt at saving religion within a secularistic soci-ety, which denies its voice and its presence owing to its western historical background, then I would suggest a Hinduistic approach. “(Müller) … believed that a study of the development of Indian religion could yield a universally valid schema of religious growth, thus suggesting that the monistic teachings of some of the Upanisads, or something similar to them, would be the highest development in the progress of any religion.”45

2.1 Bengal School of Religious Reasoning

A ‘reform within the existing religion’ is an expression used by the followers of a particular religion who are beginning to question the existing forms of that religion. It indicates man’s intellectual capacity to enquire into the meaningfulness of the various practices of religions. This, obviously, needs to give way to rationality in the process of thinking about the existing forms. Therefore, looking back at the practises of religious reformers would be of great use to the present generations if we wish to understand the reality and truth of religions. I shall make an attempt at presenting the important reformers of India in the part that follows. These personalities have made their contributions to Indian society in the area of religion, thus con-tributing their influence on the social practices of the society. A similar phenomenon – clearly, from the axial age – has been described by Habermas as a ‘revolution in thought’. This type of revolution enlightened the people to move towards a higher level of their cognitive capacity and view various sociological and religious elements from a rationalistic point of view.

The school of Bengal’s revolutionary thought with regard to religion and its relation to soci-ety was one of the leading expressions of Indian religious thought. Not only did it deal with reforming religion but it also created a national spirit that planted seeds of struggle for Indian Independence Movement. Religion became the foundation for these members to build their principles of freedom and independence. Therefore, in the following section, I will make a comparative analysis of sociological engagement of religion, or in other words, the seculariza-tion of belief. 2.1.1 Secularization of Belief

A similar attempt such as that of Habermas has already been done by Vivekananda who ap-peared in the beginning of an era when the western world was being overcome by the secular-istic attitude. Vivekananda interpreted Vedanta largely in the way that he did because he be-lieved that the only rationally defensible basis for religion against materialism could be found in the ‘pure’ monism of Vedanta .47 Intellectual and rationalistic approach towards religion bear the essentiality of a postmetaphysical religion. In this case, I would like to present Brahmo Samaj and its impacts here. To comment on the beginning of Brahmo Samaj:

Brahmo Samaj laid the foundation to what we call today a modern India. It was created during the period of 1772 and 1830 at the gates of British capital in the city of Calcutta in India. Just like the flow of trade that flourished in India during that time, radical western philosophical ideas also found a sudden influx. “By serving as avenues linking the regional elite with the dynamic civilization of contemporary Europe, the Orientalists contributed to the formation of a new Indian middle class and assisted in the professionalization of the Bengali Hindu intelligentsia.”49

They were attracted by western thought and saw an opportunity that would lead them to purify Hinduism and produce “an optimistic vision of mankind’s future.”50 It was a very fitting invention to the then Indian society, which had always been highly theistic unlike the west which exercised some amount of choice in such matters. “Unitarians and Brahmos with a Uni-tarian bias, though they attacked the orthodox tradition, advocated social improvement, and struggled for progress, did so as theists in the name of God.”51 Science was not to be alienated from religious thought. However, we – the moderners – have the tendency to “misread secular-ism into the methodology of science, the philosophy of science, and even into the psychohisto-ry of the scientific mind and personality. Too infrequently are we reminded that the paradigms of history are relative, that science may have metaphysical roots, and that scientific geniuses such as Newton and Einstein were religious men.”52 2.1.2 Dialectics of Religion

In order to arrive at a solution for a philosophical problem, the method of dialectic is consid-ered as an important agent. This tradition of establishing the relative truth as objective truth through the means of logical arguments is undoubtedly found in different religions. As men-tioned earlier, my aim here is to explicitly expose the possibility of a dialogue between Glauben and Wissen in the line of Habermas. In this manner, both parties will be eligible to recognize each other as rationalistic components and for my case, religion is also given more credit by becoming an area of openness to science. Consequently, I take the example of Raja Ram Mo-han Roy to arrive at the given case.

Roy’s methodology in reforming his own religion was developed through his contact with many scientific adventures and inventions of the western world. This, inevitably, aroused in him a desire to have a critical approach towards Hinduism and its practices. What Habermas calls today a mutual learning process, could be found in Roy’s approach. “Ram Mohan Roy was […] a critical modernist who sought to combine Vedanta with modern scientific culture.”53 He envisioned an ever-deepening pluralistic situation to reinterpret dharma from a rationalistic perspective. The word dharma (which is translated to the western world as ‘religion’) is the highest form of rationalistic expression. He comes to this conclusion by putting “egalitarian religion ethics”54 as the foundation of his argument. Shankara’s commentary on Vedanta Sutra coupled with the Upanishads served as vital sources from which Roy derived what is called the model of rational and ethical theism.55

Ram Mohan Roy fought vehemently against the evil practice of sati .57 He was able to do that because of the education and enlightenment he received about various religions and their practices. Sati was one of the evilest practices in Hinduism and he had to strike at its very roots with the help of others who supported this cause. It was mainly through the combined effort of a Christian missionary and Roy that the practice was put to an end. Schouten cites a leading newspaper of that time which says: “The manner in which he fought sati showed how the zeal of the Christian missionary and the idealism of the Hindu reformer could be combined to strike at the roots of a social malaise”.58

Roy was also able to establish Brahmo Samaj, which means ‘the society of Hindus’. This movement could be understood in our modern terms as a religious reform movement. He considered Hinduism as a monotheistic religion, which gave him the impulse to free the Hin-dus from all sorts of superstitious beliefs and burdens. Roy’s views as a free thinker were pub-lished in his famous Persian book, Tuhfat-ul-Muwahhidin (A Gift to God). He propagated his views on religion especially by outlining the connecting point of all religious or fundamental teachings.59 He worked very strenuously to take Hinduism back to its roots. According to him, there is only one God in Hinduism who is the creator and sustainer of his creation. This God is eternal, unchangeable and unending. It is quite obvious that every religion has plenty of unimportant elements; however, that should not be the criterion to judge a religion as false. Moreover, these elements do not necessarily confirm the essence of a religion. Hinduism is also not an exception and has elements such as these.60

The concept of dialogue and learning from one another as proposed by Habermas62 had an anticipated activity within the Indian context and ushered in new philosophic-theological ex-pressions of Christianity. Similar approaches occasioned mutual openness to various religious traditions. This also implies recognition of the rationalistic activity of the other and the other’s perseverance towards attaining the truth. In this manner, it totally opposes the principle of truth existing only in one religion and instead focuses on the elements of revelation as available in various traditions. One of the best examples is that of Brahmabandhab Upadhyay.63 He was a Bengali thinker and philosopher who was a Hindu by birth and later turned towards Chris-tianity. His attempts at achieving a Hindu-Christian religious ideology were unfortunately not encouraged by the church in Rome. I shall present his approach in which the principle of mutuality of religions was underlaid. Upadhyaya’s attempt with advaitic philosophy was to discover in an Indian context the relevance of the Gospel of Christ to a Hindu. It was not a private attempt; rather it emerged in the pluralist scenario of his society. It was a philosophical interaction that he made with the existing traditions in the context of his home.64 He asserted his theological approach by returning back to the origins of Hinduism, which he hoped, would open the way that would lead to Christian faith. Upadhyaya was enthusiastic about the idea of how Greeks found the degrees of truths manifested in the incarnated logos. In a similar man-ner, he envisioned the usefulness of vedantic philosophy for making a basis for understanding and interpreting Christian faith within a local context.

The case of Upadhyay certainly serves as an example for and opens up a possibility towards finding out elements of truth in various religious traditions. Above all, it helps in analysing a rationalistic approach in presenting the truth of God through a religion.

2.2 A Gandhian Position

Dr Martin Luther King in the American world and Mahatma Gandhi in the eastern world were models to demonstrate that a Habermasian process of translation has had its success. They were examples of revolutionaries in the modern world and were able to save the world of theirs with a strong religious background. Both were believers and had access to scriptures during their role as civil leaders and were above all great practitioners of their belief systems. One was a Christian pastor and the other a guru who founded a religious ashram. Both of them engaged themselves in Independence movements, which included and demanded respect and dignity of all. However, I would like to deal with here Gandhi’s ideology as it pertains more to the theme of my research. This is primarily to demonstrate how Gandhi has made use of religion to achieve his so-called secular goals. “The authoritative concepts of the Gandhic philosophy of life are also the values he finds in Hinduism.”66

Gandhi had based himself very much on the Hindu traditions. The concept of satya , ahimsa and dharma is fundamentally found in the various traditions of Hinduism. The Vedas helped him develop concepts like satya (truth) and rita (the moral order of the whole nature).67 Gand-hi was a personality in whom the combination of religion and politics could be seen very clear-ly. His religion or his identity as a Hindu was essential for him in order to be effective in his political career too.

Gandhi’s interest in spiritualising the politics of his time was to live again the dream of the an-cient Indian tradition of Ramarajya . This is a concept derived from Ramayana, a religious text of Hindus written by Valmiki. According to this text, in the kingdom ruled by the righteous king, Rama, values of truth, justice, and righteousness were the most important of all. Gandhi took it upon himself to return to this concept of Ramarajya from his religious texts and to present it to his contemporaries.69

Gandhi’s political action could be said to be nothing but the concept of karma yoga mate-rialised.71 Through this method, he makes an attempt at bringing both the secular and the sacred onto the same platform. His commitment towards the freedom struggle is obviously a secular one but such a secular inducement was also supported by his deeply-set religious learning and convictions. Indisputably, the results of his political endeavours bear witness to all this. It is not to be overlooked that he had always presented himself as the follower of strict vedantic Hinduism. He placed God in the centre of his freedom struggle and also placed ex-treme importance to the truth of non-violence in achieving freedom. Once again, I would like to reiterate here the necessity for a reflective religion – one that exists not only in the way that Habermas conceptualises it but also within a meditative reflection, which is characterised through an Indian pattern visible in Gandhi’s methodology. Thus, the connection between God and man is made to be irrefutable and consequently validated. Incontrovertibly, we seek after truth and this search, according to Gandhi, is very much identical to the principle of ahimsa or the non-violent path that would achieve freedom from oppressors.72 Therefore, Mall suggests that one can name his anthropology as an experimental one. Gandhi is a combination of a traditionalist who stands on the ground of faith, religion and scriptures and a reformer or a proponent of enlightenment.73 2.2.1 Satya

As Gandhi tries to realize his secular cause based on his religious convictions, he considers it as a search for truth. The word satya is translated as ‘truth’. His concept of truth is related to the upanishadic understanding of truth as the only path that leads to triumph. That is why when we analyse the Indian national flag, we find that the motto that lies behind it is satyam eva jayate, which means ‘truth alone triumphs’. Satya , however, for Gandhi is not a logical truth – in the sense of a function – “ einer Eigenschaft einer Aussage ” (a characteristic of a statement).74According to this, morality is the basis of all things and truth is the substance of all morality. His understanding of truth is a process of development in relation to the realization of self. Just as Jesus is supposed to have said, ‘I am the truth’, by which statement he means that he identifies truth with himself; for Gandhi, truth and God are identical. He places truth equally with conscience as truth is the inner voice. The highest principle to which truth refers to is the correspondence of thought and word as true.75 To adore God, then, would be to adore him only as truth.

It also needs to be mentioned that the disidentification of truth with law is not within Gandhi’s philosophical horizon as the highest Law, for him, is identified with truth itself. By doing so, he comprehends that there is a power that unifies and binds all the things together. The term Rita is an expression of this power – that which constitutes the eternal and divine order. Otherwise, in secular terms it is defined as the solidarity with all the creatures.77

Furthermore, this solidarity is exposed in terms of love that has a binding power. Though love can be expressed in egoistic or altruistic ways, it is primarily the latter that generates and promotes life. This sociological anthropology of Gandhi, if we observe closely, has a religious basis or can even be said to be motivated purely by his religious convictions. Thus, one cannot deny the spiritual element that existed in his principles, which were obviously materialized in his civic and secular life.78 2.2.2 Ahimsa

Another concept of Gandhi’s that could be used in order to further comprehend the process of translation is ahimsa . The word, ahimsa , is translated to English as ‘non-violence’. It originates from the idea of equal respect for all creatures and the whole of creation. This concept even led – with the introduction of Jainism in the later period – to the practice of vegetarianism in India.79 This was because consumption of meat was considered sinful according to the idea of ahimsa . “According to the Manusmrti, ahimsa is the foremost among the dharmas that are common to all. It is included in the yoga of mind control. Ahimsa means much more than what is meant by non-injury; it implies not doing harm to others even by thought or word.”80

Gandhi apparently derived this concept from Mahavira, Buddha and also Jesus as these were the progenitors of the religions that emphasize values such as ahimsa (non-violence), karuna (compassion), nächstenliebe (charity).81 Ahimsa is a core value for all Indian societies, includ-ing many tribal and religious communities across the land. Ahimsa is deeply-rooted in the daily lives of Indians and it is extended to the food habits of many Indians, which is indicated by the tradition of vegetarianism among some Hindus.82 Besides the saying, satyannasti paro dharmah (truth is the highest dharma), there is another saying in reference to ahimsa : ahimsa paramo dharma , that is, ahimsa as the highest dharma. This idea goes back to Upanishads and outlines that the law of not hurting other creatures is based on the concept of the unity of all life. Ahimsa is amongst one of the five ethical virtues presented by Chandogya Upanishad.83

Gandhi, also called as the father of the Indian nation, took up this concept of ahimsa in his political philosophy. As it is obvious that Gandhi took the primary role in the independence movement in India, he had to develop a philosophy that would let his voice be heard and gather followers for the cause of independence. Being a highly religious and philosophical person, he took heed to religion and its teachings, especially that of Hindu texts. The Bible also had an in-fluence on him, especially the Beatitudes part of the New Testament. However, he formulated his political agenda of fighting against the British in the form of ahimsa , or non-violence. He did not want to take the path of arms and violence; rather, he followed the non-violent method in order to achieve Independence for India. His method of protesting through Satyagraha is an example for this in which he employed the two basic principles of satya and ahimsa . 2.2.3 Satyagraha as Synthesis

The word satyagraha is commonly identified with one of the great Indian movements, the In-dependence Movement against the English Raj.84 It had been inspired at that time by Gandhi’s concept of satya or truth as I have mentioned above. This concept is to be understood basically within a spiritual context, which outlines the necessity of actions such as satyagraha . Even though it has its origins in a spiritual and religious context, it is vividly experienced within a sociological or communitarian context. Once again, we see here the amalgamation of the secular and the sacred which cannot be stated differently. They can even be argued to be in-trinsically interdependent. The literal meaning of the word satyagraha is “holding on to the truth.”85 Thus, it is not just a means to an end but it is the goal and the means encapsulated into one. Therefore, one can even interpret it as karma yoga as it orients itself towards action. But the field and context where this is applied is a field of conflicts.86 Satyagraha was employed by Gandhi in a context of struggle for emancipation in South Africa.

It is implicit that by employing Satyagraha , physical violence against the adversary has no place; a satyagrahi takes upon himself or herself the pain from the adversary as a form to endurance to achieve the result. “Self-suffering in satyagraha is directed toward the moral persuasion of the opponent. Self-suffering means voluntary injury to the self to persuade the opponent to become empathetic to the sufferer’s situation and concerns.”88

Therefore, satyagraha is a technique that involve three principles – namely, truth, non-vio-lence and suffering. Gandhi uses this technique purely in a social context to achieve the goals set by him with regard to the freedom struggle.89 One could observe here that the philosophical exercise he is trying to practise is similar to that which Habermas calls translation and appro-priation of religious concepts towards a secular society.

2.3 A Critical Appropriation of Religion

Ahimsa was a religious concept developed especially in Hinduism. But it could be translat-ed as a concept that would be appealing to members of all religions. Gandhi, throughout his Independence Movement, had members from all religions as his followers. Even though these concepts were essentially Hinduistic in nature, they could be integrated and present-ed as common concepts so that members of every religion would find them relatable and similar to those in their faith. Moreover, Gandhi did not enforce Hinduism or his faith on his followers and his closest friends were also from other religious backgrounds. In other words, it could be said that Gandhi used an intellectual language that was appealing to all the members.

Gandhi used a civic language that could convert religious concepts and convictions towards the societal usage. He recognized the religious deposit of the nation and applied it to societal governance in order to achieve his aim of independence and then to avoid corruption and establish an elite and equal society. Likewise, according to Kanchana Mahadevan, Ambed-kar, too, proposes a critical outlook towards religion. “[…] so that it is compatible with free-dom, equality and fraternity. Conversely, he also critiques modern interpretations of freedom, equality and solidarity from the perspective of the Buddhist religious ideal of solidarity.”92

The religious treasure of Indians is mainly the Vedas and the Upanishads . Therefore, they are to be considered as literature of wisdom and experience of a nation and not of a particular religion. They form the earliest writings of the subcontinent and are highly intellectual in their nature and remains deeply philosophical and religious in our modern times. It is in these writ-ings that we see the quest of the human mind and the nature of an argumentative India. Mod-ern Indians, however, fail to see them as the production of human intellect that need not neces-sarily belong to any religion as such. There is no reason why these texts should be monopolized by Hindus; it is only the emergence of various religions in India that led them to be categorized as religious texts. It is, nevertheless, not an easy task to convert them into a national hegemony or national literature. The very fact that Buddha took elements from this literature is a sign that they are the basis of a cultural philosophy rather than a particular religion. On account of a similar reality, Habermas puts emphasis on becoming aware of religious deposit. “As he (Habermas) sees it, secular translations of religious projections of successful forms of life can continue to inspire us, and encourage us to make tentative efforts at cooperation with a view to bringing about social change for the better, even without the certainty of divine assistance.”93

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3 Reasoning Religion in Public: The Habermasian Challenge to Indian Religions

Through the results of my research, the following part opens up and leads to further themes of research. A critique forms the basis of an extended knowledge. This is what I have been trying to achieve through my research. Various forms of societal developments in the western world form a basis to critique the existing practices, especially that of religious approaches and thinking.

The need to critique is one of the important factors that contributes to a healthy religion especially within a public sphere. What lacks in the Indian context is a continuing and re-newed critique of religious traditions and a renewed way of thinking that has been very much a part of the early Indian religion. In the case of Christianity, it is widely accepted that theology is not just a sacred study but also a critical study of faith and its traditions. Every generation produces its critique based on its belief systems, dogma, faith and philosophical and theological propositions. To give an example, Thomas Aquinas – who was considered as one of the important fathers of the church and believed to be the master of theology and a pillar of catholic dogmatic traditions – has also been critically analysed. His teachings are not considered any more as absolute but are rather open to criticism. This is how Christian theology expresses its openness to newer forms and understanding of its own faith, religious traditions and practices. More examples could be given with regard to Christianity so that it opens ground for discussion to understand various themes pertaining to daily human life in our time.

This is what theology does. In the same manner, writings from various religious leaders as well as religious texts from India should be exposed to criticism. That would enable us to reach a newer understanding and do away with what is not necessary. The following points indicate various areas where such exercise is possible.

Kanchana Mahadevan argues that “Indian secularism is not a critique of religion or an “En-lightenment fundamentalism” as it is in the West, but rather accommodates both faith and reason.”95 Could this also be considered as the real reading of Habermas? Though Habermas has a western outlook, the procedure of his philosophy of religion was to bring about a com-mon platform for both faith and reason to co-exist. In this way, he comes closer to an Indian understanding of secularism. But that should not satisfy or do away with the challenge that Habermas poses even to a highly religious society. But what is more substantial in the analysis between Habermas and Ambedkar is the critical approach towards one’s own religion. In this context, “Ambedkar’s arguments, neglected by Indian academic debates on secularism, are sig-nificant. An architect of the Indian constitution, and a member of the erstwhile ‘untouchable’ caste of India, he negotiated both religious faith and reason by making traditions critical while reconstructing them.”96

However, my propositions here are basically concentrated on academic centres which be-come instruments of and largely have their engagements to form religious public opinion. The state only acts on the secondary level when something becomes a public issue. Therefore, I wish to narrow my engagement with local religions in the public sphere and avoid mixing those with the political scenario in India that includes the State extensively.

3.1 Public Theology

In order to initiate reasoning of religion, I shall start with the proposal of public theology. In reference to the previous parts of my paper, the central theme of which aims at the debate of religion in the public sphere has been mentioned in the Introduction. Here, I shall go into detail what public theology constitutes. On the whole, public theology enables us to engage in discussions about religion that affects our day-to-day lives. This public debate enables us to reason with our religious traditions and beliefs that shape our communitarian and pluralistic world. No conflict based on religion is a remote occurrence but is built on a series of convic-tions and debates that influence or lead to such events. Therefore, public theology has a role to play in building up events which do not lead to destruction but rather to construction. And in the following points I will be able to enumerate different methods that could be considered feasible in making this public theology a possibility.

Julio describes distinctly the public character of theology.

Theology’s presence in the public sphere is not a new theme. For example, a trend like that of liberation theology already comes closer to such a phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is to be ques-tioned how “theology should participate in public life.”99 The plain ideology of merely having a religious voice in the political sphere is not sufficient. In dealing with public theology, Felix Wilfred clearly states that in Asia public theology is more concerned about the public than the-ology itself. Furthermore, such an approach is a suitable one for a religiously pluralistic society in which Christianity does not have its monopoly.

Public theology has its significance to members of all religions. So, when I propose public theology, I refer to the kind of theology that could spring from any religion and has the intention of having its role within the public sphere in order to address issues concerning a pluralistic community. It is important to differentiate the stage of rehearsal and the stage of performance. According to Felix, theology functions as the ‘stage of rehearsal’ and the motivating forces help the individuals to become actors on the stage of performance.101Also, the application of this public theology, principally, is not limited to any community; rather it has the effect of functioning positively within a pluralistic society. “Moreover, in Public Theology we address and interpret the truths of faith in such a way that they become meaningful to people around us. Even Christology could be so interpreted and ex-plained that a person who is not a Christian by religious belonging will find the discourse meaningful.”102

Another important aspect of public theology is associated with the role played by intellectu-als and the responsibility attached to their ability. It is the responsibility of these public intel-lectuals to initiate and discuss the role of religion and its influence in relation to society.

However, it needs to be said that these public intellectuals need to have the necessary sensi-tivity to understand the realities of daily life and the problems of their civic life. This requires them to not limit themselves to paths and members of their faith but to be open to an inclusive horizon.

The resurgence of religion in the public sphere paved way towards concretely developing a crit-ical approach towards religions in general. This sort of approach could only be actualised in a society through an intellectual engagement with religion in the public sphere. Therefore, the need for public theology cannot be denied and should be deemed as a methodology to analyse the religious societal problems.

The following points open up opportunities through which public theology could be made possible and available to people. Undoubtedly, public theology offers more meaning and nu-ance to the presence of religion in case it is misled or misunderstood by both believers and non-believers. It would help them to go into details of religion and its phenomenon so that it could lead to a better understanding of religious practices and its role in society.105

A case study of the street pastors in Britain is an example that shows actions motivated by religious principles are not always destructive but can also be constructive for society. This case study clearly demonstrates that the members of this group of street pastors were motivated by their religion to protect the nightlife of certain members. They offered support and protection from criminal actions that occurs during night time to these members. Though their actions were motivated by their faith, they did not explicitly expose themselves as religious through the use of religious symbols. Moreover, they also took these occasions to engage themselves in the discussion and reasoning of religion with a positive outlook.106

3.2 Critique as a Hermeuneutic Responsibility

What does hermeneutics actually do? One could say that hermeneutics helps one to under-stand. As per the difference between exegesis and hermeneutics, the latter is concerned with the general understanding; whereas exegesis is limited to scriptural texts, especially that of bible. As for my purpose here, it would help to support the understanding of the meaning of objects or reality or the phenomenon of religion. I aim to understand religion within a given context in a manner that constructs our societies.

Hermeneutics also brings together theory and praxis . The initiator of such hermeneutics, es-pecially during the time of romanticism, is Schleiermacher who asserted that he hates all the-ory not born from praxis .109 “Understanding cannot be understood simply by talking about it. Rather, it must become accessible within the horizon of methodical analysis, and this business is the business of reflection.”110

The importance of hermeneutical responsibility is vital as “to understand a tradition is a similar process with understanding a person in a conversation. Thus, hermeneutics can be seen in a dialogical sense, in which we open ourselves, not only to receive the message of other, but in a sense of transforming our consciousness after the contact with him.”111 What does it mean, then, to go beyond hermeneutics in order to understand or interpret religion? Teodor Negru understands Habermas this way:

Why should there be a discussion about a hermeneutic responsibility at all? Owing to the mo-tivational power that religion has, it is a major and important responsibility to interpret this motivational power in order for it to lead towards constructive human societies. The following points concretely brings out on whose shoulder this responsibility falls upon. Habermas has rightly brought this out in his thesis with regard to religion as a basic factor of society. Religion can be said to give meaning to human life in its various situations, which could be impossible otherwise. From this perspective, the interpretative responsibility that it carries is enormous. A religious fundamentalist attitude has at its roots, the undisputed and unopposed teaching of religious leaders. The leader’s word is the highest command for a religious fundamentalist that they would obey unquestioningly. Hermeneutic responsibility here involves an awakening impulse of an individual, especially when inhuman practices like war and violence are being justified by religious writings.

Sadly, if these religious writings are not re-contextualized and re-interpreted, then it would not be possible to reach a newer comprehension of religion. India prides itself on the fact that in spite of outwardly Islamic or Christian influences, it has retained its traditions based on an-cient religious scriptures. Even though it is a matter of pride, it is something that needs further reflection. This attitude projects the stagnation of culture, philosophy and religious thinking which become hurdles to modernity or development114. My propositions outline a renewed un-derstanding of religion and its texts. Considering the fact that religion is part of one’s life and it stands behind everyone’s lifestyle, it is a prerequisite that citizens have a religious education that is critical of one’s faith, beliefs and traditions.

The very example of political elections in India shows how drastically they are based on religion. The major percentage of Indian politics makes oppositions using religion. Moreover, they confuse religion and nationalism by identifying nationalism with religion. Attitudes such as these, unfortunately, affect the very democratic values of the nation. “If we really want to understand the impact of religious nationalism on democratic values, India currently provides a deeply troubling example.”115

The most notorious religious conflict of the generation that shook the nation was the Godhra incident of 2002. The conflict arose between two important religions groups, the Hindus and Muslims. As the local government was a Hindu-led party that showed extreme favouritism towards the members of their religion, they justified the events that occurred. It was one of the nasty political conflicts in the subcontinent and it could be noted that it began as a re-ligion-based communal problem that resulted in the deaths of many. The religious problem arose from the Hindus’ claim that a certain land was the birthplace of a God of theirs, which in the subsequent years went into the ownership of the Muslims. The supposed defilement of one’s God is the basic problem here. This was, however, not observed by the religious leaders who never wanted to have rationalistic conversations about it without favouring extremist at-titudes. On the contrary, they actively supported the prejudices and fuelled the communal feelings that lay beneath it. “Gujarat provides a vivid example of the bad things that can occur when a leading political party bases its appeal on a religious nationalism wedded to ideas of ethnic homogeneity and purity.”116 One could claim that this is an incident that occurred years ago and may not be of relevance today. However, it was proven not to be the case as the Indian Supreme Court has found this time (2020) to pass its verdict on the incident under the political rule of the same political leader who is now the Prime Minister of the country. There are posi-tive claims that at least the issue has been settled; but these claims submerge the fear of whether such prejudiced judgements could affect the nation’s integrity and secular nature.

3.3 Proposition to Initiate Habermasian Principles

This part reflects on the various propositions that are to be made towards the end of my re-search. In order to make the Habermasian principle or the philosophy of religion realistic on the Indian soil, I wish to propose the following areas where it could be done. The following section details how it could be done within a completely religious milieu. There are different areas that could concretely make these principles available. The aim of these proposals is to spread awareness of what is missing in public religion. 3.3.1 Critical Religious Study

“The academic debate on Indian secularism neglects a critical hermeneutics of religion. It highlights India’s spontaneous coexistence and overlapping of religious communities in the light of which secularism de-absolutizes faith and valorises religious pluralism.”117 The reality is that religion is found in almost every educational institute in India based on the managers of these institutions. Christian schools, without a doubt, have regular Christian instructions in most of their institutions. Likewise, the schools managed by Hindus and Muslims also have adopted the same manner. Teaching of religion is part of their private curricula, even if it is not approved by the government officially. Incidentally, local governments have overlooked it and, at the same time, we often hear of school authorities being attacked based on this reality. What is indeed the need of the hour is to introduce a common religious education with a neu-tral language that would accommodate and initiate an analytical approach towards one’s own religion.

If religion plays an important role in the lives of Indians and influences very strongly the political and social lives, then it is in these classrooms that religion has to be discovered in a constructive manner. It is the classroom that could show the path of critique towards religion and its role in the public sphere. Many are apparently afraid that a critical approach towards studying religion would lead Indians to the European fate of religion being highly side-lined. However, this is an attitude that would not give one an opportunity to have a critical outlook towards one’s own faith and religion. Even though, excellence in scientific areas is evident within the Indian society, the real contemporary need of the time is the ability to be critical to-wards one’s beliefs and philosophical approaches to both public and private lives. A real radical religious life comes from a desire to live one’s religion radically. On the contrary, any religious act that goes against one’s religion is not an act of radicalism but the result of ignorance of one’s own religion. Such attitudes can be addressed by having or receiving a critical religious edu-cation. When it comes to religious education in academic centres, especially schools, there is a tendency to introduce scriptural catechetical studies of a particular religion. This, of course, would be of no help towards the development of a critical view. Instead, a study of religion in general without these should be of much value.

The Council of Europe had a position earlier based on the idea of a laity that does not discuss religion as a public issue. This principle considers religion as a private matter that need not re-quire debate on the public level; however, this approach was changed later. A certain space had been created in the council that sought to include studies of religion in its policy with regard to its educational programme. What is to be observed here is the intentionality behind the intro-duction of religious studies into the educational policy. This move was taken after 2002 because the new millennium, undoubtedly, experienced more religious conflicts in pluralistic societ-ies.119 Examples of such incidents are not lacking as well. There have been a lot of stereotypes created through the media leaving no space but to make religious studies a necessary one. “Education is the key way to combat ignorance and stereotypes. School and university cur-ricula should be revised, as a matter of urgency, so as to promote better understanding of the various religions … as an essential part of the history, culture and philosophy of humankind.” (Council of Europe, 1999) This is just a stepping-stone for considering the issue of religion in the modern world. In the later years, especially with the twin tower attack in USA, it became obvious that there is a pressing need to take the matter far more seriously.120

Jackson analyses the type of institutions which express their nostalgic nature by promot-ing older ways and by imparting education based on a single faith. This, he especially delin-eates with regard to Christian education in the schools in Britain. These are called faith-based schools. Nevertheless, there are faith-based schools which are even models of dialogue and create space for the exchange of ideas about various religions. They initiate attitudes which “… respect the voice of the child and maintain a stance of openness to others in society …”. These can be obviously considered as primary steps towards legitimate and inclusive education centres. “The view was advanced that all schools should promote social justice (including reli-gious tolerance), knowledge about religions, the development of pupils’ skills of criticism and independent thinking as well as dialogue and interaction between young people from different backgrounds.”121 Though Jackson’s views are mainly based on a European society – which was beginning to come into terms with multi-ethnicity, cultural and religious set-up – this typol-ogy of religious education is even applicable to the Indian context. A pluralistic atmosphere is obviously not a new situation in India, but what is important is a more conscious academic education about the reality of the societal forms within India.

With regard to religious authorities, I would like to state that in all the religions mainly the priests play a very important role. Whether be it in metropolitan set-up or in a rural set-up, it is the priest who is considered to be the authority for every religion. The important factor is then to analyse how open and ready the religious authorities are to initiate such principles. Religious authorities should have a more principle-oriented attitude rather than an egoistic and power-oriented one. The latter attitude will not allow the authorities to update and check themselves with modernistic thinking in order to contribute to the growth of society. Princi-ples such as ‘emancipation through religion’ and ‘reformation’ apparently will not play a role in their vision if it is limited.

The title of this section on reasoning religion implies a methodology of rationalistic ap-proach towards religion. However, it is to be carefully observed that sometimes reasoning re-ligion is only done with regard to another’s religion and not one’s own. This itself is a form of apology. But in a pluralistic society, reasoning religion implicates reasoning one’s own religion and the formation of a critique of one’s belief systems rather than the Other’s. To cite a part of the Gospel: ‘why do you look at the speck in your brother’s eye when you have log in yours?’ This is actually a logical approach and will, firstly, help in avoiding religious conflicts based on careless comments, which often lead to violence. Secondly, it helps pluralistic communities to grow in a mutual manner by having the shared goal of reasoning religion.

When religious authorities use public forums to make addresses, they are essentially obliged to follow this sort of attitude and duty. As the public sphere forms the thought of the public, an ‘attentive language’ is to be expected wherein the sentiments and emotions of the members of various religions are to be taken into consideration so as not to hurt them. 3.3.3 Centres of Religious Formation

Why do I consider centres of religious formation as important places wherein the Haberma-sian principles could be discussed? It is because we could agree, indubitably, that these centres produce candidates who shape the religious opinion of the believers. India is considered as one of the countries with the highest population of people affiliated to religion. People frequenting religious places, engaging themselves in religious activities, debating religion on social media, engaging in hate-crimes based on religious differences, etc. are not strange activities to the Indian community. These signify the need for the professional propagators of various religions to respond to such incidents using a critical perspective.

Candidates who prepare themselves to be official propagators are to be introduced to a Haber-masian methodology that accommodates a self-critical perspective of one’s own religion. In a religiously pluralistic milieu, these members have the duty to form the religious opinion of their members, thus nourishing a spirit of acceptance and appreciation of pluralism. In order to better direct the religious opinion of their members, they themselves are to be primarily introduced to such methods during the years of their formation. Fortunately, a systematised formation programme is available in many of the religions. But whether a critical study of one’s own religion is also made available is yet to be checked. Nevertheless, here I limit myself to the Christian and Catholic formation centres with regard to such approaches. Do they see the necessity and possibility of such a critical study?

The recent works of Habermas published in 2019 clearly indicates that to understand religion and the way it works within a society, we need to undertake a critical study of religion, and above all, it has to be done from its sociological perspective because it has never grown alone. Even though philosophy has tried to distance itself from religion to follow a secular path, one cannot speak of it without reference to religion. In this manner, Habermas brings out the ra-tionalistic elements of religion, which have been denied by some secularists. Therefore, studies similar to these contribute to the formation of the candidates. 3.3.4 Religious Gatherings as Public Sphere

This research is aimed at presenting a typology of religion in the public sphere that will reason-ably coexist with a healthy religiously pluralistic society. If the case envisages a democratic and religiously pluralistic society, then what follows is the development of a critical study of their contents. Such a study would bring various concrete elements in religious and philosophical texts that would contribute towards the goal. As Maureen points out Habermas’ intention with regard to religion in the public sphere goes beyond Rawls’ ‘proviso’ that allows religious citi-zens to present their reasons in the political field. Though they might be reasonable, they need not be acceptable to other members; thus, they remain in a domain of conflict and are called as “irreconcilable tensions”.124 However, Habermas means “Instead, in view of the entrenchment they cause it is the task of reason to call all sides to self‐reflection and to initiate a process in which antagonistic perspectives can learn from each other.” 125 As per Habermasian inten-tionality, one need not take away religion from the public sphere but adopt it within a newer approach of its existence in society. Naturally one cannot deny its contribution to society, but one cannot also deny the negativity that it endorses occasionally in society.

While contextualizing Habermas within the Indian religious setting, I have mentioned re-ligious spaces as the public sphere. It had been argued that religious space is indeed a public sphere that is often not considered or recognized as it is. As per my result, a rationalistic exis-tence of religion is one of the stages of religion in the public sphere. The debate of religion in the public sphere is obviously a wider field that cannot be just limited to the point of rationality. Other discussions like the political aspect of religion in public sphere refer to its relation to the democratic nature of the state and its secularistic expression. However, this requires another field of discussion beginning from the stage that recognizes the aspect of rationality in religion. It even further leads to discussions such as religious freedom and its political significance and could even concentrate on case studies such as concrete religious conflicts and their analysis in various societies.

The challenge that lies here is to recognize that religious places often form the public opin-ion, sometimes even without being aware of it. It is more obvious in the case of Christianity where the churches are not just places for ritualistic religious practices, but also places where the religious teachings are disseminated verbally. In churches, the scripture is interpreted and spoken to the worshippers on a constant basis when they gather. This is true for Islam and partially true for the Hindu temples as well. In case of Hindu temples, the activity of proclamation of scriptures and their interpretation is not so regular in comparison. However, there is an obvious presence of a number of religious gatherings formed in order to listen to the various freelance gurus – which is again a common occurrence in India. It could also be compared to a number of Christian sects whose pastors gather on regular basis. These reli-gious gatherings, in fact, do not have any purpose in connection to educating its members in their scriptural texts or in leading to discourses pertaining purely to their spiritual interests. Additionally, they include elements and themes that relate to social and political life of the country that are even discussed in vehement tones. These are also example of events that have an apologetic nature, which attract large crowds not only physically but also through the social media.

Religious claims and discourses basically contain a dogmatic authority, which gives them the credibility to certain validity claims. According to Habermas, this sort of dogmatism is inevitable. The authority that these dogmatic principles of religion possess is unquestion-able as they form its very bedrock. These dogmatic claims are given to the religions and is based on their insights on intersubjectivity.127 Consequently, when religious gatherings mix up dogmatism with their exclusive or apologetic interests within a religiously plural-istic society, it leads to the formation of a political public opinion of its adherents which is not limited just to a spiritual realm. Reasons behind such fundamental dogmatism are not easily changeable even when they are confronted with good intentions. Because they form the centrality of a believer’s faith – thus contributing to their basic ethical and moral con-victions – attacking that would be a very difficult task. Nevertheless, it is a reality that takes place in our societies. Therefore, could the postmetaphysical approach not be a challenge to public religion in India?

Through the recognition of rationality of religion, it has become obvious that we are on a safer ground than those before us to further proceed with discussions pertaining to religion. From a European perspective, the discussion on rationality in religion has been a matter of debate ever since the time of Reformation. In the same vein, one cannot deny the pre-existence of a reformative spirit on the Indian soil – which had already been demonstrated through the exposure of the axial age – and not just limit its existence to Europe. However, in Europe this has been gradually capsualized within academic areas. Though this reformative philosophy coupled with the enlightenment history has indeed influenced and led to the freedom struggle movement from colonisers in India, it has gradually disappeared in the following years. Ideas such these could not be further unearthed because of this as well. One of the best examples that I could cite within the Catholic religion is the event of Vaticanum I & II. It has hardly been left out of the seminary classrooms. Their religious gatherings still become centres of promotion of an euphoric religion which neglect the intellectual aspect of religion. Therefore, my research is highly oriented towards the Indian context, which sometimes has to begin from the ground level and this may not be the case for the western societies.

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IV Conclusion – Towards a Critique of Religion

Towards the conclusion of my thesis, I am obliged to take into consideration some of the brutal atrocities based on religion that shook our societies.1 These series of tragic events have trig-gered one of the societies which gave rise to the idea of secularism in the sense of total separa-tion of church and state. One cannot turn a blind eye towards the gruesome attacks motivated by ‘religion’ and the consequent repercussions. Primarily, the research had the objective of a study that was concerned about religion and its role, especially in Indian public sphere. Taking into consideration the current performative character of religion, I felt a need to undertake this study analysing its role and influence in the public sphere.

Therefore, the research is aimed at deepening the knowledge about religion from a socio-phil-osophical perspective through an extensive study of the Habermasian philosophy of religion. Simultaneously, the aim was to conscientise the readers about the importance of recognizing the rational fund that religion possesses. In order to engage in a discourse with this problem, I proposed a Habermasian philosophy of religion as an alternative to the existing conception of religion’s role in the Indian public sphere.

1 Why Habermas?

This research has revolved around the methodology of making the concept of rational religion available and actively present in our civic societies in opposition to what we understand as the fundamentalist or terroristic religion. The expression, ‘rational religion’, is of course not a new approach, rather it has been in usage since the reformative ages, which always concentrated on a rational approach towards religion. However, the difference in my work lies in having found a methodology that analyses how this rational religion could be made a possibility to the pub-lic sphere. To this end, I have used Habermas’ postmetaphysical philosophy that underlies in reasoning with religion.

Habermas, however, bases his critique of religion by placing postsecular societies as a point of reference, ultimately leading it to become a euro-centric perspective, or in other words, a western standpoint. Religion in the non-western world takes up more of an anthropological position and cannot be limited to a sociological or normative interpretation. For instance, Talal Asad’s religion is not just a normative concept but it basically includes the experiences of individuals, which influences their religious attitudes in public.2

Habermas being agnostic is not a suitable agent to address the matters of religion objectively and could be considered as a controversial intellectual. This would perhaps lead to a confusion on our part to place him in any particular category. Firstly, as an agnostic intellectual, he cannot have an access to the opaque nature of beliefs and thus he cannot question the validity of his contribution towards religion. Secondly, he only addresses the issue as an outsider, or as merely an observer who probably may not be in a situation to personally comprehend the religious actions of a religious person. Thus, his contribution could be viewed by the religious sections of society as a deficiency that cannot present a case for religion. Furthermore, when he says that the European society could not be what it is without Judaism and Christianity, he establishes the basic need of religion in society; whereas at the same time, he refuses to be a part of this religion which he esteems as important. This situation was nonetheless clarified by his statement that he is tone-deaf to religion ( religiös unmusikalisch ). Although Habermas is in a position to enlighten religious problems philosophically within the public sphere, it is obvious that the anthropological aspect of religion – which can only be experienced through one’s faith – is not within his competence.

Nevertheless, Habermas remains as an option to make this research relevant in our times, when the power of religion is rapidly increasing both within the secular and non-secular soci-eties. Thus, the exploration of Habermas’ philosophy of religion was demonstrated through the reconstruction of the element of rationality that is overshadowed either by a fundamentalist interpretation of religion or by a highly misunderstood secularism that denies the existence and engagement of religion in society.

As Florian Uhl observes, Habermas’ basic conviction that communicative rationality will substitute religious rationality sooner or later is certainly not his present position. He tends to see more light and positive elements in religion in his later writings.3 In order to arrive at placing religion in a safer area of rationality, the method of reconstructing its rational heredity is vital. This is the reason why this research began primarily by demonstrating the zusammen- wachsen of religion and rationality of society. This, of course, has been basically projected by highlighting the theory of the axial age, which formed one of the foundations of my thesis. In trying to raise awareness about the importance of religion in society, Habermas clearly men-tions that modernity has to reconcile itself with religion, instead of pushing it away or placing it under the roof of the non-rational. Therefore:

Nevertheless, Habermasian methodology is often expressed as rational reconstruction, which was also the steering principle of my research. As Pedersen expresses, Habermas uses this method –

To the western problem of an excessively secularistic attitude and to the Indian problem of excess in religion, this thesis tries to bring about a balanced methodology that could be applied within both contexts. It works equally in a situation where religion is ignored (because it has been falsely accused of its irrationality) through the exposition of its rational inheritance and in a situation where religion leads to communal irrationality through highlighting the history of purifying religion from its irrational practices and approaches.

2 Resurgence of (Negative) Religion

The starting point of my research was to recognize the resurgence of religion in our times. Even in the so-called secular western nations there is an obvious resurgence of religion, which is sometimes expressively visible not only through the increase in the presence of various religions but also through religious terrorism. One might suppose through the emergence of societies distancing themselves from religion that we have passed the age of apologetics. On the contrary, today we see it in various forms and these have been explained through reactionary modernism and militant truth claims.6 These religious apologetics use the public sphere to spread their per-sonal opinions as public opinions. There are scholarly apologetics who lead discussions or invite members of other religions to make their case by defying other religions. Unfortunately, this is not the way to a spirit of dialogue but rather only increases a spirit of agitation.7

History teaches us that similar negative discussions in the past, for example in Christianity, have led to a lot of human misery as well as the persecution and destruction of cultures and histories. So, it is worth questioning whether such apologetic discussions are still valid in our present day world. If a person is truly striving to establish peace through religion, it would be basically important to avoid apologetic discussions and truth claims. Instead, only by basing oneself on the spirit of one’s religion could a profound contribution be made to the society.8

The proposal made by Habermas through postmetaphysics is one that uses such method-ology. It avoids fundamentalist truth claims and enters into a dialogue that occurs through communicative rationality to establish a consensus. Since it is not the prerogative of a single religion to possess the truth, postmetaphysical thinking facilitates the acceptance of other re-ligions with respect. This may not demand one to forsake one’s own religion because each religious group has found its divine expression in its own milieu. Thus, in this manner it also creates space for interreligious dialogue based on philosophical discourse.9

3 Critiquing Public Religion

According to Habermas, the principles of public sphere mandates that one cannot confine religion to a private sphere; rather it occupies a larger space and stage for its performative character to become tangible. This denotes that the private religious experiences and convic-tions are expressed through opinions that shift from a private sphere to a public sphere. By ex-ploring various social organizations such as varna (caste) system in India, this public nature of religion has been established. The fact that every religious gathering or forum moulds various opinions of the members was expressed through the analysis of religious meetings. The opin-ions that arose from such assemblies range from dogmatic religious views to socio-political ideologies. Every religious public sphere can be said to represent the performative character of religion. “Religion is not primarily reflected in a world view, but is embodied in the practice with which the community of believers performatively testifies to the content of their faith.”10While contextualizing Habermas within the Indian religious setting for the purpose of my study – in part one and then towards the end of part five – I have tried to expose this character-istic of religion, which is also its most important element. It could be argued that true religion cannot only be projected in public terms, but it has many other phases, including for example, a personal transcendental experience. However, this is where I limited the scope of my study. With regard to my research, religion that is expressed and visible in the public sphere is what played the central role.

The analysis of religion’s presence in public, especially within the Indian context in compar-ison to the West, has been the revolving idea of my study. Therefore, the core of my argument was to aim at a reasonable and rationalistic religion; particularly, when it makes its public appearance. This naturally involves the role of state that has the responsibility to support it in order to fulfill the principle sarva dharma sambhava (equal respect to all religions).11

My thesis has been an attempt at finding a way for a reasonable religion in public. Therefore, it has required a critical approach to deal with the innate sociological factors of religion and its mechanisms, which is expressed as follows by Habermas, “… because religions are not only absorbed in the cognitive dimension of world views, but were constitutive for the structuring of early socio-cultural forms of life as a whole and have therefore attracted the interest of so-cial theory from the very beginning”.13 Religion at its earlier stage was not just like any other societal element, rather it was the very nucleus of society; it could even be stated that the hu-man society today is a product of religion. All public life has been basically steered by societal norms that have been given the status of sacrality, which in their later phase, has achieved a further status as a seperate entity that preserved these norms. And, thus we have the institution of religion. However, individual transcendental experiences could not be definitely separated from this sphere and they had to become the foundations or sources of authority to religion. Thus, while I do not deny the centrality of transcendality as being the holder of religon, it is important to realise that the composite fusion of the these two elements is the reality of religion today in the public sphere. So, in order to deal with such a reality the Habermasian approach is seemingly fitting and develops a critical standpoint. His approach towards phi-losophy is non-hierarchical and that is important. The dialectical approach is obviously an open approach that allows people to express their views and facilitates various ideas to flow in. It evidently implies a dialogical method that engages itself in the exchange of ideas without sticking to the old models. There is may not be any absolute way; but, at least, the dialogical method allows us to approach and discuss various issues with a spirit of openness. Habermas’ idea of reflective religion has served as an impetus for its application within the Indian context. Well, one might and should ask: which religion in particular? My response to this is that reli-gion in general. The religions that are still the instruments of superstition and pull the masses backward in their societal lives.

4 Genealogy of Religion and Reason through the ‘Axial Age’

The dialectics of Glauben and Wissen mark the mise-en-scène of the intentionality in discov-ering the genealogy of religion and reason. Following the postmetaphysical approach, in order to combat the problem of religion, my study started with an analysis of the Durkheiman un-derstanding of religion. This brought about the results that expose the genealogy of religion contributing to a simultaneous growth of cognitive elements in society. This part disclosed the idea about how one cannot separate religion and society because all societal rationality has emerged from what we call today as religion. Furthermore, in order to support this argument, the concept of religious rationality has been explored through the concept of the axial age. The discussion on the axial age was intended to lay a foundation for understanding the mechanics of postmetaphysical approach to religion. For Habermas, ‘modern reflexive religious belief’ or what he calls as ‘postmetaphysical philosophy’ has its roots in ‘axial intellectual formations’.14By dedicating a large section of a chapter to the axial age, I attempted to demonstrate how religions and their founders strove towards its rationalistic presentation. “Post-metaphysical thinking tends to miss the element that is characteristic of religion and constitutive for a re-ligious understanding of the world, as long as it only looks at the cognitive structures that emerged in the worldview revolution of the Axial Age.”15

Through the investigation of various religious movements, namely prophetic ones like Christian and Buddhist, diverse elements of rationalistic attitudes were exposed. Through a repeated emphasis on reasonable religious practices, whether it is in the Judaic sphere or the Indian context, it has been made clear that the intentionality of the religious founders was far from inhuman fundamentalist and destructive religious notions. They, on the contrary, demanded a reflective exercise of religion based on sound human cognition and reason. Thus, “Axial Age initiates the independence of thinking and reflection”.16 Such an approach is also characterized by its revolutionary thinking as it follows a critical path by questioning basically the existing religious practices. What is more fundamental to recognize here is that Habermas, through his rational reconstruction, tries to find rationality not outside of religion, but within it – and it forms the integral part of the cognitive growth of religion.17

Both Habermas and Benedict see religion as a resource of reason. Because of this, both of them disagree with the modernistic application of reason, which they consider as naïve. In-stead, they open up discussions allowing modernity to consider reason from a broader per-spective.18 The essentiality of comprehending religion that is founded on axial methodology will be further clarified in the following section that considers secularism.

5 Secularization as a Research Programme

Modernity (or modernization) is understood as a process of rising above the existing situation. It helps us to go towards a better functioning of the society and aims for better life situations. However, when modernity does not reach its goals or correspond to such an understanding, then it is to be observed that it is leads us backwards into the past and concentrate on the negative practices of antiquity instead on the betterment of life. If the substance of humanity is at stake owing to religious reasons that are supported by the state, then such reasons are to be questioned.19 Furthermore, the different perspectives of secularism – the Indian and west-ern – also contribute towards analysing the meaning of secularism, which is not anymore Eu-rocentric. Rajeev Bhargava presents Indian secularism in the sense of neutrality, which differs from the western understanding of secularism. Thus, it contributes to extending the horizon of the research programme of secularism beyond the West. “The concepts of secularization and secularity make sense as an analytical framework for a comparative research agenda that aims to examine the historical transformations of all world religions under conditions of modern structural differentiation.”20

This research has moved from the common understanding of the historical event of secular-izing the produce of the church to observing secularization from different perspectives based on the concept of Entzauberung by Hans Joas as well as the analysis of secularism in the light of Taylor’s arguments. These discussions have brought into light how religion could work towards its genuine self. The loss of the sociological meaning of religion and its role in constituting an individual’s self, have been analyzed so as to propose a possibility for regaining the purpose and origin of religion. This part has demonstrated that a critique of religion has not come from outside but rather from within – having its roots already in the prophetic disenchantment – which possesses the capacity for universalizing morality. Thus, it can be said to denote the Habermasian character of self-reflective religion.21

The application of such an approach is not only useful to religious circles; rather it is useful even to the secular public sphere, which becomes the stadium of its (religious) performance. Habermas expresses this universal character through his proposal of an epistemic stance to-wards other religions and the internal logic of secular knowledge and also by acknowledging the priority of secular reasons in politics.22

6 Formative usage of Religious Deposit

Owing to its rational inheritance and contribution to cognitive growth, religious reasons ob-viously function for the growth of society. However, it does not effectuate unconditionally that society employs religion in order to produce constructive results. Therefore, a Habermasian approach towards religion has demonstrated how this rational inheritance of religion could be implemented for public life. It has been exposed centrally through the concept of translation.23It is, however, not a one-to-one translation, but rather a postmetaphysical approach, which encourages us to look for the availability of semantic contents and deposits that could be trans-lated. Consequently, it accommodates the availability of religious content to both religious and non-religious members. In the case of India, it tries to build up concepts that are available and useful to members of all religions, thus becoming a methodology that can prove its function-ality in a religiously pluralistic society. For this purpose, various examples were given from the Indian context, especially in the last section where figures such as Gandhi and members from Brahma Samaj experimented with translation.

By stating that Europe cannot think of its societal moral life without the Judeo-Christian foun-dations, Habermas firmly asserts the vitality of religion. This is the very deposit of religion enjoined with the philosophical contribution. In a similar manner, through my research it has been shown that India is also formed on such religious deposit. Furthermore, to demonstrate the same, an emphasis has been laid on the upanishadic texts owing to their universalistic nature which does not limit them to particular religion. These ancient texts became sacred for the members of the society who grew up with them. Unlike the mythological texts, they concentrate more on the human beings and their constant striving towards a transcendental being. The greatest fund that one can find in the Indian Upanishads is the dictum tattvamasi which means ‘that thou art’. This kind of a realisation has the potential to lift up a human being from all sorts of evil acts in the world and to make him a noble person. This is the great moti-vation principle that it gives to the people. The realization of this dictum is what is required at least for the people of India. Such a realisation can lead to the ousting of evil inclinations like selfishness, discrimination in the name of caste, creed, race, colour, etc. Western understand-ing of religion mainly has to do with its systemisation through the safeguarding of people’s beliefs as proclaimed by an authority. On the other hand, an Indian understanding of religion based on dharma emphasises the need for freedom in worshiping a deity when a person feels the need to do so in accordance to his or her spiritual self. It becomes more a free worship (without any rules for it) in that case.

Therefore, lastly, a critical study of religion surely allows one to understand the concept of God and religion’s genesis in the human society. Such a critical study done with the help of sociologists will enlighten even a religious-minded person to see through the perils of funda-mentalism. A reflective critical study of religion will enable them to have an open discussion about areas pertains to religion. That will always leave a room for productive scepticism to-wards what is considered the absolute truths of religions. This research thus further opens up the problem in order to question whether a critical perspective of religions is available in the Indian society. It also questions religious education and whether it allows one to be critical towards of one’s own beliefs and traditions.

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V BIBLIOGRAPHY

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VI GLOSSARY

1.Advaita Single; p. 214

2. AhimsaNon-violence; p. 380

3.BhagvadgitaA Hindu Scripture and mythological narrative; p. 514. BrahmaThe Absolute; p. 265

5.BrahminsPriestly class; p. 66

6.DalitA member of Indian society placed into the lower clas-sification of caste system; p. 22

7.Dharma(s)The Indian word to represent the western concept of Religion; p. 49, p. 381

8.MayaIllusion; p. 214

9.PuranasMythic texts; p. 62

10.RamarajyaKingdom of Rama; p. 377

11.Sarva dharma sambhavaEqual respect to all religions; p. 120

12. Sanatana dharmaEternal religion; p. 52

13.SatyaTruth; p. 378

14. Tat tvam asiThat thou art; p. 262

15.UpanishadAncient Indian philosophico-religious texts; p. xvi

16. VarnaCaste; p. 64

17. VedasAncient Indian Religious Texts; p. 170